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INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago, an article about legal constraints on scien-
tific inquiry would have been a most unlikely enterprise. From
the nation's inception in a period of enlightenment, optimism, and
faith in science, to the mid-1960's, science enjoyed widespread
public support and esteem.' The nation welcomed the advances
in health, safety, and comfort ushered in by developments in fields
such as medicine, chemistry, and geology, while our imaginations
were captured by discoveries in space, atomic theory, and flight.
The first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo gave some pause, but
the atom seemed a single genie let out of a single bottle. If the
genie could not be put back in, perhaps it could be tamed, or at
least kept quiet.
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. J.D., 1974, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley.
** UCLA School of Law, Class of 1983.
*** UCLA School of Law, Class of 1984.
We gratefully acknowledge the encouragement and ideas of Robert Sinsheimer
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1. E.g., B. HINDLE, THE PURSUIT OF SCIENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA
1735-1789, at 381-92 (1956); T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
(1801); D. PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE (1965) (continuing prestige and influence
of science); Delgado & Millen, God, Galileo and Government: Toward Constitutional
Protectionfor Scientoc Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349, 354-61 (1978) (early faith in
science).
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In the late 1960's, all that changed. Prompted by concerns
over a deteriorating environment, weapons research, and the spec-
ter of genetic engineering, and heightened by a growing percep-
tion of science and scientists as parts of an amoral, if not immoral,
Establishment that must be rendered sensitive to the wishes of the
citizenry, a new mood, much more critical of institutional science,
developed. 2 In the last ten years alone, we have seen calls to ban-
ish weapons research from university campuses, 3 to stop or se-
verely curtail recombinant DNA research, 4 to discontinue
investigation into race-based differentials in IQ,5 to block study
into the causes and solutions of inner-city violence, 6 to cease test-
ing and exploring the XYY syndrome and its connection with de-
linquency,7 and a virtual prohibition on research with human fetal
material.8 Research with human subjects has come to be closely
regulated,9 and scientists in some areas have seen their work sub-
jected to secrecy regulations imposed by the government.' 0 Scien-
tists who have pursued lines of inquiry perceived as "sensitive" or
disfavored have complained that they were denied promotions,
tenure, or grant money by conservative, or cautious,
administrators. "1
2. See infra notes 3-11, 48 and accompanying text.
3. The University of California, for example, which operates a major nuclear
weapons research facility at Livermore, California, has been under continual pressure
by students, peace groups, and some faculty and alumni to cease operating the facil-
ity. See, e.g., Bleifer, Berkeley anti-nuke protest ends in police scuffle- 95 arrested,
UCLA Daily Bruin, Jan. 25, 1983, at 3, col. 3; Mar, Military connection to UC lab
assailed, UCLA Daily Bruin, Apr. 13, 1983, at 6, col. 4.
4. See infra notes 123-26, 167-70 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 54-93 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Hodson, Reflections Concerning Violence and the Brain, 9 CRIM. L.
BULL. 684 (1973) (criticizing suggested use of brain surgery to control violent individ-
uals); Hastings Center Rep., Apr. 1979, at 2 ("In Brief') (psychosurgery on prisoners
and mental patients); Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?"
"Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616,
633-38 (1972) (drug therapy to control violent inmates at medical facility).
7. See People v. Yukl, 83 Misc. 2d 364, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1975) (evidence of
XYY condition inadmissible to negate criminal responsibility); Culliton, Patients'
Rights. Harvard is Site ofBattle over Xand Y Chromosomes, 186 SCIENCE 715 (1974);
Powledge, The XYY Man: Do Criminals Really Have Abnormal Genes? Sci. DIGEST,
Jan. 1976, at 33.
8. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
10. Clearance Confusion after DOD Clampdown, 122 Sci. NEWS 180 (1982); Pe-
terson, A Question of Free Speech, 122 Sci. NEWS 396 (1982); Remote Censoring
DOD Blocks Symposium Papers, 122 Sci. NEWS 148 (1982).
11. See Delgado & Millen, supra note 1, at 351-52 and sources cited therein;
Sociobiology" A New Theory of Behavior, TIME, Aug. 1, 1977, at 54 (sociobiologist
denied tenure). Teaching of certain scientific topics has also come under attack. Fun-
damentalist religious groups have demanded "equal time" and textbooks for the
teaching of Creationism rather than Darwinian evolution. See 121 Sci. NEWS 12, 20,
44 (1981); 122 Sci. NEWS 27, 358 (1982).
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It seems a virtual certainty that a scientist's right to pursue
controversial research free from excessive official intrusion will be
tested in court in the near future. Stephan Toulmin, one of the
leading philosophers of science of our time, predicts a Supreme
Court decision within ten years. 12 Thomas Emerson believes the
decision will be written in first amendment terms. 13 At least six
law review articles have addressed the subject.' 4 Most conclude
that science is, or should be, protected by the first amendment.' 5
Much of this early writing on the status of science under the
Constitution, while useful in raising the issue for discussion, is
nevertheless of limited value because it overlooks the multiform
nature of science and the context-dependent variousness of the
first amendment. Given the complexity of both the analytical in-
strument and the subject to which it is likely to be applied, it
seems safer to begin not with broad generalization, but more nar-
rowly. This Article, accordingly, explores a single aspect of the
scientific-governance question-the permissibility of state action
forbidding or discouraging the pursuit of new scientific knowledge
on the ground that it is inopportune.' 6 For concreteness, the Arti-
cle uses as illustration proposals to forbid or discourage research
12. Toulmin, The Research and the Public Interest, in RESEARCH WITH RECOMBI-
NANT DNA 101 (1977) ("I . . . would predict that a case raising this question will
probably reach the Supreme Court sometime during the next fifteen years or so, and
that the Court will probably decide that freedom of speech does, at least in general
terms, embrace freedom of scientific inquiry."). Id. at 103.
13. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 746 (1977).
14. Delgado & Millen, supra note 1; Favre & McKinnon, The New Prometheus.
Will Scientific Inquiry be Bound by the Chains of Government Regulation?, 19 DUQ. L.
REV. 651 (1981); Ferguson, Scientfic Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL
L. REV. 639 (1979); Lederberg, The Freedoms and the Control of Science. Notes from
the Ivory Tower, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 596 (1972); Robertson, The Scientist's Right to
Research. A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1978); Note, Considera-
tions in the Regulation of Biological Research, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1420 (1978). See
also infra note 174 and sources cited therein (articles and notes dealing with control of
particular types or areas of scientific inquiry); Limits of Scientfic Inquiry, DAEDALUS,
Spring 1978.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 175-81.
16. The term "inopportune science" seems to have been coined by Robert Sin-
sheimer. See Sinsheimer, The Presumptions of Science, DAEDALUS, Spring 1978, at 23
("Can there be 'forbidden'-or, as I prefer, 'inopportune' knowledge? . . the posses-
sion of which, at a given time and stage of social development, would be inimical to
human welfare . : . ?"). See also M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, BIOETHICS AND LAW
62-63 (1981) ("Is There Knowledge We Shouldn't Have?"); Smith, Scienific Knowl-
edge and Forbidden Truths, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1978, at 33. David Smith
believes some knowledge can be untimely for a society not mature enough to absorb
it. It would be destructive, he states, to make a child aware of sexual perversity or to
tell a seriously ill person of his or her condition immediately. Other knowledge can
be destructive if it is "incompatible with the very being of a person." Id. at 34 (citing
the example of virtues such as humility and spontaneity that are destroyed by their
bearers' knowledge of them). Some scientific truths, according to Smith, may be in-
[Vol. 31:128
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into possible race-based differentials in intellectual endowment, orIQ. 17
The regulation of science asserted to be inopportune was se-
lected for two reasons. First, the charge that certain areas of in-
quiry should not be pursued because they portend knowledge that
is unwise to have is important in its own right; such charges are
being heard with increasing frequency and in connection with a
widening range of scientific activities.' 8 Second, the problem is
significant for what it illuminates-it pits strong scientific-freedom
claims against powerfully emotive, broad-ranging, but diffuse so-
cial interests. It may someday prove the analog of obscenity: the
issue that finally crystallizes first amendment thinking and causes
it to fall into place.
The Article begins in Part I by describing the IQ controversy
in some detail. Part II reviews the ways in which race-based IQ
research can be regulated or discouraged. The third and fourth
parts identify the individual and social interests at stake in the IQ
controversy and evaluate them in light of constitutional and com-
mon law doctrine. We conclude that a court entertaining a chal-
lenge brought by an IQ researcher whose work is blocked by
official action will probably find that a fundamental right has been
infringed, but that the state interest supporting the regulation may
be compelling. In Part V, the Article considers a range of means
by which the state's interest in avoidance of the harms of race-
based IQ research may be promoted while infringing as little as
possible on protected liberty.
I. HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE RACE-IQ
CONTROVERSY
Theories attributing group differences in intellect to innate
factors have a long history. In the Republic, Socrates proposed
opportune for society for much the same reasons-confronting them weakens a social
trait or value that we prize.
We use "inopportune" in Sinsheimer's sense alone, meaning knowledge the mere
possession of which by human beings is, or could be, detrimental to their well-being.
Physical danger created by the research or its results is not an essential part of the
"inopportune" concept.
17. IQ (intelligence quotient) is "a number used to express the apparent relative
intelligence of a person determined by dividing his mental age as reported on a stan-
dardized test by his chronological age and multiplying by 100." WEBSTER'S NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 595 (1980). Mental age is the average age of all test-takers
who earned the same score as a given person. See infra text accompanying notes
19-107 (describing debate over IQ tests).
18. See, e.g., M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 16, at 62-63. ("inopportune"
charges leveled at recombinant DNA research, research into human genetics, research
attempting to make contact with intelligent extraterrestrials, and research designed to
control the aging process).
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that rulers teach the myth that God fashioned thinkers, workers,
and soldiers according to their differing metallic compositions.
Once sorted, the members of these classes must be kept separate,
for prophecy foretold the destruction of the state should brass and
iron children be permitted to mingle with golden people, the
rulers. 19
The myth of the metals was a product of Plato's political phi-
losophy and metaphysics. Its purpose was to win acceptance for
an innovative, anti-egalitarian system of government on the
ground that such a government would be balanced, or "just."
Plato did not teach that the myth was literal truth;20 only that the
masses should be taught it so that they would accept their assigned
stations in life. Only relatively recently has it been asserted that
group-based differences in innate intellect are scientifically
provable.2'
A. Early Origins: Race-IQ Theories at the Turn of the
Century 22
At the turn of the century, America's rush into industrialism
resulted in a number of problems-overcrowding, industrial mo-
nopoly, labor unrest, the need to absorb large numbers of immi-
grants-as the country rapidly changed from a rural to an urban
19. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 106-07 (F. Cornford ed. 1978).
20. When asked whether the myth would be believed, Socrates responds: "Not
in the first generation; but their sons and descendants might . . . and finally the rest
of mankind." Id. at 107.
At least one modem student of heredity seems to have regarded Socrates' myth
as a precursor of an important discovery. H. EYSENCK & L. KAMIN, THE INTELLI-
GENCE CONTROVERSY 12 (1981) (Eysenck's description of myth as Plato's contribu-
tion to "the distinction between nature [heredity] and nurture (environment]" and as
an early statement favoring genetic causes over environmental ones). But cf. K. PoP-
PER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES: THE SPELL OF PLATO (5th ed. 1959). In
view of historical evidence of Athenian society,
the holistic and anti-equalitarian interpretation of justice in the Repub-
lic was an innovation, and . . . Plato attempted to present his totalitar-
ian class rule as 'just' while people [in Athenian society] meant by
'justice' the exact opposite ....
Why did Plato claim, in the Republic, that justice meant inequality if,
in general usage, it meant equality? . . . [Tihe only likely reply seems
to be that he wanted to make propaganda for his totalitarian state by
persuading the people that it was the 'just' state.
Id. at 92.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 54-93 (controversy generated by recent
assertions of certain scientists that there are demonstrable, physically-based differ-
ences in intellect between whites and blacks).
22. This section traces the development in the United States of the idea that there
exist differences in intelligence among the races. For an examination of the European
antecedents of the race-IQ movement, see B. EVANS & B. WAITES, IQ AND MENTAL
TESTING, AN UNNATURAL SCIENCE AND ITS SOCIAL HISTORY 1-7 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as B. EVANS & B. WAITES, IQ MENTAL TESTING].
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society. 23 The Progressive movement, a reform movement of the
time, turned to social science for assistance in coping with these
problems.24 Darwin had transformed scientific thinking about the
natural sciences. Progressive social scientists hoped to apply his
evolutionary theory to human institutions in the belief that it
would bring efficient management to society just as it had brought
success to science and technology. 2
5
One key problem confronting society during the late 1800's
and early 1900's was the educational system. The enrollment in
Eastern urban schools, particularly, swelled with non-English
speaking immigrant children from the poorest socio-economic
groups in southern and eastern Europe. 26 Educators had to con-
tend with seemingly wide differences of ability between old stock
American children and the new immigrant stock. In 1909 Leo-
nard Ayers, a prominent educator, published a study of the school
problem, maintaining that, on the average, thirty-three percent of
public pupils were "retarded"-over age for their grade-and un-
able to learn.27 Ayers concluded that schools were squandering
funds in educating repeaters. 28 During this same period, psychol-
ogists were developing the early IQ tests.29 Educators saw these
tests as a scientific means of sorting out students, and thus avoid-
ing the wasteful allocation of educational resources to those un-
able to learn. 30
23. See W. BEAN & J. RAWLS, CALIFORNIA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 285-96
(1973).
24. R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 131-72 (1956). Hofstadter explains
that the force behind this reform movement was the middle class's aspiration to
regain the influence it had before the rise of the corporations. Their movement was
carried out under the banner of terms like ';patriotism, citizen, democracy, law, charac-
ter, conscience . . . terms redolent of the sturdy Protestant Anglo-Saxon moral [char-
acter]." Id. at 318.
25. Id. at 181-84, 242. See also R. CALLAHAN, EDUCATION AND THE CULT OF
EFFICIENCY 1-5 (1962).
26. Id. at 14-15.
27. L. AYERS, LAGGARDS IN OUR SCHOOLS 3 (1909).
28. Id. at 3-5; R. CALLAHAN, supra note 25, at 15-18.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 31-34, 37 (early development and use of
IQ tests).
30. Within the testing movement, two beliefs central to Progressive thought-the
supremacy of Anglo-Saxon values, and belief in science-coalesced. The proponents
of testing also drew strength from advocates of the eugenics movement of the period
who attributed traits and behaviors such as murder, prostitution, and laziness to in-
nate intelligence and "the nature of one's germplasm." Karier, Testing for Order and
Control in the Corporate Liberal State, in THE IQ CONTROVERSY 339, 344-45 (N.
Block & G. Dworkin eds. 1976).
The American eugenic movement has origins much earlier than the turn of the
century. See generally S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 30-112 (1981) (summa-
rizing scientific efforts during the first half of the nineteenth century to correlate brain
weight with intelligence). See also J. HALLER, JR., OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION:
SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF RACIAL INFERIORITY, 1859-1900 (1971); W. STANTON,
19831
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B. IQ Controversy in the Twenties
Entry of the United States into World War I created the need
for a means to select personnel qualified to be military officers.
The American Psychological Association, through its president,
Robert Yerkes, offered to test the mental capacity of recruits for
the United States Army. The Army accepted the offer and tested
more than 1.7 million recruits for IQ.31 For several decades fol-
lowing, the data from these tests became the principal source of
information concerning occupational, ethnic, racial, and geo-
graphic differences in mental ability in the United States.3
2
Analyzing the Army data, psychologist Lothrop Stoddard an-
nounced that "[t]he average mental age of Americans was about
fourteen. '33 Using the same data, C.C. Brigham drew compari-
sons of test scores among ethnic groups. He found that native and
Nordic European draftees were intellectually superior, and ex-
pressed concern about the inferior genes of Mediterranean, Al-
pine, and black races. Brigham's studies and those of other
psychologists proved influential in Congress' passage of the 1924
National Origins Act which reduced the quota of Alpine and
southern European immigrants.
34
The Army test results attracted the support of popular writers
associated with the eugenics movement who saw in the data evi-
dence for their belief that improving conditions and education
would only encourage the survival of weak elements in the gene
pool.35 The tests also attracted criticism. In 1922, in a series of six
articles in the New Republic, 36 Walter Lippmann questioned
whether IQ tests measured intelligence, whether intelligence was
THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS (1960) (scientific attitudes toward race in America,
1815-1859). In a yet unpublished article, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp of the Has-
tings College of Law argues that the genetic determinism that dominated social sci-
ence in the last part of the nineteenth century serves in part to explain the law of race
relations during the period. See H. Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation
Before Brown (Feb. 1983) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
31. Haney, Validity, Vaudeville, and Values: A Short History of Social Concerns
Over Standardized Testing, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1021, 1021-25 (1981).
32. Id.
33. I. STODDARD, THE REVOLT AGAINST CIVILIZATION (1922).
34. The Army data were cited repeatedly in congressional reports submitted by
eugenics advocates which led to the passage of the "national origin quotas" which
significantly reduced immigration by southern and eastern Europeans. E.g., Europe
as an Emigrant-Exporting Continent and the United States as an Immigrant-Receiv-
ing Nation, 1924: Before the House Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1311 (1924) (report of H. H. Laughlin).
35. See generally L. KAMIN, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF IQ 15-30 (1974);
Karier, supra note 30, at 348.
36. Lippmann, The Mental Age ofAmericans The Mystery of the 'A " Men; The
Reliability of IQ Tests; The Abuse of the Tests; Tests of Hereditary Intelligence; A Fu-




fixed by heredity, and whether inherited intelligence accounted
for racial and ethnic differences in IQ. Lippmann's opponent in
the debate was Lewis Terman, the developer of the Stanford-Binet
test. Terman, like other IQ testers, contended that intelligence
was simply that which the tests measured. 37 Lippmann responded
that the questions contained in the tests were essentially arbitrary
and reflected the tester's biases.
38
While conceding that the 'tests could be useful to school ad-
ministrators in predicting school performance, 39 Lippmann was
concerned about the ways in which the tests could harm the chil-
dren tested. A bright child with a score depressed by poverty or
inadequate education might be led to believe that he or she was
inferior and predestined to lack of achievement. Unsophisticated
or prejudiced school administrators could use the test scores to
justify reduced efforts to educate children identified as slow learn-
ers.40 Terman, for example, proposed that children scoring below
70 be counseled to become unskilled laborers; those scoring be-
tween 70 and 115, skilled laborers or clerical workers; and those
scoring over 115, members of a profession. He also advocated a
differentiated ("tracked") school curriculum corresponding to the
pupils' IQ scores.
41
Lippmann attacked Terman's views for ignoring the impact
of environmental influences upon a child's development.
Terman's own studies indicated that intellectual growth is greatest
in the early years, yet his observations began with the testing of
four-year-olds. Terman was thus criticized for "discuss[ing] he-
redity in schoolchildren before study[ing] the education of in-
fants. '' 42 Lippman also took issue with Brigham's assertion that
inherited intelligence accounted for IQ differences among the
Army recruits. Brigham had overlooked that many of the immi-
grant recruits had little or no formal education.43 Lippmann con-
cluded that IQ scores represented "an unanalyzed mixture of
native capacity, acquired habits and stored up knowledge" 44 and
were only helpful to demonstrate a child's internalization or lack
37. See Terman, The Great Conspiracy, in THE IQ CONTROVERSY 30, 36-37 (N.
Block & G. Dworkin eds. 1976).
38. Lippmann, The Mystery of the "A"Men, supra note 36, at 9-11.
39. Lippmann, The Reliability ofIQ Tests, supra note 36, at 17.
40. Lippmann, The Abuse ofIQ Tests, supra note 36, at 19-20.
41. See L. TERMAN, INTELLIGENCE TESTS AND SCHOOL REORGANIZATION 27-28
(1923). See also L. TERMAN, INTELLIGENCE OF SCHOOL CHILDREN 268-90 (1919).
42. Lippmann, ,4 Futurefor the Tests, supra note 36, at 27.
43. Lippmann, A Defense of Education, 106 CENTURY ILLUSTRATED MAG. 95,
99-103 (1923). Lippmann criticized Brigham for "assuming" that the tests measured
intelligence. "[Tihere is no law compelling professors to assume the very thing which
they set out to prove." Id. at 103.
44. See Lippmann, A Futurefor the Tests, supra note 36, at 28-29.
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of internalization of Anglo-Saxon values.45 The notion that intel-
ligence is genetically fixed could "produce nothing but discredit
for psychology, fatalism and paralysis in the schools, injustice in
society, and unnecessary despair or an unwarranted conceit"
46
among the "exponents of the New Snobbery.
'47
C. Revival of the IQ Controversy in the Sixties and Seventies
By the late 1960's, a track system similar to that proposed by
Terman and others had become commonplace in American public
schools. Nevertheless, American attitudes toward the assumptions
and conclusions of these early behavioral scientists had changed.
With the Vietnam War, the arms race, and the discovery of the
hazards of pollution, the nation's faith in science had been shaken.
Terms like "the machine," "the establishment," and "the system"
reflected a growing skepticism of science as an instrument for so-
cial advancement. 48 Thus, educational tracking and the pur-
ported scientific theory on which it was based came under attack.
In Hobson v. Hansen 4 9 Judge Skelly Wright found that tracking
locked disadvantaged children into their socio-economic class,
and set up a self-fulfilling prophecy in which students with low
IQs performed poorly in school because their teachers and parents
expected them to fail.50
More optimistic theories of intellectual development were
also subject to criticism. Earlier in the decade, as the condition of
blacks became a national issue, Piaget's views on the role of expe-
rience in intellectual growth 51 had gained favor and formed the
45. Testers, as a profession, have been accused of being servants of corporate
capitalism. See Karier, supra note 30, at 339.
46. Lippmann, A Defense of Education, supra note 43, at 103.
47. Lippmann, A Futurefor the Tests, supra note 36, at 29.
Lippman also foretold that the testers themselves would be the long run benefi-
ciaries of claims that the tests measured innate capacity. See id, supra note 36, at 28.
Mental testing is today a multi-million dollar business. Karier, supra note 30, at 362.
Mental testers have also been accused of being servants of the 'corporate liberal state,'
id. at 339; but, as Cronbach explains, though there may be "a natural affinity between
their ideas and a hierarchically organized, differentiated society, testers worked with
the social structure, not for it." Cronbach, Five Decades of Public Controversy Over
Mental Testing, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST I, 13 (1975).
48. For an examination of the ambiguous role science has played in American
thought during this period, see Marx, Reflections of the Neo-Romantic Critique of Sci-
ence, DAEDALUS, Spring 1978, at 61. See also supra note 3 and accompanying text;
M. HORWITCH, CLIPPED WINGS: THE AMERICAN SST CONFLICT (1982).
49. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
50. Id. at 491.
51. J. Piaget is a leading twentieth-century cognitive psychologist. His work in-
cludes CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD (1960); JUDGMENT AND REASONING IN
THE CHILD (1962); LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF THE CHILD (1962); CHILD'S CON-
CEPTION OF PHYSICAL CAUSALITY (1972); CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD
[Vol. 31:128
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theoretical basis of the Headstart Program.5 2 As his views became
accepted, new methods were sought to stimulate intellectual
growth through enrichment of the child's environment. By the
late sixties, however, evidence began to surface indicating that the
Headstart Program was not producing the expected and desired
results. Most agreed that the program had been too hastily and
ambitiously drawn. 53 Nevertheless, the lack of consensus among
scientists and educators regarding the relative merits of tracked
education and programs such as Headstart provided the condi-
tions for a vigorous revival of the heredity-environment dispute
begun fifty years earlier.
1. The Controversy Surrounding Arthur Jensen
In 1969 Arthur Jensen published an article which revived the
environmentalist debate. 54 The article began: "Compensatory
education has been tried and it apparently has failed." 55 The
Berkeley psychologist reviewed evidence indicating that differ-
ences in IQ and scholastic aptitude within the white population
could be attributed in large measure to genetic inheritance. But
the statement that sparked controversy was the suggestion that it
was "not [an] unreasonable hypothesis that genetic factors are
strongly implicated in the average Negro-white intelligence
difference."
56
No one contested Jensen's finding that blacks scored on the
average one standard deviation 57 lower than whites. But the leap
from evidence concerning heritability of IQ scores within popula-
tions to the suggestion that there were intelligence differences
among populations created a national furor.58 Many social scien-
(1975); THE CHILD AND REALITY (1976). Piaget generally stressed the manner in
which a child's mental capacities develop through interaction with the world.
52. Some environmentalists believe that relatively small environmental depriva-
tions or enrichments could produce large, long-lasting effects. The early Headstart
programs were based on this belief. See Cronbach, supra note 47, at 2. A federally
funded preschool program, Headstart was designed to prepare disadvantaged chil-
dren for school.
53. Id; Smith & James, The Effects of Preschool Education. Some American and
British Evidence, 1 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 223-40 (1975).
54. Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as IQ and Scholastic Achievement].
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 82.
57. Standard deviation is a measure of spread, a statistical device used to de-
scribe how slowly or rapidly particular distributions thin out in either direction from
their mean, or average. The standard deviation of most commonly used IQ tests is
about 16. D. KRECH & R. CRUTCHFIELD, ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 547 (1961).
58. Jensen's article created much debate in the popular as well as academic press.
Observers note that in the 1969-1970 Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, twelve
out of fifteen items related to testing dealt with Jensen's article. See Haney, supra
note 31, at 1025.
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tists feared that any appearance of support for Jensen's views by
the scientific community would simply strengthen pernicious ra-
cial and ethnic prejudices.59 Others hailed Jensen as a courageous
investigator who dared to entertain a controversial hypothesis.
60
As in Lippmann's debate with Terman, the revived contro-
versy revolved around three issues:61 the validity of mental tests
as measures of intelligence, the heritability of intelligence, and the
existence of IQ differences among racial and ethnic groups. Jen-
sen's hypothesis added a further element to the debate, however:
a correlation 62 between IQ and occupational attainment.63 Jensen
observed that persons with similar IQ share similar socioeconomic
standing regardless of their race.64 Racial identity is thus unnec-
essary to explain achievement and social status. Innate ability
acts as a "natural assorting process" within a hierarchy of occupa-
tions.65 Positing that intelligence is highly heritable,66 Jensen ar-
59. Jerry Hirsch, a geneticist, editorialized: "It perhaps is impossible to exagger-
ate the importance of the Jensen disgrace, for which we must all now share responsi-
bility. It has permeated both science and the universities, and hoodwinked large
segments of government and society. Like Vietnam and Watergate, it is a contempo-
rary symptom of serious affliction." Hirsch, Jensenism." The Bankruptcy of "Science"
Without Scholarship, 25 EDUC. THEORY 3, 3-4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hirsch,
Jensenism." The Bankruptcy of Science].
60. See, e.g., Vernon, Book Review, 15 CONTEMP. PSYCHOLOGY 161 (1970) ("I
would applaud Jensen for his courage in bringing these problems out into the
open. ... )
61. See, e.g., P. VERNON, INTELLIGENCE: HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT vii
(1979) (despite 50 years of controversy over IQ testing, "it is doubtful that any of the
protagonists have ever been persuaded to change their views."). Some contemporary
observers charge that the debate persists today in part because of the socio-political
consequences entailed in any resolution. See B. EVANS & B. WAITES, IQ AND
MENTAL TESTING 189 (1981) (proponents of race-IQ differences, in some cases, desire
to show that lack of upward mobility of blacks is understandable and not a sign of
discrimination).
62. "Correlation" is a statistical term that describes the extent to which two sets
of data behave similarly. H. WALKER & J. LEV, ELEMENTARY STATISTICAL METH-
ODS 161-75, 257-64 (1958). Correlation does not necessarily imply a causal
relationship.
63. Many of Jensen's writings are summarized in Jensen, The Current Status of
the IQ Controversy, 13 AUSTL. PSYCHOLOGY 7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The Cur-
rent Status].
64. Id. For Jensen, black-white correlations between IQ and status extend be-
yond occupation to include areas of deviance such as criminality and delinquency.
Id. at 17.
65. See IQ and Scholastic Achievement, supra note 54, at 14-15. For the environ-
mentalist's response, see, e.g., Lewontin, Race and Intelligence, in THE I.Q. CONTRO-
VERSY, supra note 30, at 78; Scarr, From Evolution to Larry P, or What Shall We Do
About IQ Tests?, 2 INTELLIGENCE 325, 339 (1978).
66. Jensen's evidence is drawn largely from analysis of kinship data. Based on
these data he concludes that between 50 and 80 percent of IQ variance is attributable
to variance in genotypes, and that this variance implies a correlation of .80 to .90
between IQ and genotype. See The Current Status, supra note 63, at 12-14. Several
of Jensen's critics have pointed out, however, that some of Jensen's data are drawn
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gued that "reallocating existing socioeconomic and educational
...advantages or disadvantages will not produce any apprecia-
ble change in the rank order of individuals or group[s] .... 67
Critics discounted Jensen's argument, pointing out that une-
qual distribution of educational privileges, wealth, and power
made Jensen's posited natural sorting process illusory.68 Environ-
mentalists did not deny the significance of genetic factors for ex-
plaining differences in human behavior, nor that variances in IQ
within populations are, in part, genetic. They took issue, however,
with Jensen's proposition that genetic differences along racial lines
account for white-black differences in IQ and occupational
achievement. 69 Some even questioned whether such a proposition
could ever be established or refuted.
70
from the studies of Sir Cyril Burt, which are now widely believed to be fraudulent.
See, e.g., H. EYSENCK & L. KAMIN, supra note 20, at 98-105. See also Hechinger,
Further Proof that tQ. Data Were Fraudulent, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1979, at C4, col.
4. See infra Part IVF (Social Disutility of Race-IQ Research).
67. The Current Status, supra note 63, at 25.
68. Karier, supra note 30, at 355-56.
69. Jensen's principal critics include Richard Lewontin, Leon Kamin, Sandra
Scarr-Salapatek, and Jerry Hirsch.
Lewontin, a geneticist, reviewed Jensen's evidence for a black-white difference in
IQ and found it inconclusive and "irrelevant." Lewontin, supra note 65, at 89. Jen-
sen's "fundamental error," according to Lewontin, was "to confuse heritability of a
character within a population with heritability of the differences between two popula-
tions." Id. Columbia psychology professor Leon Kamin also attacked Jensen's meth-
odology and argued that IQ tests serve principally to legitimize the low status of racial
minorities in the hierarchy of occupational status, i.e., they operate as instruments of
social control. Kamin, supra note 35, at 2; Kamin, Heredity, Intelligence, Politics, and
Psychology.- I, in THE IQ CONTROVERSY, supra note 30, at 242. Sandra Scarr-Sala-
patek, although agreeing with Jensen that genes influence IQ, argued that the black
environment constituted a separate subculture that did not share the same socioeco-
nomic qualities as white culture. The tests, according to Scarr-Salapatek, are valid
predictors of a person's capacity to succeed, but only in the culture in which the tests
were designed-in most circumstances, white culture. Scarr, supra note 65, at 338-39;
Scarr-Salapatek, Race, Social Class, and IQ, in EDUCATING THE DISADVANTAGED
1971-1972 198 (E. Flaxman ed. 1973). Geneticist Jerry Hirsch labelled the question of
whether heredity or environment was more important a pseudo-question. Hirsch, Be-
havior-Genetic Analysis and Its Biosocial Consequences, in THE IQ CONTROVERSY,
supra note 30, at 156, 171-73.
70. See, e.g., Hirsh, supra note 69, at 172-73.
The controversy made Jensen's name a household word. For contrasting views
on the popular attention paid to Jensen, compare Hirsch, Jensenism: The Bankruptcy
ofScience, supra note 59, at 3-5 (highly critical of Jensen), with Cronbach, supra note
47, at 3-5, 12-13 (Jensen a victim of the media response to his ideas). Some critics
charged that he became enthralled by the spotlight, see Cronbach, supra note 47, at 5,
that he had lost his sense of balance and become doctrinaire. Id. See also Ramey &
Haskins, Early Education, Intellectual Development and School Performance: A Reply
to Arthur Jensen and J Mclver Hunt, 5 INTELLIGENCE 41, 46 (1981); Ramey & Has-
kins, The Modification ofIntelligence Through Early Experience, 5 INTELLIGENCE 5,
16-17 (1981) (specialized programs do promote development of mental ability in pre-
school children). But see Jensen, Raising the IQ: The Ramey and Haskins Study, 5
UCL4 LAW REVIEW
2. Proposals to restrict inquiry
Many of Jensen's academic colleagues attacked his thesis on
methodological grounds, but others criticized the nature of the in-
quiry itself. Law professor J.D. Hyman wrote that social scientists
should be sensitive to social problems; that a high probability of
truth be shown before "hypotheses .. .which reinforce the ste-
reotypes on which our caste system has been built" are put for-
ward.7' The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues,
an organization of social and behavioral scientists, expressed con-
cern that hereditarian statements could be seriously misinter-
preted, and used to justify repressive social policies.72 Elizabeth
Alfert, a colleague of Jensen at Berkeley, wrote that many persons
read and quoted Jensen's work but failed to notice the many qual-
ifiers it contained. 73 Bernard Diamond, professor of law and psy-
chiatry at Berkeley, found that race-IQ studies risked "social
denigration" of the groups singled out and urged that researchers
be required to obtain the consent of parents who might not wish
their children to participate in studies aimed at discovering ethnic
differences.
74
Despite such criticisms, Jensen sought approval for continued
research on race and intelligence. 75 He took the position that soci-
ety should allow the interested scholar to investigate any hypothe-
sis free from the "unnecessary difficulties [which] arise when...
scientific question[s]. . . become mixed up with socio-political as-
pects of the problem .... ,,76 Jensen further argued that impor-
INTELLIGENCE 29, 39-40 (1981) (any early gains from pre-school programs tend to
fade with time, as basic intelligence is unchanged).
In early articles, Jensen acknowledged the influence of environmental factors,
but as the debate lingered he "let the point drop from sight." Cronbach, supra note
47, at 5, 12. Jensen had many critics to respond to, and with each reply he became, in
their view, increasingly assertive and un-scholarly. See id. (scientists not well suited
for the "spotlight;" lack the "skills of Lawyers;" "abandon scholarly consistency;" and
take themselves too seriously).
71. Hyman, tQ. and Race, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1969, at 31 (letter to the
editor).
72. Comment, Statement by SPSSI on Current IQ Controversy.- Heredity versus
Environment, 24 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1039 (1969).
73. Alfert, Comment. The Promotion of Prejudice, J. SOC. ISSUES, Autumn 1969,
at 206-209. It was rumored that Jensen's article was "must reading" in the Nixon
White House. Daniel Moynihan, then a member of the Nixon cabinet, responded to
the rumor saying the article was not "must reading"; that "[tihe subject did once come
up in a Cabinet meeting. . .[merely a] casual enquiry .. " Moynihan, Comment:
Jensen Not "Must Reading'in the Nixon Cabinet, J. SOC. ISSUES, Spring 1970, at 191.
74. Diamond, Problems of the Ethical Control of Social and Psychological Risks
to the Subjects of Behavioral and Social Science Research 11-14 (unpublished manu-
script, 1974) (on file at UCLA Law Review).
75. See Lyons, Scientists Shun Confrontation on Causes of Differences in IQ.,
N.Y. Times, May 3, 1970, at 58, col. 4.
76. Jensen, Can We and Should We Study Race Differences?, in 3 THE DISAD-
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tant social problems might remain unsolved if scientific inquiry
were restricted, pointing particularly to "dysgenic" trends in ur-
ban slums. 77 Before society embarks on costly efforts to solve in-
ner-city problems, Jensen urged, it ought to determine the extent
to which these problems result from unchangeable intellectual
deficiencies.
78
At the 1970 meeting of the National Academy of Science
(NAS), William Shockley, co-inventor of the transistor, joined
Jensen in encouraging further research into ethnic and racial dif-
ferences in intelligence. Shockley delivered an address postulat-
ing a mathematical model explaining differences in wage earning
power between blacks and whites in terms of neurological organi-
zation rather than environment. 79 Many members of the Acad-
emy declined to participate in the discussion in light of protest
demonstrations and criticisms stirred by the IQ question. 80 When
Shockley repeated his proposal in 1971, the NAS membership ac-
cepted the validity of the study of human racial differences but
rejected a recommendation that the organization endorse or spon-
sor studies in this area. 8'
3. Free Speech on Campus
In the late sixties and early seventies, during the revival of the
IQ controversy, a number of attempts were made to prevent pro-
ponents of genetic IQ theories from presenting their views or pur-
suing their research. In the months following the appearance of
Jensen's article, faculty and students at Berkeley called for his dis-
missal.82 There was an attempted invasion of Jensen's classes, and
his research assistant was harassed.83 The chairman of the Berke-
ley academic freedom committee warned that "[a]ny attempts to
fire him would be a violation of academic freedom."' 84 The IQ
controversy had merged with the right to free speech.
In October of 1969, William Shockley was prevented from
delivering a paper on genetic racial differences by a group of black
VANTAGED CHILD 142, 149 (J. Helhmuth ed. 1970). See also The Current Status, supra
note 63, at 24-26.
77. Dysgenics is the study of retrogressive evolution due to the disproportionate
reproduction of the genetically disadvantaged.
78. See Jensen, Race and the Genetics of Intelligence, in THE IQ CONTROVERSY,
supra note 30, at 100-01.
79. Lyons, supra note 75.
80. Id.
81. See Walsh, National Academy of Sciences.-Awkward Moments at the Meet-
ing, 172 SCIENCE 539, 539-41 (1971).
82. Davis, Harassment Charged by Author ofArticle about Negroes' .Q. "s, N.Y.





students at Dartmouth who applauded continuously during his
speech.85 This harassment was no doubt in response to Shockley's
campaign to have the National Academy of Science encourage re-
search in dysgenics. 86 Shockley, a Nobel laureate in electrical en-
gineering, was concerned that the gene pool in the United States
was deteriorating. The dysgenic threat, he warned, would be
greatest in the event of a nuclear exchange. Without a reserve of
highly intelligent individuals to regain control, the future of the
United States would be in jeopardy.87 Of particular concern to
Shockley were blacks who, without infusions of white genes,
would suffer "genetic enslavement. ' 88 In order to stem the deteri-
oration of the gene pool, Shockley suggested that the government
offer bonuses to the genetically inferior who agreed to undergo
sterilization.
8 9
In September, 1971, Richard Herrnstein, a Harvard behav-
ioral psychologist, attracted criticism for an article he published in
the Atlantic Monthly. 90 Herrnstein agreed with Jensen's hypothe-
sis that IQ is largely determined by heredity and suggested that
the IQ's of white and non-white groups be studied to see if there
were genetic differences among them. Herrnstein presented a syl-
logism that touched off a minor controversy: if social and eco-
nomic conditions are made uniform for everyone, then the power
of heredity will eventually stratify any achievement-based society
so that a child remains in his or her father's socio-economic sta-
tus.91 Herrnstein argued that, in the absence of variation in envi-
ronment, only heredity can influence status. Though Herrnstein
did not suggest that blacks were destined to form the lower caste,
it was easy to infer this from his article. Alvin Poussaint, associate
professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, wrote in the
Boston Globe that "[w]hether he intended it or not, [Herrnstein]
has become the enemy of black people .... -92 In the ensuing
year, student protests prevented Herrnstein from teaching at
Harvard and from speaking at Princeton and the University of
85. Dartmouth Blacks Bar Physicist's Talk, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1969, at 37, col.
2.
86. See Shockley, Dysgenics, Geneticity and Raceology." A Challenge to the Intel-
lectual Responsibility of Educators, 72 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 297 (1972).
87. Shockley, supra note 86, at 303.
88. Id. at 304.
89. Id. at 306.
90. Herrnstein, ZQ., ATL. MONTHLY, Sept. 1971, at 43.
91. Id. at 58-60.
92. Poussaint, Herrnstein: A Black Point of View, Boston Globe, Dec. 3, 1971, at
20, col. 3 (Op-Ed). Herrnastein wrote a subsequent account of the events which fol-





The broadest statement on the right to free speech grew out
of the "Shockley affair" at Yale in 1974. The Yale Political Union
invited Shockley to speak but cancelled the invitation when stu-
dent groups protested. A second organization invited him, but
Kingman Brewster, then president of the university, opposed the
invitation, charging that the group was using "free speech as a
game" and demonstrating a "lack of sensitivity to others."' 94 A
third group invited Shockley to speak. He appeared but was
shouted down.95
As a result of the Shockley episode, Yale decided to re-ex-
amine its attitude towards free speech. C. Vann Woodward, a
noted historian, chaired a committee formed for this purpose.
The Woodward report was critical of President Brewster and Yale
generally, finding a "deterioration in the commitment to free
speech. .".."96 There were signs of "a willingness to compromise
standards, to give priority to peace and order and amicable rela-
tions over the principle of free speech . . . . 97 The report called
for strict rules against disruption of speeches or coercion by physi-
cal violence or threats.98 It specifically rejected the view that ra-
cial insults or other "fighting words" could justify disruption by
an audience. 99 The committee emphasized that "[tihe banning or
obstruction of lawful speech can never be justified on such
grounds as that the speaker is deemed irresponsible, offensive, un-
scholarly, or [the speech] untrue. I°°
D. The IQ Controversy in the Eighties: The Debate Broadens
The debate about genetic determinants of human behavior
did not end with the publication of Jensen's and Shockley's theses
and the initial wave of reaction to them. In 1980, Arthur Jensen
published a second book, Bias in Mental Testing. I0' His declared
intention was not to extend his earlier thesis but rather to defend
93. Id. at 17-41 (1973).
94. Lewis, A Report on the Dangers to the Right ofFree Speech, N.Y. Times, Jan.
26, 1975, § 4, at 18, col. 1.
95. Id.
96. Id. The Woodward report is reprinted in Report of the Committee on Free-
dom of Expression at Yale, 4 HUM. RTS. 357 (1975) [hereinafter Report].
97. Report, supra note 96, at 373.
98. Id. at 375-76.
99. Id. at 376.
100. Id.
101. A. JENSEN, BIAS IN MENTAL TESTING (1980). See Gould, Jensen's Last
Stand, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 38, May 1, 1980, at 38. Jensen still maintains that the black-
white IQ differential is largely attributable to genetic factors. See Jensen, Obstacles,
Problems, and Pit/alls in Differential Psychology, in S. SCARR, RACE, SOCIAL CLASS,
AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN I.Q. 493-44 (1981).
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the reliability of IQ tests against the charge of cultural bias.10 2
Shortly thereafter, a National Academy of Sciences panel pub-
fished a report finding that existing IQ tests, although they do
yield disparate white/black average scores, do not discriminate
against racial minorities in the prediction of academic
performance. 1
03
There has also been renewed interest on the part of psycholo-
gists in developing "culture-free" IQ tests that might eliminate or
reduce differences among groups. In October of 1982, two Cali-
fornia psychologists announced the development of one such test
that reduces the mean difference between blacks and whites "by
half-from about 15 points to seven" and produces a "negligible
difference" between Hispanics and whites. °4 A recent study indi-
cated that Japanese students score higher than white American
students on IQ tests, and that the relative difference has increased
by about seven points in the last two decades. 0 5 Attention has
also focused on purported male-female differences in brain anat-
omy and function; a number of researchers have proposed that
male superiority over females in mathematics and spatial percep-
tion is innate, 0 6 while others have purported to discover that wo-
men exceed men in verbal ability and human relations.1
0 7
II. REGULATION OF THE SCIENTIFIC ENTERPRISE: How RACE-
IQ RESEARCH CAN OR MIGHT BE RESTRICTED
Sharply critical responses to the work of Jensen, Shockley,
Herrnstein, and other proponents of race-IQ theories suggest that
some regulation of either the conduct or the product of such re-
search may be proposed and instituted. Since any restriction on
the work of race-IQ scientists will probably take the form of one
or more regulatory modes now in use, this part examines the ways
in which scientific research is currently regulated and the relative
efficacy of each mode. Later sections analyze whether or not such
restrictions would be constitutional and, if so, what state interest
102. A. JENSEN, supra note 101, at ix.
103. Herbert, Ability Testing Absolved of Racial Bias, 121 Sci. NEWS 84 (1982);
Herbert, Intelligence Test: Sizing Up a Newcomer, 122 Sci. NEWS 280 (1982).
104. Herbert, Intelligence Test. Sizing Up a Newcomer, 122 Sci. NEWS 280, 281
(1982); L.A Times, Aug. 25, 1982, pt. I, at 14, col. 1.
105. Garmon, Japanese Jump, 122 Sci. NEWS 28 (1982).
106. Tangley, Male-Female Brain Anatomy May Differ, 121 Sci. NEWS 422 (1982).
But see Garmon, supra note 105.
107. Garmon, supra note 105.
In an unusual twist, it was recently revealed that William Shockley is one of the
supporters of a "Nobel Prize sperm bank," a private effort to increase the reproduc-
tive rate of persons of intellectual accomplishment and thereby slow the rate of ge-
netic drift. Comment, Eugenic Artifcial Insemination. A Cure for Mediocrity?, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1850 (1981) (discussing Nobel Prize sperm bank).
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or interests would legitimate them.10 8
A. Self-Regulation by the Scientific Community
Those who wish to protect scientific inquiry from governmen-
tal regulation sometimes offer self-regulation as a preferred alter-
native. 10 9 Self-regulation may be undertaken at three levels:
voluntary self-restraint by individual researchers; policy state-
ments of professional bodies that encourage restraint; and publi-
cation policies of scientific journals.
1. Self-regulation by the Individual Researcher
Arguably, external controls can stifle legitimate research ac-
tivity. The researcher may be overburdened with paperwork or
may avoid areas of inquiry he or she believes the regulator will
view with disfavor. Outside regulators, if they are nonscientists,
may lack sensitivity to notions of scientific freedom. Regulators,
even if they are scientists, may be so preoccupied by documenta-
tion and other irrelevancies that they permit genuine abuses to
slip by unnoticed." 0 Proponents of self-regulation argue that it
will be effective through peer pressure, that scientists value highly
the respect of their colleagues"'I and that self-policing has hereto-
fore adequately restrained plagiarism and scientific fraud.
1 2
Critics of self-regulation reply that while competition among
researchers creates a threat of exposure that keeps scientists hon-
est, peer pressure is less effective where protection of the public is
concerned.' 13 Self-interest may cause a researcher to inflate the
benefit and discount the risk of proposed research and thereby ex-
pose the public to a level of danger that society would not con-
108. See infra Part IV. The individual and state interests are balanced in Part V,
infra. The survey tendered in this section (Part II) does not aim to be analytical, but
discursive. Thus, no effort is made to determine whether particular modes of regula-
tion are constitutionally problematic, or trigger "state action." A number of examples
are drawn from an area of research-research with recombinant DNA molecules-
that resembles race-IQ research in some respects and that has recently been in the
public eye. DNA research is like race-IQ research in that both concern biochemical
bases of organic behavior, including human behavior. Both areas of inquiry have
drawn fire for somewhat similar reasons: as inhumane, "inopportune," and likely to
cause social chaos.
109. Bok, Freedom and Risk, DAEDALUS, Spring 1978, at 115, 117-18.
110. Id. at 118.
111. Sinsheimer suggests that a policy of restraint could only come about if
enough scientists believed that such a policy were desirable. Self-discipline therefore
is the means whereby consensus develops. See Sinsheimer, supra note 16, at 32-33.
112. See, e.g., Woolf, Fraud in Science.- How Much, How Serious?, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Oct. 1981, at 9, 11.
113. See J. GOODFIELD, PLAYING GOD: GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE MA-
NIPULATION OF LIFE 178-79 (1977). See also Woolf, supra note 112.
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done.11 4 Moreover, unlike lawyers and physicians, scientists have
generally not established disciplinary boards with the power to
suspend or expel members."l 5 Self-policing would thus lack teeth.
2. Policy Statements of Scientific Organizations
Self-regulation can also take the form of statements issued by
major scientific organizations and societies. However, most na-
tional organizations that have addressed the question of a scien-
tist's responsibility to society have opposed regulation. At most,
they have recommended that scientists give adequate considera-
tion to the public interest before beginning research."l 6 For exam-
ple, in 1967 an ad hoc committee of the National Academy of
Sciences recommended that race-IQ research be protected from
external regulation, but found no need for the crash program ad-
vocated by William Shockley, among others. 1 7 In 1973, another
committee of the National Academy of Sciences supported a re-
searcher's right to investigate problems of human genetics "with-
out hindrance because of fear that the results may be misused or
because the conclusions may be unpalatable."'"1 8 The American
Anthropological Association, by contrast, concluded that "there is
an obligation to reflect on the foreseeable repercussions of re-
search and publication on the general population being stud-
ied."'' 9 The Genetics Society of America expressed a similar
concern. 120  All such declarations are normative statements of
what ought to be, and provide for no sanctions in the event of
violation. 12'
Although simple policy resolutions and statements in them-
selves may have little effect in shaping the conduct of individual
scientists, well-publicized moratoria entered into by the leading
114. Green, Law and Genetic Control Public Policy Questions, 265 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 170, 173 (1976).
115. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6078 (West 1974) (attorneys).
116. Woolf, supra note 112, at 9. See also R. CHALK, M. FRANKEL & J. CHAFER,
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES IN THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING SOCIETIES (1980).
117. Racial Studies.- Academy Slates Position on Callfor New Research, 158 Sci-
ENCE 892, 893 (1967).
118. Reinhold, A Limit on Scholarship?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1973, at E5, col. 2.
119. Id. at col. 2-3.
120. Peter, GSA Members Vote on Heredity, Race, andIQ, 25 BIOSCIENCE 417, 418
(1975). See also Genetic Dierences in Intelligence, 105 INTELLECT 214 (1977).
121. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. See also Edsall, Scientfc
Freedom and Responsibility, 188 SCIENCE 687, 688 (1975) (describing stands taken by
American Association for the Advancement of Science, Committee on Scientific Free-
dom and Responsibility). The Committee found no reason to restrict research on
living human fetuses. Id. at 689. The Committee also proposed the establishment of
scientific committees of inquiry that would inquire into matters of research ethics,
publish the results of such inquiries, and bring critical issues to the attention of gov-
ernment. Id.
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scientists in a field do seem effective. 2 2 In mid-1973, scientists
attending a conference on recombinant DNA research expressed
concern that careless use of the new technology could prove dan-
gerous. At the conclusion of the meeting, the participants ad-
dressed a letter to the National Academy of Sciences urging that
the Academy "consider this problem and recommend specific ac-
tions or guidelines."' 123 The Academy convened a committee of
scientists which, within a year, announced a worldwide voluntary
moratorium on certain types of DNA experiments pending an in-
ternational conference to study the safety issues. 124 The morato-
rium was universally honored during the months between its
announcement and the international conference, 125 and ended
when the federal government published guidelines for recombi-
nant DNA research in July 1976.126
3. Publication Policies of Academic Journals
a. Measures aimed at ethical content. Though scientific jour-
nals routinely review the merit of articles submitted for publica-
tion, they exercise few controls over the articles' ethical or social
content.127 A number of organizations and individuals have sug-
122. See text accompanying notes 123-26 (example of effective moratorium).
123. Letter from Maxine Singer and Dieter Soil to Philip Handler, President, Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, and John R. Hogness, President, National Institute of
Medicine, reprinted in 181 SCIENCE 1114 (1973).
124. Committee on Recombinant DNA, Potential Biohazards of Recombinant
DNA Molecules, 185 SCIENCE 303 (1974).
125. Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: A
History of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1029
(1978). The conference, held at Asilomar, California in early 1975 proposed proceed-
ing with most but not all DNA experiments, provided researchers complied with
physical and biological safety measures aimed at varying levels of hazard. Berg, Bal-
timore, Brenner, Roblin & Singer, Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Mole-
cules, 188 SCIENCE 991 (1975).
126. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National Institutes of Health,
Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as DNA Guidelines]. Neither the original conference, the Asilomar meeting,
nor the NIH guidelines subsequently enacted provided for public participation in de-
cision making concerning DNA research. Critics thus charged that the proposals
amounted to scientists asking to regulate themselves. See Nelkin, Threats and
Promises: Negotiating the Control of Research, DAEDALUS, Spring 1978, at 191, 196;
Pepich, Formulation of the NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research as an Ex-
ercise in Due Process, 73 AMER. Soc. INT. L. PROC. 219, 231 (1979); Wade, Gene
Splicing Rules: Another Round of Debate, 199 SCIENCE 30, 33 (1978) (potential for
conflict of interest when NIH acts as "sponsor, conductor, and regulator" of recombi-
nant DNA research). They asked whether in a climate of intense competition scien-
tists would voluntarily comply with guidelines that inhibited their research, and
suggested that in a controversy as heavily political and ethical as the one over DNA
research, there is a great need for public participation. Id.
127. See Woolf, supra note 112, at 1 1-13 (discussing journals' reluctance to pub-
lish retractions or notices of suspect data). Sometimes, the decision whether or not an
article has scientific "merit" can become controversial. The University Action Group,
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gested that an effective means of controlling violations of safety
and ethical standards in research is to prevent publication of re-
search conducted in violation of these standards. 128 In 1970, the
Council of Biology Editors recommended that when editors eval-
uate articles based on research subject to ethical standards, criteria
of publishability include the extent to which the research met
those standards. 129 Others, including David Baltimore, an influ-
ential recombinant DNA scientist, have recommended that all ar-
ticles be required to contain a statement of the safety measures
observed in connection with the research. 130 NIH Director Don-
ald Fredrickson made a similar recommendation.131 The assump-
tion underlying these proposals is that the desire to publish would
motivate researchers to comply with appropriate safety and ethi-
cal standards.
b. Measures aimed at scientic fraud. Fraudulent scientific
data, including race-IQ research results, present a grave potential
for harm. 132 Thus, measures aimed at detecting such fraud may
seem in order, and editors of scientific journals have begun to con-
sider guidelines designed to minimize its occurrence. 133 But be-
cause researchers have long considered fraud an aberration, 134 to
date few journals have instituted procedures for dealing with pub-
lication of falsified data. One journal requires that authors sub-
a Harvard faculty organization, protested the publication in the Atlantic Monthly of
Richard Herrnstein's views on intelligence research. See Ireland, The Relevance of
Race Research, 84 ETHICS 140, 141 (1974). See also 157 PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY 2739
(1950) (prominent astronomers attempted to force publishers of Immanuel Velikov-
sky's book, WORLDS IN COLLISION, to halt publication because his theories conflicted
with their own). Most editors, however, do not view their responsibilities as including
the monitoring of papers submitted to assure that the investigators followed accepted
ethical practices. Brackbill & Hellegers, Ethics and Editors, 10 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 20 (1980); Curran, Law-Medicine Notes- The Law and Human Experimentation,
275 NEW ENG. J. MED. 323, 325 (1966).
128. See Debakey, Ethically Questionable Data: Publish or Reject?, 22 CLINICAL
RESEARCH 113 (1974). See also Debakey, Scientific Publishing, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIOETHICS 188-94 (W. Reich ed. 1978); Abelson, The Editing of Science, SCIENCE,
March 19, 1971, at 1101.
129. Brackbill & Hellegers, supra note 127, at 20.
130. Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, U.S. Dept. of Health,
Education, and Welfare, P.B. No. 76-1133, 1 RECOMBINANT DNA RESEARCH 251
(1976).
131. DNA Guidelines, supra note 126, at 27,902 and 27,912.
132. Some race-IQ research, years after its publication, has been pronounced
fraudulent. Cyril Burt, an early pioneer in heritability of intelligence studies who
influenced Jensen and others, is now widely regarded to have altered fraudulently the
results of many of his studies over a long scientific career. See B. EVANS & B.
WAITES, supra note 22, at 159-64; Kellog, The Case of the Suggestible Psychologist,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Aug. 1982, at 69.
133. See Woolf, supra note 112, at 13.
134. Id. at 9-11; Broad & Wade, Science's Faulty Fraud Detectors, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, Nov. 1982, at 51.
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mitting work for consideration agree to make their data books
available for five years. 135 Other journals are reluctant even to
print retractions when an article is shown to contain fabricated or
fraudulent material. 136
B. Regulation Through Employment Sanctions at the
Institutional Level
Academic research may also be regulated through an institu-
tion's control over tenure, promotion, and merit increases. An ac-
ademic institution may legitimately take into account a faculty
member's research interests and record when making employment
and promotion decisions. 137 It may restrict newly hired faculty to
particular research topics or place reasonable restrictions on the
conduct of their research.138 An institution may also review a pro-
fessor's scholarly and instructional records periodically to deter-
mine whether or not they justify awarding tenure. 139 Once tenure
is granted, reviews similar to those of nontenured faculty mem-
bers are carried out to determine promotions and merit raises. 140
At each of these stages, disapproval of a professor's area of re-
search or the manner in which it is conducted can affect a scien-
tist's advancement. This is particularly true of the untenured
professor. One science writer has written that intra-academic
politics at Harvard University during the Cambridge hearings on
recombinant DNA research pressured younger, untenured faculty
into silence. 14 Speaking or teaching opportunities and tenure
have reportedly been denied to scientists who advocated positions
their departments or universities found unpopular or
controversial.
42
135. See Woolf, supra note 112, at 13.
136. Id. at 14.
137. See infra notes 238-73, 279-83, 381-92 and accompanying text.
138. See generally Robertson, supra note 14, at 1203, 1232.
139. Olswang & Fantel, Tenure and Periodic Performance Review: Compatible Le-
gal andAdministrative Principles, 7 J. C. & U. L. 1, 25 (1980/1981).
140. W. FURNISS, FACULTY TENURE AND CONTRACT SYSTEMS-CURRENT PRAC-
TICE (Am. Council on Educ. Spec. Rep. 1972). See generally Brown, Tenure Rights in
Contractual and Constitutional Context, 6 J. L. & EDUC. 279 (1977) (protection af-
forded by tenure and interaction between tenure and constitutional rights); Develop-
ments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1968) (broad
review of academic freedom in higher education including role of tenure in protecting
that freedom).
141. Wade, Gene Splicing.: Critics of Research Get More Brickbats than Bouquets,
195 SCIENCE 466, 466-67 (1977) (critics of recombinant DNA research who have spo-
ken out against gene-splicing pressured into silence for fear of being fired).
142. Wicker, The Shockley Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1973, § I, at 41, col. 5
(Harvard cancelled a scheduled debate between Professor William Shockley of Stan-
ford and Roy Innis of the Congress of Racial Equality largely because of protests
from the Black Law Students Association). See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1973, § 1, at
51, col. I (Princeton sponsors debate between Shockley and Innis amid student pro-
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C. Regulation Through Public Funding
1. Funding Decisions and Peer Review
Because some scientists are dependent on support from the
federal government for basic research,143 the government's power
of the purse can be used to discourage undesired research or chan-
nel it into acceptable directions. The primary method by which
the federal government dispenses money for the support of basic
research, including research supported by the National Institutes
of Health and the National Science Foundation, is peer review. 144
These agencies convene juries of non-government scientists to ad-
vise the government as to which research proposals to fund. The
scientists who serve on these juries must be employed by nonprofit
institutions, be active in research, and be distinguished in their
fields. 145 The proposals are ranked, and the institute funds the
highest ranked until its research funds are exhausted. 4 6 Because
there is a marked disparity in funding among the various insti-
tutes, a meritorious proposal assigned to a cash-poor institute may
go without funding.1
47
The peer review system seems to operate without systematic
bias, 148 although the preferences and predilections of reviewers do
affect the likelihood that a particular grant will be funded. 14 9 The
subjectivity inherent in the peer review system and in the initial
decision to allocate funding among the various institutes can
cause researchers to avoid lines of research that seem promising
but that they fear a reviewing panel would find philosophically
unacceptable.
150
2. Administrative regulation to assure consent and minimize
harm to human subjects
In 1974, in response to a series of incidents that raised ques-
tions about researchers' obligations to human subjects,' 15 the fed-
test but strictly limits attendance and press coverage). Why You Do What You Do-
SOCIOBIOLOGY" 4 New Theory of Behavior, TIME, Aug. 1, 1977, at 54 (Professor
Robert Trivers, a leader of the sociobiology movement, denied tenure at Harvard,
although the University asserted his work in sociobiology was not the reason).
143. See infra note 152.




147. Id. at 161.
148. See, e.g., Cole, Cole & Simon, Chance and Consensus in Peer Review, 214
SCIENCE 881 (1981) (discussing National Science Foundation's peer review system).
149. See id. at 885.
150. See Seiler & Murtha, Government Regulation of Research, SOCIETY, Nov.-
Dec. 1980, at 23.
151. Id. The incidents included reports that medical researchers at the Jewish
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eral government issued regulations to protect the subjects of
biomedical and behavioral research. 152 The regulations require
researchers to obtain approval of research plans from local Insti-
tutional Review Boards for all research involving human subjects
that is funded by the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices. 153 Local boards are composed of at least five members. At
least one member must be concerned primarily with nonscientific
areas and another must not be affiliated with the institution.
54
Boards are required to evaluate proposed research to determine
whether the anticipated benefit to the subject and society is rea-
sonable in relation to the risk of harm,15 5 and to assure that in-
formed consent is obtained. 15 6 Although mainly charged with
protecting subjects from physical harm, some boards have ex-
panded their purview to include economic, psychological and so-
cial injury. 15 7 When a particular area of research poses an
unusual degree of danger, additional guidelines may be
enforced. 1
58
Chronic Disease Hospital in New York had injected live cancer cells into patients
without their knowledge, and that the United States Public Health Service had with-
held treatment for syphilis from 400 indigent black research subjects who were part
of a long-term study to determine the effects of the disease. Pattulo, Reconciling Risk
and Regulation, SOCIETY, Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 34. There were also instances of objec-
tionable procedures outside the biomedical area, for example the social scientist who
secretly observed homosexual activity in restrooms and then interviewed the partici-
pants under the guise of a public health survey after tracing them to their homes.
Humphreys, Tearoom Trade-Impersonal Sex in Public Places, TRANS-ACTION, Jan.
1970, at 10, 15 (cited in Bok, supra note 109, at 127 n.4).
152. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1982). The Health and Human Services Department is the
largest source of funds for medical and behavioral research in the United States. New
HHS Rulesfor Research on Humans, 119 ScI. NEWS 69 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
New Rules]. The rules require that any institution that receives HHS funds file an
"assurance" of steps taken to protect human subjects of all research. In addition, an
institution must file a statement of ethical principles for all research, regardless of
source of funding. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103 (1982).
153. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103 (1982); New Rules, supra note 152, at 69-70 (listing types
of research exempt from Institutional Review Board approval).
154. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (1982).
155. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(2) (1982).
156. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(4)(5), 46.116 (1982).
157. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 74, at 11-12.
158. For example, at the request of DNA scientists following the Asilomar meet-
ing, see supra note 125, the National Institute of Health adopted detailed guidelines
for recombinant DNA research. The guidelines require review and approval of
projects by an impartial local committee, and assign four levels of biological and
physical containment which are matched to scaled assessments of potential risk. 43
Fed. Reg. 60,080, 60,109-13, 60,124-25 (1978).
Under the guidelines, prime responsibility for ensuring the safety of recombinant
DNA experiments lies with the principal investigator and local Institutional Biosafety
Committee. 45 Fed. Reg. 77,398-400 (1980). There is a provision for on-site inspec-
tion of the research, but the only sanction for violation is termination of funding for
the institution where the violation occurs. Id. A few violations of the guidelines have
been reported. See, e.g., J. LEAR, RECOMBINANT DNA: THE UNTOLD STORY 204-07
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D. Direct Regulation of Research by Government
The federal government can also directly regulate certain
types of research under the interstate commerce clause' 5 9 or the
federal police power. 60 Governmental regulation could take the
form of a complete prohibition, or regulation of the manner in
which research is conducted. The first congressional moratorium
on a specific type of research began in 1974, with the introduction
of several bills in Congress to ban fetal experimentation. At the
same time, federal legislation was pending that would establish an
ethical advisory board, the National Commission for the Protec-
tion of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search.' 6' To assure passage of the latter legislation, the
Commission's supporters accepted a moratorium on fetal research
until the Commission could develop a fetal research policy. 62
The Commission ultimately recommended that most fetal re-
search continue, although it imposed conditions including in-
formed consent by the parents, prior studies with animals, and
absence of alternative means to obtain the knowledge sought. 63
The federal government accepted the Commission's report, clear-
ing the way for the research to continue.164
Congress also has the power to regulate the manner in which
research is conducted. In recent years, the only areas of research
that have been proposed for detailed congressional review are re-
(1978) (failure of Harvard University and one of its researchers to file appropriate
paperwork); Wade, Recombinant DNA; NIH Rules Broken in Insulin Gene Project,
197 SCIENCE 1342, 1342-45 (1977) (similar incidents at the University of California,
San Francisco).
159. Article I, Sec. 8 of the United States Constitution confers on Congress the
power to "regulate Commerce ... among the several states .... ." This power
would seem broad enough to encompass scientific research that is likely to create
broadscale economic effects. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 347, 347A (1976) (regulation of a
food additive); 21 U.S.C. § 360 (1976) (registration requirement for producers of
drugs).
160. Although the Constitution does not enumerate a general federal police
power, liberal interpretations of the Necessary and Proper Clause have given Con-
gress a broad power to legislate in the interest of the public health, safety, welfare, or
morals. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151-54 (power to control loan
sharks under Commerce Clause) (197 1); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (power to limit liability for nuclear accidents under
Due Process clause).
161. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348,
§§ 201-215, 88 Stat. 342, 348-54 (1974). See Senate Approves a Permanent Ethics
Commission, 201 SCIENCE 138 (1978) (discussing prospect that Commission will be-
come a permanent one).
162. Culliton, Science's Restive Public, DAEDALUS, Spring 1978, at 147, 154-55.
163. Yesley, The Use of an Advisory Commission, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451,
1459-60 (1978) (Author Michael Yesley served as Staff Director of the Commission
during the period in question).
164. Id. at 1466-67. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-211 (1982).
19831 RACE-IQ RESEARCH
combinant DNA research 165 and research having national security
implications. 166
A number of municipalities and states have also considered
or enacted legislation controlling types and scope of research, par-
ticularly research in the life sciences. 167 In 1976, for example, the
city council of Cambridge, Massachusetts enacted a three-month
moratorium on recombinant DNA research at all laboratories sit-
uated within the city limits. 168 The moratorium was lifted after a
review board set up to hear the views of citizens and scientists
recommended continuation of the research. 169 A similar ordi-
nance was passed ten months later by the city of Berkeley,
California. 170
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON RACE-IQ
RESEARCH
Each of the regulatory approaches discussed in the previous
Part could be applied to limit the freedom of a race-IQ researcher
in carrying out his or her chosen line of inquiry. 171 A few actually
165. See Talbot, Introduction to Recombinant DNA Research, Development and
Evolution of the NIH Guidelines, and Proposed Legislation, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 804,
810 (1981). See also Culliton, Recombinant DNA Bills Derailed: Congress Still Trying
to Pass.4 Law, 199 SCIENCE 274 (1978); Pepich, Formulation of the NIH Guidelinesfor
Recombinant DNA Research as an Exercise in Due Process, 73 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 219, 226-27 (1979).
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 2274(b) (1976) (official secrets statute). The American Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Science considers governmental control over particu-
lar types of research objectionable and argues that "(w)e should look at claims of
Inational security' with a very critical eye .... " Edsall, supra note 121, at 689. Sci-
ence magazine, in which Ed Edsall's article appears, is the official publication of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. See generally Paine, Admiral
Inman's tidal wave, BULL. ATOM. Sci., Mar. 1982, at 3 (similar reactions to further
regulatory proposals).
167. See CAMBRIDGE, MASS., REV. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. I, § 11.7 (1950);
PRINCETON, N.J., REV. ORDINANCES ch. 26A § 1-13 (1978); AMHERST, MASS., By-
LAWS art. III, § 10 (1978); Berkeley, Cal. Ordinance 5010 (1977); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH
LAW § 3220 (McKinney Supp. 1982); MD. PuB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 898 (1977).
See generally Wade, Gene Splicing. At Grass Roots Level a Hundred Flowers Bloom,
195 SCIENCE 558 (1977).
168. Wade, Gene Splicing Cambridge Citizens OK Research but Want More
Safety, 195 SCIENCE 268, 268 (1977) (reviewing governmental and business efforts to
regulate gene-splicing research across the nation). See also N.Y. Times, July 8, 1976,
§ I, at 12, col. 5.
169. The Cambridge Experimentation Review Board, BULL. ATOM. SCI. May 1977,
at 22, 22 and 24-27 (1977) (text of board's report); Cambridge resumes genetic re-
search, 111 SCi. NEWS 103, 103 (1977) (new ordinance restricting high-risk research
and providing fines and possible shut-down of violating labs).
170. Berkeley, Cal., Ordinance 5010 (1977). See also Chalfant, Hartmann &
Blakeboro, Recombinant DNA.4 Case Study in Regulation of Scientific Research, 8
ECOLOGY L.Q. 55, 119 n.128 (1979) (discussing benefits and detriments of local
regulation).
171. Race-IQ researchers could institute a self-designed moratorium, see supra
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have been implemented, 72 while others have only been pro-
posed. 73 Regardless of regulatory mode, it is likely that any se-
vere governmental restriction on race-IQ research would be
subject to a court challenge. In any such suit, the court will first
need to determine the applicable standard of review when official
action abridges the ability of a scientist to pursue a line of
investigation.
A. The Extent of First Amendment Protection of Scientific
Inquiry
Legal commentators have recently begun to assess the extent
of constitutional protection for scientific activities. 174 Scholars
notes 123-26 and accompanying text, or agree to ethical screening through profes-
sional journals, see supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text. They could enact
persuasive policy statements against the conduct of certain types of research, see supra
notes 116-21 and accompanying text. Research institutions could attempt to dissuade
such research through various sanctions, see supra notes 137-42 and accompanying
text. Additional regulatory mechanisms not reviewed earlier, but which might plausi-
bly be invoked, are the public purpose doctrine, which restricts the use of public funds
to expenditures providing a public benefit, see, e.g., People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624
(1881); the conflict of interest rules, designed to avoid the possibility that private
sponsorship will interfere with faculty members' university responsibilities, see, e.g.,
Weston, "Outside"Activities of Faculty Members, 7 J. C. & U. L. 68, 74 (1980/1981);
and time, place, or manner of research regulations promulgated by scientific or gov-
ernmental bodies in the interest of national security, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 2274 (Supp.
1983) (communication of restricted atomic energy data).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21 (measures aimed at controlling or
prohibiting race-IQ research), infra text accompanying note 388.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78 (proposals to restrict race-IQ re-
search). See also A. JENSEN, GENETICS AND EDUCATION 32-37 (1972) (summarizing
opposition to his views and defending his publications); Gomberg, IQ and Race.- A
Discussion of Some Confusions, 85 ETHICS 258, 264-65 (1974) (questioning whether
Jensen should have been published based on balancing of scientific merit versus
threat to human beings).
174. Articles that have addressed the issue include: Berger, Government Regulation
of the Pursuit of Knowledge. The Recombinant DNA Controversy, 13 VT. L. REV. 83
(1978); Delgado & Millen, supra note 1; Favre & McKinnon, supra note 14; Ferguson,
Scienqfic and Technological Expression.- A Problem in First Amendment Theory, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519 (1981); Ferguson, supra note 14; Lederberg, The Free-
doms and the Controls ofScience. Notes from the Ivory Tower, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 596
(1972); Robertson, supra note 14; Note, First Amendment Protectionfor Biomedical
Research, 19 ARIz. L. REV. 893 (1977); Note, Governmental Control of Positive Eugen-
ics, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 615, 631-35 (1974); Note, Considerations in the Regula-
tion of Biological Research, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1420, 1427-35 (1978).
According to Professor Tribe, the Supreme Court has recognized the tendency of
government entities to coerce uniformity by restricting the availability of knowledge,
and has imposed upon government "a duty not to preempt choices better left within
the less centralized decision-making processes" of individuals. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 902 (1978). Tribe nevertheless distinguishes government regu-
lations of scientific inquiry which aim to prevent harms unconnected with the subject
of the inquiry itself (e.g., hazardous research methods) from regulations which restrict
inquiry "because of harms thought likely to follow from what the research will un-
cover about the nature of reality. ... Id at 904. The former regulations are sub-
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generally agree that the communicative or expressive activities of
scientific inquiry are protected by the first amendment. 75 They
disagree, however, concerning the extent of protection that should
be extended to noncommunicative scientific activities 76 and the
ject to the relaxed scrutiny appropriate for laws which incidentally restrict the flow of
information, id., while the latter are likely to be rejected by the Court because their
justification "rests... on the advantages of [people] being kept in ignorance." 1d. at
905 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976)). Thus, Tribe concludes that any governmental decision to
halt a form of scientific inquiry, "because of the fear that its results might dangerously
alter popular ways of viewing human nature and might thus erode respect for individ-
ual rights and personal dignity, is immediately suspect as a usurpation of the sort of
choice that ought to be made at more decentralized, personal levels." 1d. Tribe qual-
ifies this assessment, however, by stating that the more one can link irreversible shifts
in basic conceptions or ideals to a specific line of inquiry, and the less one can accept
"as realistic" the model of decentralized choice on the questions at stake, "the
stronger becomes the argument for a collective, society-wide decision . . . to suspend
. . . an avenue of inquiry." Id. See also Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth
Discontinuity. The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 648-49
(1973).
Professor Tribe's analysis of the Court's concern over decentralized decision
making appears to be correct. In the Supreme Court's view, restrictions on the con-
tent of speech would undercut the "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... "
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Debate is certainly pre-
liminary to, and mandatory for, informed decision making. Thus, once an expression
or activity has been characterized as protected speech, the Court has forcefully stated
that the first amendment denies the government the power to restrict that expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). To be sure, the initial question as to
whether a form of speech is or is not protected will depend upon the content of the
speech and the benefits and harms likely to flow from that content. Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976). Within the area of protected speech,
however, variations in content rarely justify different government responses. E.g.,
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254-56. Thus, it is one of the "cardinal principles" of
first amendment law that regulations that affect protected expression be content-neu-
tral. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. at 85-86 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Professor
Tribe has applied this principle to any effort to distinguish between government re-
strictions on scientific inquiry based on the harms sought to be prevented.
175. Commentators generally begin their analyses by breaking down scientific in-
quiry into its communicative and noncommunicative elements. For example, Del-
gado & Millen, supra note 1, at 372-82, identify the functional components of
scientific inquiry as follows: creation of ideas; experimentation and fact gathering;
and dissemination of ideas. Favre & McKinnon, supra note 14, at 79-83, list the
components as including: observation; formulation of hypothesis; experimentation
and communication.
176. "The conclusion is reached that all three levels of analysis--constitutional
history, first amendment theory, and first amendment case law-support the inclusion
of many forms of basic scientfic research within the system of protected expression."
Delgado & Millen, supra note 1, at 353-54 (emphasis added).
"It is one effort of this Article to suggest that scientific inquiry-the actual pro-
cess of experimental investigation-merits some degree ofprotection under the free
speech clause of the first amendment. ... Ferguson, supra note 14, at 639-40 (em-
phasis added).
"This Article argues that the first amendment protects research by scientists and
1983]
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rationales for extending such protection. 177 Despite differences in
analysis, one common thread runs through the existing literature
on the subject: scientific inquiry, consisting of both communica-
tive and noncommunicative activities, constitutes a recognizable
and unique process of communication which should receive some
degree of constitutional protection.
1. Protection for communicative scientific activities
The Supreme Court has stated that "[ajll ideas having even
the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion-have the full protection of the [first amendment]". 7 In
the last decade, however, the Court has established a "scale of
First Amendment values,"' 179 within which different kinds of
speech will receive different measures of protection depending
upon their position on the scale. 180 At one end of the scale, some
speech receives no protection because "such utterances are no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and mo-
rality."'' Among the unprotected kinds of speech are pornogra-
phy and obscenity,8 2 "fighting words,"'' 8 3 speech which incites
violence, 184 and ordinary libel of nonpublic figures.' 85 If speech
others to the same extent that more conventional forms of speech are protected, thus
granting to scientists a large measure of, but by no means absolute, autonomy in their
choice of research topics and methods." Robertson, supra note 14, at 1204 (emphasis
added).
177. See infra text accompanying notes 203-15.
178. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (speech broadly protected).
179. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
180. Ferguson, supra note 14, at 645: "[lIt now appears that the Supreme Court is
moving toward a hierarchical view of the first amendment, a view that assigns differ-
ent levels of constitutional protection to different kinds of expression."
181. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
182. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
183. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
184. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
In addition to state regulation of unprotected forms of speech, regulation of pro-
tected speech based on content may be constitutional if justified by the dangers of
imminent lawless action. The test for such cases was originally articulated by Justice
Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), rev'd, 395 U.S. 449 (1969):
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, un-
less the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may
befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.
Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(per curiam), the Court narrowed the "clear and present danger test," stating that the
state may not "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
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does not fall into these categories, it will receive at least some pro-
tection. For example, erotic expression and indecent language re-
ceive less than full protection because the social value of such
speech is limited. 86 Commercial speech also receives intermedi-
ate protection because of the government's strong interest in pro-
tecting the public from false or misleading advertising 87 and
because commercial speech has traditionally been considered to
have relatively less significance for first amendment concerns. 188
All speech that does not fall within these exceptional categories,
however, has apparently been accorded full protection. 89
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447.
According to Professor Robertson, publication and research could be penalized
under the above standard
only in extreme situations where there is a high probability of serious
risk to others that is uncontrollable by less restrictive means . . . . To
ban research, the government would have to show a high probability,
approaching imminence, that the research would yield knowledge that,
if available, would very likely lead to substantial harms that the govern-
ment may legitimately prevent, that no other means would as effectively
reduce the harm, and that the predicted beneficial uses of the knowl-
edge would be small.
Robertson, supra note 14, at 1251-52.
185. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
186. In Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), Justice Ste-
vens wrote:
[s]ociety's interest in protecting this type of [erotic] expression is of a
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untram-
meled political debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal comment.
Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to ap-
plaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why
our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us
would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's
right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our
choice.
Id. at 70. See also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982) (suggesting that
school boards may remove "pervasively vulgar" books from school libraries); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (the broadcasting of speech which is concededly
not obscene but is indecent may nevertheless be regulated because it is patently offen-
sive and lies at the periphery of first amendment concern); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1969) (dissemination of erotic but nonobscene matter to minors may be
outlawed).
187. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) ("The first amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the
informational function of advertising. . . . The government may ban forms of com-
munication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.")
188. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56, reh'g denied, 439 U.S.
883 (1978) ("We have not discarded the 'common-sense' distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to
government regulation, and other varieties of speech.").
189. L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 577-79. Several commentators, and apparently
one Supreme Court Justice, have argued against this broad protection, reasoning that
first amendment coverage should be reserved for speech which is expressly political.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 235 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring & dissenting in
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What position should scientific expression-publishing,
teaching, lecturing-be assigned in this scale of first amendment
values? Although the Court has never directly addressed the is-
sue, it has acknowledged the significant social value of scientific
expression in cases decided on other grounds' 90 and in dicta. 191
Such indirect statements of the social value of scientific expression
are doubtlessly grounded in the liberal tradition of respect for sci-
entific endeavor,192 a tradition of particular strength in the United
appendix). See also id. at 14-15 (per curiam opinion) (discussion of public issues and
debate on the qualifications of candidates are in an area of the most fundamental first
amendment activities). See also BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech:
An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978);
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20
(1971) ("[c]onstitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explic-
tily [sic] political. There is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any other form
of expression, be it scientific, literary or . . . obscene or pornographic.").
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated that the societal interest in first
amendment protection is broader than political discussion, and extends to discussions
of philosophical, social, artistic, economic, or ethical matters. See Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977); L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 579.
190. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973), reh'g denied, 414
U.S. 881 (1973); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 261-62
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). When directly confronted with cases involving
first amendment protection for scientific expression, lower courts have also indicated
that scientific expression has social value. See, e.g., United States v. Doe (In re
Popkin), 460 F.2d 328 (lst Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 909 (1973); Henley v.
Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976). But see Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). See generally Robertson, supra note
14, at 1240-46.
191. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746-47 (1978), reh'g denied,
439 U.S. 883 (1978) (although words which "ordinarily lack literary, political or scien-
t#fc value . . . are not entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment ...
[t]he constitutional protection accorded to a communication containing. . . patently
offensive sexual and excretory language need not be the same in every context.") (em-
phasis added); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973), reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881
(1973) ("The First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have . . .
scientoc value, regardless of whether the government or a majority of the people
approve of the ideas these works represent.") (emphasis added); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 357-58 n.6 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
192. [T]he lessons drawn from . . . historic efforts to restrict the scientific
endeavor have informed a Western liberal tradition that takes as its
central tenets the inherent dignity of ideas, the sanctity of knowledge
and the value of intellectual freedom. Rooted in the rationalist spirit of
the eighteenth century Enlightenment, this liberal tradition holds that
the essence of human nature lies in the life of the mind; that the acquisi-
tion of knowledge is therefore the highest of human pursuits; and that
the free exchanse of ideas is the sine qua non of liberty. From this per-
spective, the scientific endeavor stands as its own justification, com-
manding a full measure of protection from the pressures of public
opinion and the constraints of official power.
Ferguson, supra note 14, at 641.
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States. 193 Thus, given the value society places on scientific expres-
sion, and the inapplicability of any of the announced exceptions to
first amendment protection, 94 it seems clear that scientific expres-
sion should be accorded constitutional protection. The question
is: how much protection?
There is a strong argument to be made for according scien-
tific expression at least the level of protection accorded to com-
mercial speech. James Ferguson argues' 95 that this degree of
protection is appropriate because scientific expression promotes
the three major societal interests that lie at the heart of the first
amendment according to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Council, Inc. ,196 the seminal commercial speech de-
cision. The three societal interests identified by the Court include:
(1) the individual's interest in self-expression; 97 (2) the general
societal interest in free flow of information; 98 and (3) the specific
social interest in enlightened public decision making. 199 Assum-
ing Ferguson's analysis is generally correct, 200 scientific expression
193. For a collection of historical references to the virtues of science, including
several by the Framers, see Delgado & Millen, supra note 1, at 354-61. See also
Favre & McKinnon, supra note 14, at 712-19.
194. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
195. Ferguson, supra note 14, at 645-48.
196. 425 U.S. 748, 761-65 (1976).
197. "[S]cientists clearly have strong individual interests in the free exchange of
scientific data and ideas. These interests . . . are largely intellectual in nature, and
thus-unlike the economic concerns that underlie commercial advertising-they are
fully consistent with prevailing views of free expression as a mode of self-realization."
Ferguson, supra note 14, at 647.
198. The public-at-large also has strong interests in the free flow of scien-
tific information. A system of unregulated scientific expression not only
enables scientists to draw on the work of colleagues, but also tests the
validity of hypotheses against current data and opposing views. In
these ways, it promotes the discovery of scientific truth, and thus fosters
the technological and intellectual advances that contribute to the quali-
ty of modern life and the collective wisdom of the culture.
Ferguson, supra note 14, at 647. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
764 ("Generalizing, society may also have a strong interest in the free flow of com-
mercial information.").
199. "[WIhile commercial information is relevant only to questions of economic
policy, scientific information has a direct bearing on questions of national security,
the environment, energy, health care, education and agriculture. In these areas and
others, therefore, the dissemination of scientific opinion and data is indispensable to
informed public participation in the decision making process." Ferguson, supra note
14, at 648.
See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978), reh'g denied, 438
U.S. 907 (1978) ("[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility
for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments."); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and press was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people."); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An
Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 257.
200. In a similar vein, Professor Delgado and David Millen, supra note 1, at
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arguably deserves more protection than commercial speech. Un-
like commercial speech, scientific expression has not historically
been subject to government regulation, nor has it ever been un-
protected under first amendment doctrine. 20 1 Therefore, were the
Court to address the issue directly, it is highly probable that scien-
tific expression would receive full protection under the first
amendment.
20 2
2. Protection for noncommunicative scientific activities
Although scientific expression is protected by the first amend-
ment, the noncommunicative activities of science, including re-
search, are not necessarily accorded the same status. Yet research
is so intimately connected with the scientist's goal of generating
and communicating information that without protection of this
aspect of science, the right to communicate would be
meaningless.
20 3
One possible approach to finding a basis for protecting the
364-67, find that scientific inquiry generally serves Professor Thomas Emerson's four
premises for freedom of expression set out in T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF ExPRESSION 6-8 (1970):
(i) Freedom of expression advances individual se/ffulillment.
("For serious scientists, science is a fully engrossing endeavor that may
constitute the principal creative outlet of their lives." Delgado & Mil-
len, supra note 1, at 364-65.).
(ii) Freedom of expression serves to advance knowledge and discover the
truth.
("Because scientific inquiry is a prime means by which new ideas are
generated in our society, the goal of attaining the truth requires that
scientific inquiry be protected." Id. at 366.).
(iii) Freedom of expression allows particivation in decision making by all
members of society.
("Because science is a major determinant of [the] culture as well as a
supplier of the information necessary for the intelligent resolution of
disputes that are expressly political, it should be entitled to protection
.... " Id. at 367.).
(iv) Freedom of expression is a means of assuring a society that is accept-
able to its members and therefore stable. It facilitates orderly change.
("When civil authority suppresses scientific investigation, stability is
achieved at the price of stagnation, if not lost to outright revolt." Id. at
367.).
201. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
202. Scientific expression is also closely related to political speech because infor-
mation developed through scientific research is necessary for political decision mak-
ing in a modern, technologically sophisticated society. See general y Robertson, supra
note 14, at 1216:
Science provides information relevant to a wide variety of individual
and societal decisions ranging from one's views about the nature of
man and the universe and the wisdom of governmental policies, to indi-
vidual choices regarding the purchase of certain products. Indeed, one
cannot cope with the exigencies of the modern world without access to a
wide range of scientific information.
203. See Note, First Amendment Protection for Biomedical Research, 19 ARIz. L.
REV. 893, 900 (1977).
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research component of science is to consider research "symbolic
speech." The problem with such an approach, however, is that
many research activities are not, in any sense of the word, "sym-
bolic." Unlike cases dealing with symbolic communication, for
example the public display of an American flag to which a peace
symbol has been attached,20 4 the conduct of much scientific re-
search has meaning only to the researcher. 205 Research activities
do not ordinarily constitute intentional communications of infor-
mation from a research scientist to an audience. Therefore, the
symbolic speech analysis offers only minimal support for protect-
ing scientific research.
A second approach, which might be called the "peripheral
rights" approach,206 is to observe that research is an essential step
in the process of the dissemination of new ideas; therefore, re-
search should have the same constitutional status as dissemination
itself.20 7 A related approach, which might be labeled "part-
whole," or "synergy," 208 examines the constitutional status of each
stage of the scientific process, from generation of an idea through
research to dissemination, in order to demonstrate that "if each
step in the process is protected, the whole must be protected as
well." 2
0 9
204. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). In Spence, the Supreme
Court found that the display of the altered flag presented "[an intent to convey a
particularized message. . . , and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." Id. at 410-11.
See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931).
205. See Favre & McKinnon, supra note 14, at 670.
206. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965):
[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amend-
ment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of free-
dom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print,
but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read. . . and
freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach.., in-
deed the freedom of the entire university community. . . . Without
those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure.
Id. at 482-83 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
207. See Robertson, supra note 14, at 1217. Robertson also argues that first
amendment protection for scientific research can be derived from the scientist's right
to receive, rather than to disseminate, information:
If individuals have a first amendment right to acquire information from
willing sources, then the acquisition of knowledge and information by
scientists in the research process should also be protected by the first
amendment because in the research process scientists seek to acquire or
receive information from willing collaborators or from materials under
their lawful control.
Id. at 1223.
208. Id. See Delgado & Millen, supra note 1, at 371-92.
209. Delgado & Millen, supra note 1, at 371. These authors reduce scientific in-
quiry to the following series of components, each of which is protected:
(1) Mentation (freedom of thought is protected as an essential concomitant of free
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The approach most consistent with recent United States
Supreme Court decisions would seem to be the "peripheral rights"
approach. 210 The Court has recently applied this analysis in two
contexts concerning speech: news-gathering 21' and political
spending.212 Scientific inquiry resembles these other two activities
in promoting social interests at the heart of the first amend-
ment.213 Moreover, as with news-gathering and political spend-
ing, science's noncommunicative elements are necessary
preconditions for the full exercise of the right of free expression.
All the approaches discussed above display a common de-
nominator: "scientific inquiry," in both its communicative and
noncommunicative character, describes a unique and recognizable
process of communication. 214 We find it persuasive that even the
most noncommunicative act of scientific inquiry is an essential
link in this process.215 Of course, protection for such noncom-
municative acts is not absolute; its reach will depend upon the
standard of judicial review accorded to the various governmental
regulations on scientific inquiry which may be imposed. But
expression, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)); (2) Experimentation (because
experimentation is the information-gathering step in the scientific process, it is similar
to the newsgathering operation of the press recognized in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972)); (3) Dissemination (scientific inquiry does not fit into the narrow first
amendment exceptions to protected dissemination); (4) Reception (the passive right to
know has been held to exist without regard to the perceived social worth of the
message conveyed, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)); and (5) Teaching
(right to teach protected under Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)). Del-
gado & Millen, supra note 1, at 372-79.
210. Ferguson, supra note 14, at 651.
211. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court held that a grand jury
had the power to compel reporters to disclose the identities of their confidential
sources, because the state's interest in uncovering criminal activity outweighed the
largely "speculative" effect of compelled disclosures on the ability of reporters to
gather information. Id. at 679-709. Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that "with-
out some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscer-
ated." Id. at 681. "Therefore, as the Court recognized, the first amendment right to
publish must have as its correlate the right to gather newsworthy information without
unwarranted state interference." Ferguson, supra note 14, at 653.
212. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the Court held that congres-
sionally imposed limits on the amount an individual could spend in direct contribu-
tion to a "clearly identified" candidate were unconstitutional. The Court stated that
"virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the
expenditure of money." Id. at 19. Thus, restrictions on spending necessarily operate
as restrictions on speech. Id. at 19-20, 39. "[S]ince limitations on spending restrict
the exercise of the free speech right, the expenditure of money for political speech
must itself be protected as a first amendment freedom." Ferguson, supra note 14, at
652.
213. See supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
214. Although Professors Favre and McKinnon recognize scientific inquiry as a
process, see Favre & McKinnon, supra note 14, at 664, they reject protecting scientific
inquiry under the first amendment alone. Id. at 663-64.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 203-11.
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before addressing these standards of review we shall dispose of a
potential roadblock: whether race-IQ research is indeed scientific
inquiry.
B. Is Race-IQ Research Scientific Inquiry?
For race-IQ research to receive the constitutional protection
afforded scientific activities, it must appear that race-IQ research
is science, rather than pseudoscience or nonscience. This presup-
poses a common understanding, or definition, of science, yet there
are difficulties with providing such a definition. On the one hand,
a definition may be drawn too broadly: any fact-gathering activ-
ity might conceivably be considered scientific inquiry, but not all
fact-gathering activities would have the social value that justifies
first amendment protection.216 On the other hand, a definition of
scientific inquiry might be too narrow because it excludes research
which some members of the community would consider scientific
inquiry. 2
17
Although any definition can be criticized as over- or under-
inclusive, the process of developing a definition must begin some-
where. A promising starting point is the means or method by
which scientific information is developed. Arguably, if a research
project is not conducted within the bounds of "scientific
method, ' 218 then its noncommunicative elements should receive
216. For example, the dissection of frogs in a biology class certainly serves the
students' interests in gaining knowledge, and probably serves the general social inter-
est in the free flow of information, but does not appreciably serve the specific social
interest in enlightened public decision making. See Favre & McKinnon, supra note
14, at 665 n.54. Thus, dissecting frogs should not receive the same protection as the
other forms of scientific endeavor. Professors Favre and McKinnon see the problem
of overinclusion as an inherent defect of "part-whole" analyses:
There is a significant disadvantage, however, in breaking scientific in-
quiry into component parts, because what results is a list of activities
[that] may encompass more than the "scientific inquiry" than was origi-
nally intended to be protected. For example, the components thinking,
analyzing, observing, etc., would also encompass the activities of law-
yers, economists, and historians.
Id. at 663-64.
217. Professors Favre and McKinnon, for example, attempt to provide a "worka-
ble legal definition" of scientific inquiry. Id. at 662-68. Their definition would ex-
clude the activities of a professor of sociology who conducts an opinion survey to
determine the cause of the increase in divorce rates. Id. at 668. Favre and McKinnon
reach this controversial conclusion by defining scientific inquiry to include only ac-
quisition of knowledge about "man's relationship with the natural universe"; knowl-
edge about "man's relationship with man" is excluded. Id. at 665. Such a definition
would probably be objectionable to social scientists.
218. The scientific method has been variously defined, but generally is thought to
include all or most of the following elements: hypothesis-formation, observation or
experimentation, verification or falsification of the hypothesis, publication, and, per-
haps, the use of quantitative methods. See W. FOWLER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCI-
ENTIFIC METHOD (1962); Favre & McKinnon, supra note 14, at 666-67.
UCLA LAW REVIEW
no special treatment under the first amendment.219 This conclu-
sion would be reached because the communicative elements of the
project, such as published results, would be no more deserving of
first amendment protection than false statements of fact in a news-
paper 220 or false or misleading advertising.221
One problem with the use of a methodological criterion to
determine whether or not a particular inquiry qualifies as scien-
tific for first amendment purposes is that courts are poorly
equipped to make the judgments required for such a determina-
tion.222 Moreover, entrusting such judgments to courts raises the
specter of state-imposed orthodoxy, one of the prime dangers that
the first amendment is designed to avoid. 223 Another problem
with the methodological approach is that even when research is
carried out with flawed methodology it may produce valuable re-
sults; serendipity has accounted for many major scientific discov-
eries.224 Finally, it could be argued that a threshold test based on
methodology is unnecessary-that the scientific community and
many lay persons are already sensitive to questions of method and
would not be likely to accept results derived from poor research
methods.
225
Accordingly, we propose that first amendment protection
should attach to research that is carried out pursuant to methods
that are "arguably scientific. ' 22 6 Under this broad criterion, any
study that could reasonably be portrayed as scientific would be
entitled to prima facie protection as an expressive activity. Most
219. Alternatively, a sliding-scale approach might be followed, in which classi-
cally scientific disciplines (such as physics and genetics) would receive full protection,
while the "softer" disciplines (such as psychology) would receive a lesser degree of
protection.
220. "[Tlhere is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
221. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
222. "It appears that the Court at present is ill-equipped to determine whether a
particular regulation of scientific inquiry furthers an important government interest."
Favre & McKinnon, supra note 14, at 694. But cf. Reich v. United States, 239 F.2d
134, 136-37 (lst Cir. 1956) (individual challenged authority of Food and Drug Ad-
ministration to enjoin his continued use of "orgone energy accumulators" because he
was engaged in research of "primordial, pre-atomic cosmic orgone energy"; held:
these contentions were without merit), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957).
223. See supra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
224. Benjamin Franklin's discovery of electrical conduction while investigating
the flight of kites, the discovery of penicillin, a mold, and Archimedes' bathtub dis-
covery of the principle of specific gravity are well-known examples.
225. See Robertson, supra note 14, at 1257-58 n.249. See generally supra notes
109, 111, 132-36 and accompanying text.
226. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 822, 831 (acts considered religious for pur-
poses of religious freedom clauses if they are "arguably religious." The "arguably
scientific" test proposed here is likewise intended to give a broad scope to the degree
of protection afforded, see id. at 831).
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race-IQ research would meet this criterion.2 27 That which does
not would be reviewed under the more relaxed standard appropri-
ate to activities that do not entail expression.228
C. The Appropriate Standard of Review
Having established that scientific inquiry is protected by the
first amendment, the next step is to determine the level of judicial
scrutiny, or test, applicable to government regulation restricting
the protected right.2 2 9 In those cases where regulation is related
directly only to the content of the scientific inquiry's speech ele-
ments, the restriction will be unconstitutional 230 unless the gov-
ernment can show that the regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.231 Where regulation is aimed at preventing harms uncon-
nected with the subject of the inquiry, reasonable time, place, and
227. Most such research at least purports to use scientific methods, including
quantitative analysis, THE IQ CONTROVERSY, supra note 30 (scholarly debate over
merits and demerits of race-IQ studies); IQ and Scholastic Achievement, supra note
54. It would thus qualify under the broad "arguably scientific" criterion proposed
here.
228. Socioeconomic regulation that does not impinge on fundamental rights or
classify according to suspect criteria is reviewed under a relaxed standard ("rational
basis scrutiny"), Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
229. "The significance of a constitutional right lies in the test that is applied to
determine the validity of government regulations restricting that right, that is, to de-
termine what degree of harm to other state concerns must exist before the right may
be limited." Robertson, supra note 14, at 1209-10.
230. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression be-
cause of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975). See generally supra note 174 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Tribe's analytical framework).
231. The Supreme Court's decisions invalidating content-based restrictions on
speech demonstrate that strict first amendment scrutiny is reserved for those instances
in which the government has sought specifically to "dictat[e] the subjects about which
persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue." First National
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978). The application of this high standard is
appropriate "[e]specialy where ...the legislature's suppression of speech suggests
an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing
its views .. " Id. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (invalidating,
on free speech grounds, state university rules that permitted general use of campus
facilities but denied use for religious purposes); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Di-
ego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (invalidating ordinance that permitted commercial expres-
sion while prohibiting noncommercial expression in identical circumstances); Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (invalidat-
ing regulation that prohibited utility from promoting use of electricity); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (invalidating regulation that
prohibited utility from expressing views on "controversial issues of public policy");
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (invalidating ordinance that permitted labor
picketing while prohibiting other picketing); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972) (same).
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manner restrictions will be upheld. 232 Finally, where "speech"
and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, as is often the case with scientific inquiry, "a sufficiently
important government interest in regulating the nonspeech ele-
ment can justify incidental limitations on the first amendment
freedom." 233 The standard of review for activities which combine
both speech and nonspeech elements is lower than that for pure
speech because "[t]here are few restrictions on action which could
not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased
data flow."' 234 The test for such incidental limitations is stated in
United States v. O'Brien.235
To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which
must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive
terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; co-
gent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we
think it clear that a governmental regulation is sufficiently justi-
fied if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if
the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged first
amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.
2 36
232. Eg., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569, 574 (1941). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 580-84.
233. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (upholding law ban-
ning the burning of draft cards against challenge that burning constitutes symbolic
speech; government had valid interest in functioning of Selective Service System).
234. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
235. 391 U.S. 367 (1969).
236. Id. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted). See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub-
lic Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980). The various elements of the O'Brien test can
be explained as follows:
(i) Regulations must be within the constitutional power ofgovernment.
For state governments, in order to meet this requirement the regulation
must fall within the police power, which includes the power to protect
the public health, safety, or welfare. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133
(1894). For the federal government, the regulation must be promul-
gated within one of the enumerated powers in the Constitution. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 174, at 225-27.
(ii) The state interest must be important or substantial.
Cases where the Supreme Court has recognized interests substantial
enough to justify the regulation include: United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 380 (protection of the selective service system); Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1965) (protection of national security); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972) ("public interest in law enforcement
and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings"); Procunier v. Marti-
nez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-13 (1974) ("order and security of penal
institutions").
(iii) The regulation must further the state interest.
Various regulations have failed to meet the furtherance requirement:
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
(1980) (ordinance prohibiting solicitations by unqualified charitable or-
ganizations found overbroad with respect to the legitimate government
[Vol. 31:128
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The following discussion applies the above standards to a series of
possible restrictions on the activities of race-IQ researchers at var-
ious stages of their inquiry.
237
1. Restrictions on employment. Governmental restrictions on sci-
entific research are certain to include denial of at least some gov-
ernment benefits. Because employment and funding are benefits
of great importance to researchers and necessary to the inception
of inquiry, they are the earliest stages at which governmental re-
straint on research is likely to be imposed.
For purposes of illustration, assume that a government em-
ployer, such as a state-funded university, discharges or denies ten-
ure to an race-IQ researcher because the employer believes that
the research is "inopportune. ' 238 If this denial of employment is
perceived to be based purely on ideological grounds, a long line of
cases would be implicated.239 Courts first addressed the question
of a government employee's discharge because of the employee's
interest in protecting citizens from fraud, crime, and undue annoyance);
Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (pro-
hibition of "for sale" signs on residential real estate did not advance the
state's interest in promoting racially integrated housing); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (goal of stemming corruption in
election process was legitimate but expenditure ceiling would fail to
further this interest).
(iv) The restriction must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of the government interest.
See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (state inter-
est in protecting individual privacy by prohibiting drive-in theaters
from showing films containing nudity could be less restrictively met if
viewer simply averts his eyes); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943) (municipal ordinance prohibiting ringing door bells to distribute
pamphlets struck down because privacy of individuals could be pro-
tected by less restrictive means).
237. Such an approach for judicial review of scientific inquiry has been previously
suggested by Ferguson:
[1In dealing with restrictions on scientific speech, the Court should
adopt a case-by-case approach in which it starts with the assumption
that scientific expression warrants a full measure of constitutional pro-
tection, and then determines whether the particular state interests impli-
cated by the information at issue are sufficient to justify an abridgement
of fully protected speech. Under this approach, the Court could best
serve the values of free expression while, at the same time, recognizing
that certain types of scientific information pose significantly greater
dangers than more conventional forms of expression.
Ferguson, supra note 14, at 649 n.35.
238. In 1973, William Shockley was denied the opportunity to speak or teach at
Stanford, Princeton, and Harvard. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1973, at A-5 1, col. 1; id.,
Nov. 16, 1973, at A-41, col. 5; id., May 2, 1972, at 9, col. 1. See also TIME, Aug. 1,
1977, at 54 (leader of sociobiology movement denied tenure at Harvard).
239. According to Professor Emerson, the employment cases drift from estab-
lished first amendment doctrine: "Even more than in the case of sedition laws, the
courts here deal with First Amendment problems without relying upon First Amend-
ment doctrines. Nevertheless the presence of First Amendment factors influences the
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exercise of first amendment rights at the turn of the century. The
doctrine which prevailed at that time was that government em-
ployment was a "privilege," not a constitutionally protected right.
Employment could therefore be withheld absolutely or condition-
ally-even if the condition, viewed independently, would have vi-
olated a constitutional provision. 240 For example, in McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford,241 Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice
Holmes succinctly expressed the principle: "The petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman." 242 For the next half-century,
American courts adhered to this principle.2
43
During the 1950's and early 1960's, however, the Supreme
Court began to strike down state "loyalty oath" statutes on
grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.244  In a 1967 decision,
Keyishian v. Board of Regents,245 the Court expressly rejected the
notion that public employment, including academic employment,
may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights
which otherwise could not be abridged by direct government ac-
tion.246 Quoting from an earlier case, 24 7 the Court stated, "[i]t is
too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and ex-
manner in which courts apply non-First Amendment principles." T. EMERSON, supra
note 200, at 163.
240. See L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 509-11; cases cited infra notes 241-43.
241. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
242. 155 Mass. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517. Holmes went on to say: "There are few
employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitu-
tional right of free speech, as well as idleness, by the implied terms of his contract.
The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are
offered him." Id. at 518.
243. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding a provision
of the New York Civil Service Law disqualifying from the civil service and public
school system any person who "advocates, advises or teaches" governmental over-
throw by force or violence or who organizes or joins any group advocating such doc-
trine); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1950), ajf/'d 341 U.S. 918
(1951) (upholding power of President to remove from government service anyone
whose loyalty he questions). See generally Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent Dis-
charge of Civil Service Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942, 961 (1976) (until the
1950's, courts refused to review challenges to the executive's power to remove
employees).
244. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (overbreadth); Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (vagueness and overbreadth); Cramp v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (vagueness). See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960) (overbreadth); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ("indiscriminate
classification").
245. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). In Keyishian, the Court held that the statutes found
constitutional in Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), were now unconstitu-
tionally overbroad and invalid insofar as they proscribed membership without any
showing of specific intent to further the unlawful aims of the Communist Party. Id. at
609-10.
246. Id. at 605.
247. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
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pression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions
upon a benefit or privilege.
'248
The Court has repeatedly affirmed the principle set forth in
Keyishian. For example, in 1972, Justice Stewart's decision for
the Court in Perry v. Sindermann stated that "even though a per-
son has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even
though the government may deny him the benefit for any number
of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government
may not rely. ' 249 In particular, the government may not deny a
benefit because of a person's exercise of a constitutionally pro-
tected right of speech or association. 250 This doctrine has been
further refined in subsequent cases. 251 Now, once the employee
succeeds in establishing that constitutionally protected conduct
was a "substantial factor," or "motivating factor," in the govern-
ment employer's decision not to rehire, the burden shifts to the
government to show "by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have reached the same decision as to . . . reemployment
even in the absence of the protected conduct.
'25 2
Despite the protections for teachers and other government
employees 253 articulated in Keyishian and subsequent cases, the
248. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967).
249. 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
250. Id.
251. Givan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (unanimous
per Rehnquist, J.) (reinstating public school teacher who criticized school policies in
private meeting with principal; public employee does not "forfeit" first amendment
protection by communicating privately with employer rather than spreading views
before the public); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977) (unanimous, per Rehnquist, J.) (even though untenured teacher can be dis-
missed "for no reason whatever," he or she cannot be fired for exercising first amend-
ment freedoms, in this case conveying contents of school memorandum on teacher
dress code to local radio station); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
(Board of Education dismissed teacher for writing and publishing a letter of criticism
in a newspaper regarding the Board's allocation of school funds; Court held that,
"absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's
exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis
for his dismissal from public employment." Id. at 574) (footnotes omitted). See also
cases cited in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597.
252. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977). Justice Rehnquist has stated, however, that the government as employer or
school administrator may impose upon employees reasonable regulations that would
be impermissible if imposed by the government upon all citizens. See Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 203 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Papish v. Board of Cura-
tors, 410 U.S. 667, 677 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
253. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (public employees protected
from firing because of political associations); accord Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347
(1976). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (federal act which im-
posed heavy criminal penalties on any member of a "communist action" organization
who engaged in any employment in any defense facility violated the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of association on overbreadth grounds); Bond v. Floyd, 385
U.S. 116 (1966) (Court found first amendment violation when state legislature denied
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Court has upheld the Hatch Act 254 and similar state regulations
which prohibit plainly identifiable acts of political campaigning
by civil service employees. 255 The Court upheld these statutes be-
cause they were aimed at conduct, not "pure speech, ' 256 and be-
cause the regulations were content-neutral-they did not
discriminate on the basis of the employees' political affiliations. 25
7
These cases, therefore, are distinguishable from Keyishian and re-
lated cases which involved discharge of employees precisely be-
cause the content of their speech was objectionable to the
employer.
Where a public university discharges a scientist because it
disapproves of his or her research topic, the principle of Keyishian
and its successors may come into play. Arguably, the research ac-
tivities of the discharged scientist are protected under a first
amendment right to free scientific inquiry.258 This right, it may be
argued, has been infringed by the university's discharge of the sci-
entist, because the discharge was based on the content of the re-
search and thus on the content of the scientist's speech. Since the
employment policies of the university administration have not
been applied in a content-neutral manner, the researcher should
be reinstated.
There is a situation in which this question is not susceptible
to a clear-cut answer, however. That situation arises where the
university's decision not to employ the researcher to do a particu-
lar type of research is based on reasons other than disapproval of
the information or conclusions which may be revealed. That is,
the researcher is denied employment not because the content of
his or her inquiry is inopportune, or otherwise disapproved, but
because the topic may not rank sufficiently high on the university's
list of research priorities. Universities and other governmental in-
stitutions operate under budgetary constraints which limit the
number of positions available for employment of teachers and re-
search scientists. Just as an educational institution must allocate
resources across departments, so must it allocate resources within
departments. This allocation necessarily entails some system of
seat to duly elected member of legislature because sincerity of oath of office
questioned).
254. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (1976) (certain federal employees prohibited from engag-
ing in identifiable acts of political campaigning).
255. See, e.g, United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (Hatch Act); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973) (state regulation similar to Hatch Act).
256. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
257. Id. at 616. ("The statute ... seeks to regulate political activity in an even-
handed and neutral manner. . . such statutes have in the past been subject to a less
exacting overbreadth scrutiny." Id.)
258. See supra Part liA.
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priorities which will inevitably limit scholarly inquiry into certain
areas in order to allow inquiry into other areas. The denial of
tenure or discharge of an race-IQ researcher based on such a sys-
tem of priorities may be conceived simply as the necessary and
legitimate allocation of resources according to curricular or re-
search priorities.
259
The cases concerning unconstitutional discharge of govern-
ment employees for exercising their first amendment freedoms in
academic environments provide little guidance in analyzing this
issue. For example, Keyishian concerned a state statute requiring
faculty members to sign certificates stating that they were not
communists; failure to sign was punishable by discharge.260 Such
a statutory constraint bears little resemblance to a situation in
which allocation of faculty positions may be made on the basis of
research topic. In Pickering v. Board of Education,261 a teacher
was dismissed for writing a letter to a newspaper criticizing the
school board's allocation of resources. Similarly, Perry v.
Sindermann262 concerned the dismissal of a state college teacher
for public criticism of the policies of the college administration.
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle
263
involved the attempted discharge of a teacher who had conveyed
the contents of a school memorandum relating to teacher dress
and appearance to a local radio station. In all of these cases, the
teachers were unconstitutionally "compelled to relinquish First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to com-
ment on matters of public interest in connection with the opera-
tion of the public schools in which they work." 264 Thus, these
employees were not discharged, or threatened with discharge, be-
cause of the content of their teaching, but because they exercised
their right to freedom of expression as citizens, a right which they
may enjoy outside the classroom.
To begin with, these cases are distinguishable from the case
of the discharged race-IQ researcher in the sense that his or her
discharge would be for conduct and statements inside the class-
room, laboratory, or research environment-"speech" having to
do with the very content of the research. More important, al-
259. "Because hiring, promotion, and research grant decisions involve resource
allocation and there is no right to have the institution provide those resources to a
particular individual or project, the institution may allocate its research funds accord-
ing to content and manner criteria that it chooses." Robertson, supra note 14, at 1272.
See also Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to
Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976).
260. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 592, 597 (1967).
261. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
262. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
263. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
264. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (emphasis added).
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though the researcher certainly has the right to speak freely as a
citizen, these cases do not support the proposition that the re-
searcher enjoys, as a citizen, a right to conduct state-funded re-
search. Thus, Keyishian and its line of cases provide persuasive
but inconclusive authority for reinstating the discharged race-IQ
research scientist who has conducted research in a disapproved
area of scientific inquiry.
A closer analogy to the case of the researcher who is either
dismissed or not employed to do race-IQ research may be drawn
from patronage cases where government employees have been dis-
charged for being members of the political party that no longer
controls the government agency which employs them. In Elrod v.
Burns,265 the Court held that party affiliation may be an accepta-
ble requirement for some types of government employment, 266 but
not if the employee is in a "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential"
position.267 Recently, in Brand v. Finke1268 the Court reformu-
lated the test for this situation. "[T]he ultimate inquiry is not
whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular
position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement
for the effective performance of the public office involved.
269
The patronage cases thus employ a "balance" of the public em-
ployees' first amendment rights against the "State's vital interest
in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency.
270 If
the same balancing analysis is applied to the case of a race-IQ
researcher, it could be argued that continued research along a dis-
approved avenue of inquiry would be ineffective or inefficient per-
formance of the university's mission to allocate research resources
to the most "valuable" inquiry topics. It may thus be said that the
first amendment rights of the scientist to choose his or her area of
inquiry are here being balanced against the university's duty to
encourage research in areas of greater social importance. 27'
265. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
266. Id. at 367.
267. Id. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring).
268. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
269. Id. at 518.
270. Id. at 517. Note that the balanci. referred to is similar to the balance in the
education cases; see, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391. U.S. 563 (1968): "The
problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees." Id. at 568.
271. Robert Sinsheimer, Chancellor of the University of California, Santa Cruz,
has suggested that university administrators would, in fact, make such value judg-
ments with respect to race-IQ research:
You also ask about research into relationships between intelligence and
genetics. Leaving aside the formidable difficulties which confront such
[Vol. 31:128
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Given the countervailing claims that can be made by both the
researcher and the university,272 the factual context in which the
dispute arises would probably have a great effect on a court's deci-
sion. In a case where the university/employer were clearly dis-
charging the scientist for public statements concerning
correlations between race and intelligence (followed, perhaps, by
wide publicity and public outcry), the court might very well come
down on the side of the scientist's right, as a citizen, to speak out.
However, if the researcher were discharged as a result of the uni-
versity's normal allocation of research positions, it is doubtful that
his or her right to engage in a chosen line of inquiry as a research
scientist would outweigh the university's duty to choose areas of
inquiry most appropriate for accomplishing the task of advancing
knowledge. 273 The cases will present problems, nevertheless, to
research-the problems of the definition of "intelligence," the problems
of separation of genetic and developmental (cultural) influences in a
situation wherein controlled mating is infeasible-I would raise similar
questions as to the priority that might be assigned to such research. As-
suming that valid and meaningful results could be obtained, what use
could our society make of such? Would they merely serve as grist for
social polemics? In short, would-at this time-the net social benefit of
a successful research program be positive or negative? My surmise is
the latter. Others may differ and I would be interested to hear their
arguments.
Letter from Robert Sinsheimer to David Burkenroad (Nov. 5, 1982) (on file at UCL4
Law Review).
272. The scientist might reply that the balance should generally be struck in favor
of freedom of inquiry. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957);
Delgado & Millen, supra note 1, at 386-88 ("A professor denied employment, ad-
vancement, or tenure because his employer objected to the content of his research
could challenge the university's decision as a violation of his academic freedom." Id.
at 353). Cf. Ferguson, supra note 14, at 650 n.41 (the availability of the concept of
academic freedom to scientific research is limited because Supreme Court cases refer-
ring to academic freedom all involve obvious speech infringement).
273. A scientist's right to conduct race-IQ research can also be analyzed under the
liberty clause of the 5th and 14th amendments. In a long line of cases extending back
to Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Livestock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884), the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of the right to pursue one's occupation. In the seminal
case, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court held that a state legislature
could not, without a valid state objective, prohibit the teaching of foreign languages
and thus prevent a teacher of German from practicing his profession: "liberty...
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual
to . . . engage in any of the common occupations of life. ... Id. at 399.
The Meyer decision did not, however, stand exclusively upon the right to pursue
a profession. The right of parents to choose an education for their children and the
right of children to receive knowledge were essential to the decision. Id. at 401.
Thus, it was not clear how much weight the Court actually assigned to the teacher's
liberty interest.
The Court has been reluctant to state squarely what constitutional weight it will
assign to the right to pursue one's profession. This reluctance is exemplified by Ep-
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), a case involving a statute that made it unlaw-
ful for a public school teacher to teach evolution. The Court rejected both the right of
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the extent that, in either situation, the university has not been neu-
tral in its assessment of the content of the researcher's topic and
speech. Probably the strongest claim would be one made by a
race-IQ researcher fired because he or she proposed to establish
the existence of genetically-determined racial differences while a
colleague who set out to prove the opposite was retained, or vice-
versa. Few, if any, cases will be that simple.
2. Restrictions on funding. Like employment, funding is crucial
to successful scientific inquiry. Furthermore, governmental enti-
free speech and the liberty clause as grounds for overturning the statute and decided
the case instead on establishment of religion grounds. Id. at 105-06.
It is equally unclear whether the right to pursue a profession is a "fundamental"
interest, like freedom of speech, that requires the Court to scrutinize strictly the state's
motives and purposes in regulating it. Justice Marshall referred to that uncertainty in
his dissent in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), by
beginning an analysis of the right to pursue one's occupation with the statement,
"Whether 'fundamental' or not .... " Id. at 322 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Despite the Court's uncertain position, some scholars do argue that employment
as a scientist is a fundamental interest. Favre & McKinnon, for example, argue that
science, by being mentioned in the patent clause of the Constitution, "is found within
the structure of the Constitution. . . . [Additional] support for a fundamental right
can be found in the decisions of the Supreme Court. . . . In Meyer v. Nebraska the
Court stated that the term liberty in the fourteenth amendment included the right to
acquire useful knowledge." Favre & McKinnon, supra note 14, at 709-10.
But this analysis is not compelling. Favre and McKinnon fail to see that the
Meyer holding would not necessarily have been reached had parents' and children's
rights not also been involved. Nor, it would seem, does the mere mention of science
in the patent clause render science an interest that will be treated as "fundamental" in
constitutional analysis.
It is more likely that when confronted with the issue the Court will not recognize
a fundamental right to research grounded in the liberty clause. See Robertson, .upra
note 14, at 1213. Thus, a researcher's work would not be a fundamental interest, strict
scrutiny of governmental regulation through discharge or denial of employment
would not be required, and the employment decision would not have to be justified
by a compelling state interest.
Most decisions concerning the right to pursue a given profession actually deal
with the right to a livelihood. See Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472
(1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307 (1976). There is no infringement upon a constitutional right to livelihood where
the state's action does not interfere with an individual's right to future employment.
In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the employer denied tenure to a
professor with a one-year employment contract. The Court found that the employee
had no property interest in employment, since he had a limited contract. Id. at 578.
Furthermore, his freedom to seek other employment had not been infringed upon
because no stigmatizing charges had been made against him that would interfere with
potential future employment. Id. at 573. Finally, the right to livelihood is not abso-
lute; to the extent that one's work affects public matters, it becomes subject to regula-
tion by the state. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (right to work can be
interfered with by legislative action that has a "reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State."). Thus, while a scholar may have a right to
pursue his or her calling, the state also has a right to regulate it under the police
power. The legitimacy and strength of the state's concerns are discussed in Part IV of
this Article.
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ties, especially federal agencies, are the primary sources of support
for basic research in the United States.274 Government funding
restrictions can be considered under two headings: denial of
funding and conditional funding.
(a) Denial offunding. It has been argued that a research sci-
entist denied public money to pursue a controversial line of in-
quiry can sustain an action against the government funding
agency to compel adoption of nondiscriminatory criteria for dis-
bursing funds.275 What issues would be raised by such a case if
the research in question were race-IQ research, and denial of
funding based upon the belief that the research was
"inopportune"?
Generally, the Supreme Court has found that constitutional
rights are not abridged merely because the government refuses to
subsidize those rights, 276 or makes value judgments favoring alter-
native activities. 27
7 As stated in Maher v. Roe:278
There is a basic difference between direct state interference
with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alter-
native activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional
concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will
by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed
to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
279
As in the case of employment, 280 government must be permitted
to allocate its resources in a manner consistent with its goals.
Therefore, a potential recipient of governmental funding cannot
successfully make, as his or her sole argument, the claim that de-
274. "In the post-World War II period, the Federal Government has become the
dominant source of support for basic research." National Science Foundation, 26th
Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1976, at xi (1976) (statement of acting NSF Director
Richard C. Atkinson). See generally Delgado & Millen, supra note 1, at 397 n.272.
275. Delgado & Millen, supra note 1, at 353.
276. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) ("Although the lib-
erty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted gov-
ernment interference with freedom of choice . . . it does not confer an entitlement
to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom ...
Whether freedom of choice that is constitutionally protected warrants federal subsidi-
zation is a question for Congress to answer, not a matter of constitutional entitle-
ment"); L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 1098-1106, and cases cited therein (wealth not a
suspect classification; government under no obligation to assure equal purchasing
power for commodities necessary to full enjoyment of life and liberty).
277. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (Court rejecting challenge to Medi-
caid program which subsidizes medical services incident to childbirth, but not services
incident to nontherapeutic abortions; held: constitutional right to undergo nonthera-
peutic abortion does not prevent state from making "a value judgment favoring child-
birth over abortion, and . . . implement[ing] that judgment by the allocation of
public funds.")
278. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
279. Id. at 475-76 (footnotes omitted).
280. See supra notes 260-71 and accompanying text.
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nial of funding to support the exercise of the protected right of
free expression is unconstitutional.
In 1959, the Court addressed the question of first amendment
abridgment through discriminatory denial of a valuable govern-
ment benefit.28' In Cammarano v. United States,282 the Court up-
held Treasury regulations that prohibited business deductions of
lobbying expenses on the ground that, although lobbying is pro-
tected by the first amendment, governmental refusal to underwrite
lobbying costs does not violate the first amendment. 283 Justice
Harlan's opinion for the Court upheld these regulations because
they did not discriminate among lobbyists, or their messages, in
denying the deductions.
284
In 1976, the Court returned to the issue of discriminatory
funding in Buckley v. Valeo ,285 where it heard challenges to public
financing provisions for presidential campaigns that provided far
greater financial support to major-party candidates than to others.
In determining the standard of review, the Court stated that "re-
strictions on access to the electoral process must survive exacting
scrutiny. ' 286 Nevertheless, the Court found that denial of funding
to some candidates was not a "direct burden" on first amendment
rights, unlike cases covering restricted access to the ballot,
287
thereby implying that some standard less than "exacting scrutiny"
281. See generally the scholarly debate between Judges Mikva and MacKinnon in
Taxation with Representation of Washington v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 724-31, 748-49
(D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983) (Lobbying restrictions on certain non-
profit organizations required by the Internal Revenue Code found not to violate the
first amendment as "unconstitutional conditions," id. at 726, but do violate first
amendment and equal protection guarantees because such restrictions subsidized lob-
bying activities of veterans' organizations while failing to subsidize lobbying of other
charitable groups, id at 744-45.).
282. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
283. Id. at 513.
284. Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they engage
in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being required to
pay for those activities entirely out of their own pockets, as everyone else
engaging in similar activities is required to do under the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code. Nondiscriminatory denial of deduction from
gross income to sums expended to promote or defeat legislation is
plainly not "aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."
358 U.S. at 513, quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (emphasis ad-
ded). Although Cammarano was decided before the Court adopted its current first
amendment terminology regarding "content-neutrality," see supra notes 243-45 and
accompanying text, the holding of that case is consistent with modem doctrine: the
Court will apply a strict standard of review in situations where the government has
withheld a valuable benefit affecting first amendment rights on a content-discrimina-
tory basis.
285. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
286. Id. at 94.
287. Id. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (indigent candidates
may not be required to pay filing fees absent alternative means of ballot access); Wil-
liams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (appearance of minor parties on ballot may
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was appropriate. Without declaring a standard of review for the
issue, the Court went on to state, "fijn any event, Congress enacted
[the challenged statute] in furtherance of sufficiently important
governmental interests .... ,,288 Despite the limitations of this
analysis, it appears that discriminatory funding of first amend-
ment activities is still subject to heightened scrutiny; however,
whether the government need demonstrate that the discrimination
furthers a compelling state interest remains open to question.
Applying these principles to the case of the unfunded race-IQ
researcher, it is clear under Maher v. Roe that the right to engage
in scientific inquiry is a right against government interference, not
an entitlement to a particular allotment of public funds.28 9 Ar-
guably, the choice of specific areas of inquiry to be funded by the
government should remain a matter of governmental discre-
tion. 290 However, the scientist may succeed in his or her action
against the government to compel nondiscriminatory criteria for
disbursing funds if the government's asserted interests in, and
manner of, disbursement do not meet the standards of exacting
scrutiny, or whatever intermediate standard of scrutiny was indi-
cated in Buckley. Finally, Buckley suggests that if the researcher
does receive funds, he or she may have to "voluntarily" accept
conditions on the funding which to some extent burden the free-
dom of scientific inquiry. 29' It is to that issue that we now turn.
(b) Conditionalfunding. If the government does grant bene-
fits, it may not condition receipt of those benefits on relinquish-
ment of constitutional rights.292 Cases regarding such conditional
not be conditioned on whether they can obtain voter petitions with signatures totaling
15 percent of the number of ballots cast in the previous gubernatorial election).
288. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 95 (1975) (emphasis added).
289. Robertson, supra note 14, at 1206, 1268. See also Maryland Pub. Interest
Research v. Elkins, 565 F.2d 864, 866 (4th Cir. 1977) ("There is no affirmative com-
mandment upon [the government] to activate [the citizen's] exercise of First Amend-
ment guarantees; the only commandment is not to infringe their enjoyment").
290. Professor Robertson argues that scientists should enter the political arena for
their specific projects.
[T]he first amendment right to research, like other rights, is no help to
the scientist who wants both government funds and total discretion on
how to use them. If scientists wish their views about the research
budget to prevail, they, like other professions and groups, are relegated
to the political process, for there the polity's commitment to the utility
of research and new knowledge must ultimately be determined.
Robertson, supra note 14, at 1279.
291. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95.
292. [The government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests---especially, his interest
in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a
person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations,
his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). See also Van Alstyne's statement that
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benefits have given rise to what is termed the doctrine of "uncon-
stitutional conditions."
293
Among first amendment cases, the cornerstone decision is
Speiser v. Randall,294 in which the Court established the principle
that enjoyment of a government-conferred benefit cannot be made
contingent upon compliance with a condition that violates the first
amendment rights of one who would otherwise qualify for the
benefit.295 Speiser invalidated a requirement that persons seeking
to qualify for a state property tax exemption for veterans sign a
loyalty oath. The Court rejected the contention that because a tax
exemption is a "privilege," its denial based upon refusal to sign
did not infringe upon free expression. 296 The Court found that
the loyalty oath requirement improperly created a presumption of
disloyalty on the part of the applicants, and likened the denial of
the tax exemption to a penalty for the exercise of rights of free
expression.297 Thus, the Court held that the requirement allowed
the government to "produce a result which [it] could not com-
mand directly. ' 298 Cases following Speiser have applied its prin-
ciple to denials of unemployment benefits, 299 welfare payments,3°°
and, most often, denials of public employment. 30'
From Speiser and its progeny, it is clear that the government
may not dictate conditions through its grant of funds to a research
scientist if the conditions infringe the recipient's exercise of first
amendment rights. Conversely, content-neutral restrictions on
scientific inquiry do not infringe on the recipient's first amend-
ment rights, so long as the standards of United States v. O'Brien
under appropriate circumstances one's interest in his government job,
his publicly financed home, his food stamp meals, or his state university
educational opportunities may indeed be constitutional rights in the
positive-law sense ought no longer be denied. . . . Any per se constitu-
tional distinction which would exclude governmental regulation of sta-
tus in the public sector from constitutional review would, to steal a
phrase from Mr. Justice Holmes, reflect neither logic nor experience in
the law.
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1463-64 (1968).
293. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 509-11;see also T. EMERSON, supra
note 200, at 191-92; O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions.- Welfare Benefits with Strings
Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966).
294. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
295. Id. at 518-19.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 518-20.
298. Id. at 526.
299. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1963).
300. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969).
301. See cases cited supra notes 244-52 and accompanying text.
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are met.30 2 In addition, if the conditions are content-based, then
they must pass the test of strict scrutiny in order to be permissi-
ble.30 3 In order to determine into which category conditions on
race-IQ research funding would fall if justified on the grounds
that such research is "inopportune," we examine some existing
conditions imposed on government-funded research.
To a certain extent, race-IQ research is already subject to
conditional government funding because it includes the study of
human subjects. Existing federal regulations on human experi-
mentation 3°4 protect research subjects who may be exposed to the
possibility of physical, psychological, or social injury30 5 by requir-
ing the scientist to obtain informed consent from the subject as
well as prior administrative approval.
3°6
Race-IQ researchers may object to such informed consent re-
quirements because it may be impossible to persuade parents to
permit access to their children's school records once they under-
stand that the researcher is interested in exploring the IQ level of
different racial groups. 30 7 Arguably, these consent requirements
are not content-neutral because they discriminate against areas of
scientific inquiry which raise controversial questions to which the
subjects may object. Such arguments do not appear convincing.
The consent requirements do not single out race-IQ research for
restrictive treatment; the requirements apply to all human subject
experimentation. They are content-neutral because the particular
area explored does not trigger the requirement; the use of human
subjects does. Therefore, the consent requirements may be best
classified as manner restrictions subject to the lower scrutiny indi-
cated in United States v. O'Brien.
308
Although the federal consent requirements are manner re-
strictions, other aspects of the administrative review requirement
may not be. Regulations permit an Institutional Review Board
(IRB) to deny approval of a research project if it finds that the
risks to the subject outweigh the value of the knowledge to be
gained from the experiment. 3°9 According to two critics, "the
[IRBI regulations contain no objective criteria for valuing either
benefits or knowledge, thus relegating the process to a subjective
302. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
304. Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R.
§§ 46.101-.211 (1980).
305. Id. §§ 46.102, .103.
306. Id. §§46.116-.117, .109.
307. See Diamond, supra note 74.
308. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
309. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111-.112 (1980).
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weighing of values. ' 310 Assuming the IRB denies approval of a
scientist's race-IQ research project on the ground that the research
is "inopportune," that determination could be seen as an essen-
tially unguided judgment that the research is valueless or perni-
cious. Such a judgment would clearly not be content-neutral, and
both the decision of the IRB and the federal regulation would
consequently fall under the strict scrutiny standard if tested in
court. Were the court to find that the regulation did not further
very strong governmental interests, it would be struck down as an
unconstitutional condition on a governmental benefit.
3. Restrictions on publication, lecturing, and teaching. Even if a
race-IQ researcher is successful in obtaining a position and fund-
ing, a government agency may still attempt to prevent dissemina-
tion of research results through lecturing, presenting papers, or
publishing an article or book. Judicial solicitude reaches its high-
est pitch in connection with first amendment protection of pub-
lishing and teaching. Nevertheless, as noted earlier,31' some
expressive activities have been held to lie outside the scope of pro-
tected speech, or to qualify only for limited protection. Official
interference might be justified on three separate grounds: (1) that
the scholar's communication poses a danger of immediate harm;
(2) that a community may restrict certain speech to enhance the
quality of its environment; and (3) that impressionable listeners,
especially schoolchildren, may be protected from controversial or
disapproved speech. This section will not attempt to assess the
strengths or weaknesses of these justifications. It only identifies
the applicable standard of review when such justifications are of-
fered to support government prohibition, as well as the factors rel-
evant to determining whether the standard has been satisfied, and
concludes by discussing the state's burden of proof in establishing
that harms will flow from speech sought to be regulated.
a. Justfication No. 1. Immediate Harm Under Group Libel and
Group Vilification Statutes
Dictum in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire312 established that
words which by their "very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace" fall outside the protection of
the first amendment.313 Such "fighting words" can be prohibited
when they inevitably lead to "substantive evils"-violence, disor-
310. See Favre & McKinnon, supra note 14, at 698.
311. Supra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
312. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
313. Id. at 571-73.
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der, lawless action-that the government has a right to prevent.314
To be prohibited under the doctrine, the words must have been
uttered under circumstances in which they cannot be countered by
further speech 315 and are really a form of conduct 3 6 with "all the
effect of force." 317 Thus, advocacy of a particular point of view
cannot be prohibited unless the advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action.
318
The government could attempt to prevent dissemination of
race-IQ research results under a theory of protecting the public
from incitement to violence or imminent lawless action. Words
that constitute libel, group libel, or group vilification have been
analyzed in terms similar to the "imminent lawless action" stan-
dard, particularly when the words injure members of a racial or
ethnic minority group.319 For example, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 320
the classic group libel case,321 sustained a prosecution under an
Illinois criminal libel statute322 which had been construed by the
Illinois Supreme Court to prohibit only utterances that were both
314. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Schenk v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
315. L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 603.
316. Id. at 598-601.
317. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
318. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
319. See, e.g., Delgado, Words That Wound- A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epi-
thets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Brown & Stem,
Group Defamation in the U.S.A., 13 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 7 (1964); Beth, Group Libel
and Free Speech, 39 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1955); Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered,
89 YALE L.J. 308 (1979).
320. 343 U.S. 250 (1959).
321. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964). Libel is generally
a written communication that holds the plaintiff up to hatred, contempt or ridicule in
the community. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 739 (4th ed. 1971).
Opinions, however, particularly ones that do not carry assertions of fact, may not be
actionable as libel, id. at 742. Truth is also a defense to a libel suit, id. at 797-99.
When the libel is directed at a group, the plaintiff must not only show that he is a
member of the defamed group, but that the words apply personally to him. Where
the group is large, as it would be in the case of race-IQ research, neither the group nor
an individual has a cause of action, id. at 750.
While individual libel laws protect an individual's reputation, group libel laws
are designed to promote order by reducing friction among groups. T. EMERSON,
supra note 200, at 391-92. Thus, while group libel laws are extensions of the individ-
ual libel laws, they serve a different purpose. Instead of providing compensation for
injury to an individual's reputation, they are justified instrumentally as preserving
social order. Thus, while a civil remedy for group defamation may be difficult to
obtain, as indicated above, criminal prosecution may be possible, W. PROSSER, supra
at 751, as was the case in Beauharnais.
322. It shall be unlawful for any person . ..to. . .publish. . . in any
public place in this state any lithograph . . . which publication .. .
portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of
citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication...
exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt,
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libelous and likely to cause violence.323 In allowing Illinois to en-
force its criminal group libel law in a situation where the publica-
tion was both defamatory of blacks as a race and likely to cause
violence and disorder,324 the Court treated libel as a form of
speech that falls outside the first amendment. Thus, it found no
need to apply the clear and present danger test or its modem vari-
ant, "imminent lawless action. ' 325 Nevertheless, the narrow con-
struction given to the statute by the Illinois Supreme Court was an
implicit recognition of that test: the Illinois legislature was justi-
fied in criminalizing racial propaganda only because the legisla-
ture could reasonably find that it led to danger in the form of
violence and breach of the peace.
326
The constitutional validity of civil and criminal libel laws has
been in doubt since Garrison v. Louisiana 32 7 and New York Times
v. Suivan328 were decided in 1964. Application of the Garrison
and Sullivan standards to a group libel statute would require the
government to demonstrate that the prohibited expression is
knowingly false, or false and made with reckless disregard for the
truth. If such a showing cannot be made, the expression would be
protected by the first amendment. Arguably, racially harmful
speech can rarely be proven false. If the speech consists of opin-
ion, there will be no objective measure of its falsity. Thus, it is
doubtful whether even the statements held to be criminal in Beau-
harnais would be unprotected speech under current standards of
libel. Only if the racially harmful statement consists of "false
facts" would the speech be unprotected.
If racially harmful statements of an race-IQ researcher are
nevertheless protected, the appropriate standard of judicial review
in a group libel action brought against the researcher must be de-
derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or
riots....
343 U.S. at 251.
323. Id at 254. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 916 (1978).
324. There was little doubt about the asserted violation of the libel statute; the
lithograph in question stated: "If persuasion and the need to prevent the white race
from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the aggressions...
rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro, surely will." 343 U.S. at
252.
325. 343 U.S. at 266. See also T. EMERSON, supra note 200, at 354.
326. 343 U.S. at 261.
327. 379 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1964) (allegations that judges were inefficient, lazy, and
opposed to the enforcement of vice laws were protected speech).
328. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public official as defamation plaintiff must
prove that newspaper printed untruth with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard for its falsity). See also Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 and




termined. Thomas Emerson has written that "it is virtually im-
possible to reconcile group libel laws with constitutional
requirements . -.329 Such laws are inconsistent with the first
amendment because they "are premised on the proposition that
the government is entitled to determine the social value of expres-
sion.' ' 33° If Emerson is correct, group libel laws appear to be, by
their very nature, content discriminatory regulations which re-
quire exacting judicial scrutiny of their enforcement. 331 The use-
fulness of the group-libel statutes for justifying prohibitions on the
expression or publication of race-IQ research, therefore, will be
limited to cases where the government interests are truly
compelling.
Narrower forms of government intervention, directed specifi-
cally at prohibiting incitement to violence or averting immediate
psychological injury, may be subject to a less exacting standard of
judicial review. One such form was recently proposed under a
"group vilification" theory of racial utterances.332 Group vilifica-
tion statutes are concerned with statements directed at prejudiced
hearers and intended to inflame their unconscious prejudices.
333
Arguably, such statements would be more like action than speech,
tend to have "all the effect of force, ' 334 and would thus be unpro-
tected speech under Chapinsky-Beauharnais. 335 Because the first
amendment does not protect such speech, less than exacting j udi-
cial scrutiny would be appropriate. Whether the statements of a
race-IQ researcher are likely, in fact, to present the dangers that a
group-vilification statute seeks to prevent is treated in the next sec-
tion of this Article. 336
A number of uncertainties concerning the constitutionality of
restrictions on racially harmful speech were addressed, but not re-
solved, by Collin v. Smith.337 Smith arose when the Village of
Skokie, a predominantly Jewish suburb of Chicago, attempted to
prevent members of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party of
329. T. EMERSON, supra note 200, at 397.
330. Id. at 398.
33 1. If such a statute is aimed at prevention of harm to listeners or at prevention
of civil disorder, the government agency seeking to enforce the regulation must assess
the content of the speech for its intrinsically harmful qualities, or for the likelihood
that such speech will cause immediate lawless or violent reactions by listeners. Such a
statute must be content-discriminatory because it is the content of the speech that
determines whether or not prohibition is appropriate.
332. Note, Group Vi/ication Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308 (1979).
333. Id. at 312-14; see also T. EMERSON, supra note 200, at 397.
334. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
335. See 343 U.S. 250, 284 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 315-17.
336. See infra Part IV.
337. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
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America from demonstrating in the community. Three municipal
ordinances were enacted, one of which prohibited "[t]he dissemi-
nation of any materials within the Village of Skokie which pro-
motes and incites hatred against persons by reason of their race,
national origin, or religion, and is intended to do so .... *"338
Despite the questionable vitality of Beauharnais, the Village of
Skokie could find no better support from existing case law to jus-
tify the ordinance.
339
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held the statute uncon-
stitutional on two grounds. First, the Nazis' promotion of hatred
was not equivalent to causing disorder and therefore the "incite-
ment" portion of Beauharnais did not apply.340 Moreover, the
court found that "libel does indeed now raise serious and knotty
First Amendment problems" that the Village of Skokie had failed
to overcome.34' Thus, if Beauharnais implicitly allowed the prohi-
bition of race-libelous statements, Garrison, Sullivan, and other re-
cent cases cast doubt on the continued tenability of that portion of
the opinion. 342 When Smith reached the Supreme Court, certio-
rari was denied, although two justices dissented from the denial
on the ground that there was a need to determine the continued
viability of Beauharnais.343 The language of the dissenting opin-
ion suggests that the Supreme Court has not yet made a final deci-
sion on whether speech that is potentially injurious to particular
races and groups within a community is protected by the first
amendment.344
338. Id. at 1199.
339. Id. at 1204.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1205.
342. Id. at 1205 n.14. The District Court in Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 694
(N.D. Ill. 1978), found this interpretation plausible. The statute (see supra note 322)
in fact allowed prosecution of a publication which either defamed a group or caused a
breach of the peace.
343. 439 U.S. 916, 918-19 (1978) (Blackmun, J., and White, J., dissenting).
344. See Delgado, supra note 319, at 172. The tripartite description of social inter-
ests served by the first amendment in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761-65 (1976), see supra notes 195-99 and accompa-
nying text, could provide a point of departure for such an assessment of potentially
injurious speech:
(1) The individual's interest in self-expression.
Presumably, this interest is served by any racially harmful speech be-
cause the speaker wishes to speak.
(2) The general societal interest in free flow of information.
The operative term in this phrase is "information": racially harmful
speech does not necessarily inform any listener. For example, a racial
epithet arguably communicates no "information" other than the
speaker's attitude towards members of other racial groups; the epithet
itself need not be protected in order to convey the speaker's point of
view.
Similarly, speech which purports to be "scientific," but which is
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Lying in the gap between Beauharnais and the Smith case is a
broad, unresolved first amendment issue: can the government
regulate speech in order to enhance the quality of life in a commu-
nity-to enhance racial integration and harmony, for example?
b. Justification No. 2: Quality of environment and time, place,
and manner restrictions.
The Supreme Court has allowed communities to prohibit cer-
tain kinds of speech to enhance the quality of their environ-
ments.345 In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,346 the Court allowed
Georgia to prohibit the public showing of obscene films, even if
the audience was composed of consenting adults.347 According to
Paris, the state had a legitimate interest in "stemming the tide of
commercialized obscenity . . .[and in promoting] the quality of
life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce
in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself.
'348
For all intents and purposes, the Court was upholding the exercise
of the state's police power in the first amendment area.349 The
Paris Court also pointed out that the legislature was not required
to demonstrate scientifically that the harm it intended to prevent
would, in fact, flow from the forbidden speech; the Court found
that legislatures were entitled to act upon "unprovable
clearly fraudulent, see supra notes 216-408 and accompanying text,
does not serve the "general societal interest" because it also is not "in-
formation," id.
(3) The specific social interest in enlightened public decision making.
Conceivably, speech can be harmful and "enlightening" at the same
time. Racially harmful speech could, for example, inform decision
makers regarding the necessity for governmental measures which alle-
viate racial tensions through positive social programs that promote ra-
cial harmony. On the other hand, if such speech fails to "inform," then
such speech arguably does not, and cannot, "enlighten" decision
making.
345. See L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 677.
346. 413 U.S. 49, 68-70 (1973).
347. The Court did so despite having held in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565
(1969), that adults were free to examine obscene materials in the privacy of their
homes.
348. 413 U.S. at 57-58.
349. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523-28 (1934). The police power
allows governmental regulation of private interests. It is an attribute of sovereignty
and a broad legislative prerogative. See El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508-09
(1965). As such, it is flexible and dynamic, capable of being adapted to changing
economic and social conditions. See Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Washington, 483 F.2d
1323, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The primary requirement for the exercise of police
power is that it be a reasonable, non-arbitrary, and non-capricious legislative decision
that promotes the public good without infringing upon individual constitutional
rights. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). While the protection of the
physical safety of persons and property is at its core, see Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S.
238, 247 (1976), cases such as Paris Adult Theater I demonstrate that the power can be




Paris involved unprotected speech. Young v. American Mini
Theaters351 held that certain protected kinds of speech also can be
regulated to improve the quality of an environment. In American
Mini Theaters, the Court upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance regu-
lating the location of "adult" theaters showing sexually explicit,
but not obscene, films. 352 A plurality of four justices upheld the
ordinance despite its apparently content-based classification, find-
ing that the content classification was used only to limit the loca-
tion and number of theaters and not to suppress entirely the
showing of certain filMs. 353 The zoning ordinance was thus only a
place restriction subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.
354
The Court found the ordinance to be reasonable because it was
enacted after a legislative investigation had determined that a con-
centration of "adult" theaters led to economic deterioration of a
neighborhood and to an increase in crime.35 5 Moreover, the
speech in question was commercial in nature, and thus entitled to
limited protection. 3
56
The Court has observed that time, place, and manner restric-
tions are permissible if "they are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, . . . serve a significant govern-
mental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information." 357 American Mini Thea-
ters casts some doubt on the mandatory nature of the first part of
this rule. Three justices joined Justice Stewart's dissent in Ameri-
can Mini Theaters, which found that the decision "rides rough-
shod" over the requirement of content-neutrality, 358 rendering the
decision an "aberration" in first amendment adjudication.359 Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe has been less critical of the decision, pro-
posing that Justice Stevens' plurality opinion seems "likely to
have broader implications for the course of first amendment adju-
dication over the next decade .... ,,360 One of the inferences
Tribe draws is that some members of the Court may be willing to
350. 413 U.S. at 60, 61.
351. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
352. Id. See Tribe, supra note 174, at 673.
353. 427 U.S. at 69-72.
354. Id. at 63 n.18.
355. Id. at 68-70, 70 n.34.
356. Id. at 71.
357. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981); Heffron v. Int'l Soc.
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
358. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 85 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting; Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., joining in the dissent).
359. Id. at 87.
360. Tribe, supra note 174, at 674.
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uphold content-based regulations of protected speech so as to "ac-
commodate the conflicting demands of individuals and communi-
ties to have government shield each from intrusion by the
other." 3
61
Assuming American Mini Theaters is not limited to erotic, al-
beit nonobscene, speech, 362 then race-IQ research could bring into
play the kinds of conflicting demand 363 which the Court may be
willing to accommodate by way of content-discriminatory time,
place, and manner restrictions on "inopportune" knowledge. The
concept of inopportune knowledge is based on the notion that so-
ciety is not capable of absorbing certain kinds of knowledge at the
present time. 364 The concept carries with it, however, the implica-
tion that inopportune knowledge will or may become opportune
in the future. Assuming that the Court will uphold a content-dis-
criminatory regulation of speech the purpose of which is to en-
hance the environment by reducing social conflict, prohibition of
the dissemination of inopportune knowledge may qualify as a per-
missible "time, place, and manner" restriction.
Although enhancement of the environment arguably serves
to overcome the requirement of content-neutrality, a valid time,
place, and manner regulation must also "serve a significant gov-
ernment interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information. ' 365 Whether or not the
government interests served by suppression of inopportune
knowledge are significant is reserved for later treatment in this
Article.366 However, at this point we can speculate that the
Court's third requirement for permissible time, place and manner
restrictions, that of "ample alternative channels," might not be
satisfied by suppression of "inopportune" knowledge. It is one
thing to refuse to allow a speech to be made on Monday because
361. Id. at 679. Two caveats are in order. First, it may be that American Mini
Theaters' relaxation of the content-neutrality requirement is based on, and limited to,
cases involving nonobscene sexually explicit displays rather than "forms of speech
less physiological and anatomical in their content and appeal." Id. at 680. Further-
more, Tribe suggests that a "content-based discrimination is more likely to be upheld
if the government's real interest is not in protecting citizens from exposure to the
speech as such but rather in such 'secondary effects' as the physical deterioration and
crime which accompany the concentration of 'adult' theaters in a 'red light' district."
Id. at 679. The remainder of our discussion in this section proceeds on the premise
that American Mini Theaters may stand for a broader assault on content-neutrality,
outside the area of erotic or near-obscene speech.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 360-61.
363. See generally infra Part IV (discussing varieties of state interest that could be
urged to justify restrictions on race-IQ research).
364. See supra note 16 (defining "inopportune knowledge").
365. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.




another is already scheduled at the desired public forum for that
day, but permit the speech to be made the Monday following. It is
quite another matter to prohibit the publication of race-IQ
research findings in 1984 on the grounds that society will not be
capable of absorbing them until 1985 or 2001. The latter time reg-
ulation is in effect a prohibition of all discussion on a current and
controversial issue of public policy. The Court has repeatedly re-
jected such total prohibitions. 67 Because such extended time reg-
ulations appear to leave open no "alternative channels," the
regulations cannot remain within the domain of time, place, and
manner restrictions. Accordingly, strict judicial scrutiny of the
regulation would be the appropriate standard of review.
c. Justiflcation No. 3. Protection of impressionable listeners
When a proponent of race-IQ theories publishes his or her
views in the form of an article or book, the reader exercises a
choice to read or not read the offered material. Classroom teach-
ing or lecturing, however, deals with audiences whose choices are
limited, or who are young and impressionable. 368 Further, if the
school or university is public, the state may assert an interest in
the selection of curricula or materials that conflict with the interest
of the teacher in teaching or presenting whatever ideas he or she
chooses. For these reasons, the right of a researcher-teacher to
present controversial scientific ideas in classroom or lecture hall
may be somewhat more restricted than the right to put those same
ideas in print.
The government's right to regulate the content of speech ac-
tivities in the classroom is clearest when young children are con-
cerned. In Trachtman v. Anker, 369 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a school board could prohibit the distribution of
a questionnaire on sex to ninth and tenth grade children. The
court reasoned that the board was not curtailing first amendment
rights, but protecting the psychological well-being of children in
its care;370 the first amendment does not protect the right to pres-
ent material that the school board could reasonably believe is
harmful.37' A concurring opinion explained that while the harm-
ful consequences may not provoke a breach of the peace, "a blow
to the psyche may do more permanent damage than a blow to the
chin." 3
72
367. See, e.g., Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 518 (1981); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980).
368. See Tribe, supra note 174, at 677-78, 678 n.13.
369. 563 F.2d at 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
370. 563 F.2d at 519.
371. Id. at 520.
372. Id. at 520 (Gurfein, J., concurring). On the other hand, Judge Mansfield,
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One of the factors implicit in the Trachtman decision was rec-
ognition that school administrators were competent to determine
whether harm would flow from particular material. 373 Since
school administrators would appear equally competent to deter-
mine the harmfulness of lectures or teaching materials containing
race-IQ theories, courts would probably give their determinations
considerable deference.
In general, the Supreme Court has looked particularly sym-
pathetically on the need to protect children from potentially
threatening situations.374 In Ginsberg v. New York, 37 - for exam-
ple, the Court upheld a statute prohibiting the sale of material
which, while not necessarily "obscene" for adults, was perceived
by the state and the Court to be harmful to children. The well-
being of children is most clearly a matter of legitimate state con-
cern when the setting is the lower schools, to which the commu-
nity has entrusted the care of its children in loco parendis.376 With
older students, the ability of the state to limit what an instructor
dissenting, reasoned that since the questionnaire would not inevitably lead to a
breach of the peace, it could not be proscribed under the clear and present danger test
of Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). He also thought that allowing the
school board to prevent "psychological harm" threatened constitutionally protected
speech by its very vagueness. Judge Mansfield would make the test for determining
psychological harm turn on the impact on average students rather than on impres-
sionable ones. 563 F.2d at 520-22.
373. 563 F.2d at 519-20. Tribe has referred to this recognition of competence in
discussing a case in which the Civil Service Commission issued a regulation excluding
aliens from holding federal jobs. See L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 286. In this case,
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), the Court invoked strict scrutiny
because aliens were a suspect class. The same standard would be applied, of course, if
speech-a fundamental interest-were allegedly abridged.
In Hampton, 426 U.S. at 104, 114, the Court held that in evaluating the constitu-
tionality of a rule, whether or not the promulgating body has direct responsibility for
protecting the interest served by the rule is an important consideration. The Court
found that the reasons given by the Commission for justifying the rule, including the
national security and the need for providing incentives for aliens to become citizens,
simply did not fit within the actual purpose of the Commission, whose sole purpose
was the promotion of efficiency in the federal civil service. In effect the Court held
that the rule exceeded the "competency" of the agency promulgating it.
The reasoning of Trachiman was also used in Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ.,
440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971). Recognizing that a school was a "marketplace of ideas"
(cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); see also infra
text accompanying notes 277-79), the Court held that a state nevertheless had the
"authority to minimize or eliminate influences that would dilute or disrupt the effec-
tiveness of the educational process." Eisner, 440 F.2d at 807.
374. See Tribe, supra note 174, at 662 n.44.
375. 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968).
376. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d at 519. See also Goldstein, supra note 259, at
1342-44. According to Goldstein, schools can protect the well-being of the young
children under their care in great part because one of the principal roles of educa-
tional institutions is that of inculcating them with societal values. This paternalistic
function, argues Goldstein, is inherently incompatible with the premises underlying
the exercise of first amendment rights in the educational context.
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may teach them is still unsettled.377 Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School District378 held that first amendment
rights were available to secondary school teachers and students, at
least to the extent of permitting them to wear symbolic armbands
protesting the Vietnam War. But the protective mantle of the first
amendment was limited by the Court's recognition of the "com-
prehensive authority of the .. .school officials, consistent with
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the
schools" 379 and by its observation that the amendment is to be
applied "in the light of the special characteristics of the school
environment."
38 0
At the university level, the content of a teacher's lectures or
writings presents fewer dangers of indoctrination and psychologi-
cal trauma than at the primary or secondary level, and the state's
parenspatriae concerns are, accordingly, weaker. Still, a univer-
sity professor cannot automatically invoke the first amendment to
teach anything he or she wishes. 38' According to Thomas Emer-
son, university regulations, whether emanating from the gov-
erning board, administration, faculty groups, or other sources,
may legitimately specify the scope of the knowledge and values
that are taught. 382 In particular, regulations concerning assign-
ment of professors to courses, assignment of textbooks, and the
scope of subject matter for particular courses are all proper exer-
cises of supervisory authority and do not abridge a faculty mem-
ber's rights of free speech. Infringement may occur, however,
when the regulations prescribe the manner in which the faculty
member must present the material, 38 3 or when the university seeks
to muffle a professor in the role of social critic. In this latter situa-
tion, the university's institutional control is much less legitimate
than it is with respect to curriculum. When a professor exercises
the function of social critic, Emerson argues, the university can
demand scholarly competence, but not much more.
384
If Emerson's analysis is correct, a university could legiti-
mately tell particular faculty members not to teach psychology, or
377. Two "loyalty oath" cases, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112
(1959), and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957), recognize the impor-
tance of academic freedom in general. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968),
which presented the issue of a right to teach evolutionary theory, was decided on
establishment of religion grounds, a rationale not applicable in the race-IQ context,
id. at 105-06.
378. 393 U.S. 503, 506-08 (1969).
379. Id. at 507.
380. Id. at 506.
381. See generally Goldstein, supra note 259, at 1340.
382. T. EMERSON, supra note 200, at 618-21.
383. Id. at 624.
384. Id. at 619. See generally supra text accompanying notes 238-73.
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IQ theories, or population genetics, and it could discipline them if
they violated these orders. But a professor who had university ap-
proval to teach in any of these fields could not be ordered to avoid
all mention of race-IQ theories. Nor could the university interfere
with the professor's activities in non-teaching roles such as social
commentator or advocate-activities like public lecturing, writing
of letters to the editor, or testimony before congressional groups.
In these circumstances, the university may only require its faculty
to meet professional standards of competence. Punishment
should be permitted only if the professor acts irresponsibly or un-
professionally-for example, by failing to substantiate opinions
with any facts or evidence.385 It would seem that few race-IQ re-
searchers would be subject to sanction under this standard.
Within these broad limitations, universities may institute rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions on university speech
to assure the tranquility of the campus. 386 Thus, they could pre-
vent a race-IQ speaker from delivering a highly provocative
speech at a time when racial tensions are running high on campus,
so long as they make clear that the speaker could appear at a later
time. The university could also prohibit a race-IQ speaker from
appearing because the subject of the speech does not have a high
educational or intellectual priority or because the speaker's cre-
dentials appear inadequate.3 87 Indeed, it was on the latter basis
that a Stanford University Dean of Graduate Studies denied Wil-
liam Shockley's request to teach a graduate seminar in human ge-
netics. Shockley's competence in mathematics and engineering
was not viewed as extending to the field of genetics.
388
A final consideration relates to the type of free speech limita-
tions a university can impose on a teacher. In the context of this
Article, it concerns the university's "competence" to determine
whether theories concerning racial differences in intellectual ca-
pacity should be explored or taught.389 A university may be man-
385. T. EMERSON, supra note 200, at 620.
386. Id. at 621.
387. Moreover, priorities set by the university may determine the allocation of
scarce educational resources or facilities. T. EMERSON, supra note 200, at 621; see also
supra notes 275-91 and accompanying text. This rationale was used in connection
with the right to publish an article in a state-subsidized journal. In Avins v. Rutgers,
385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968), a federal appeals court
rejected the arguments of a plaintiff who contended that the editors of the Rutgers
Law Review had discriminated against his conservative ideas when they rejected his
article on the issue of school desegregation. The court held that the editors had the
discretion to determine the suitability of articles submitted to them. Id. at 153.
388. W. Turner, Stanford Vetoes Shockley Course, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1972, Pt.
A, at 9, col. 1.
389. See supra note 373.
Stephen Goldstein, supra note 259, has also argued that at least lower-school
authorities have the competence to decide what can be taught to children under their
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ifestly competent to determine that a race-IQ speech could cause a
temporarily volatile situation on campus to explode with violence,
or to determine that it already has enough race-IQ researchers in
its employ. But suppose a university attempted to interfere with
the research or teaching of an educational psychologist already in
its employ, on the ground that the work threatens to cause broad
social harms, such as an increase in prejudice in society. Here, the
outcome is not so clear. In Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,390 a case that addressed the validity of a racial "quota"
for selecting students at the UC Davis medical school, the Court,
quoting Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 391 declared that the univer-
sity's "broad mission is education, not the formulation of any leg-
islative policy. . . . [I]solated segments of our vast governmental
structures are not competent to make those decisions, at least in
the absence of legislative mandate .... ,,392 If the same rationale
is applied to university restrictions on the teaching of race-IQ the-
ories, Bakke may mean that a legislature is competent to regulate
race-IQ teaching but that the university is not.
d Proof of harm.
Whoever imposes the race-IQ teaching restrictions, whether
university or legislature, will have to demonstrate the plausibility
of the cause-effect relationship believed to justify the abridgment
of expressive acts.393 This holds true whether the effect is psycho-
supervision because of the school's inculcatory role. Goldstein believes that lower
school authorities could demand that a teacher not make known to his students the
existence of theories of possible genetic differences in intelligence among racial
groups because such discussion would lead to racial prejudice. Goldstein, Academic
Freedom. Its Meaning and Underlying Premises as Seen Through the American Experi-
ence, I I ISRAEL L. REV. 52, 73-74 (1976).
In emphasizing the inculcatory role of schools, however, Goldstein does limit the
reach of his conclusions. Indeed, he admits that the emphasis given to the inculcatory
role will vary from institution to institution and that therefore it will have to be taken
into account on a case-by-case basis in deciding the scope of academic freedom. Id.
at 74.
A wide scope for regulating the activities of university researchers is found in a
view of academic freedom that emphasizes the role of political bodies in setting uni-
versity policy. Goldstein argues that the issue is not whether teachers have a constitu-
tional right to teach what they please, even if it is contrary to the instructions of
school authorities. Rather, the issue is who should make these decisions. Then, em-
phasizing the inculcatory role of educational institutions, Goldstein concludes that
this decision is ultimately one of political policy, which should be decided by school
boards or other "politically responsive groups." Goldstein, supra note 259, at 1356.
390. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
391. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). See also supra note 373.
392. 438 U.S. at 309.
393. See supra text accompanying note 350. Paris Adult Theatre I established that
when a protected right is infringed, the Court will closely examine any legislative
assertions about the relationship between cause and effect, 413 U.S. at 60. Linmark
Associates v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), for example, concerned
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logical trauma, the danger of a riot, or an increase in social
prejudice. In Larry P. v. Riles 394 a federal district court con-
fronted a challenge by black plaintiffs to California's use of IQ
tests in placing children in special classes for the educable men-
tally retarded. After weighing all the evidence, Judge Peckham
made a finding that "native intelligence" could not be measured
by IQ tests, and that those tests measure only the skills tested.
395
The court also noted the differential impact of the tests on mem-
bers of racial minorities, pointing out that the history of the IQ
test was "at least in the early years, a history of racial prejudice, of
Social Darwinism, and of the use of scientific 'mystique' to legiti-
mate such prejudices. ' 396 For these reasons, the court held that
the state could establish no compelling interest to justify the use of
IQ tests that resulted in educable mentally retarded classes with
"overwhelming disproportions of black children." 397 It therefore
enjoined the use of any tests until the State Board of Education
made a determination that the tests were not racially or culturally
biased.39
8
Although the actions and goals of a high school testing psy-
chologist and those of a race-IQ researcher differ somewhat, some
of the principles of the Riles case seem applicable to any case in-
volving regulation of the researcher. First, any state agent seeking
to abridge the researcher's rights must prove that the research pro-
gram will be harmful. Second, by conditioning the use of the IQ
test on the results of further research, Riles implies that race-based
harms may sometimes be countered by "more speech," in this case
speech that points to a test's bias.399 Finally, the case points out
that there is a difference between knowledge and policy. The state
stands between scientific knowledge and social policy and is free
to ignore scientific knowledge, especially where it appears to be of
questionable cross-cultural or cross-racial validity. The Riles
the attempt of a community to stem the flight of white homeowners from a racially
integrated area by prohibiting the posting of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs. The Court
held that the promulgator of the regulation must show that the prohibition of "for
sale" signs was necessary to achieve the objective of retaining the city's integrated
character. The Court was not convinced by the record that prohibiting the signs
would "reduce public awareness of realty and thereby decrease public concern over
selling." 431 U.S. at 95-96.
394. 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
395. Id. at 952.
396. Id. at 935.
397. Id. at 984-85.
398. Id. at 989. The court pointed out that: "[t]he rather weak evidence . . . in
support of the genetic explanation tends to rest on the disparities in I.Q. scores, which
obviously overlooks any possible bias of the tests themselves." Id. at 955.
399. Ireland argues that the criticism of Jensen and Schockley is unjustified. Ire-
land, The Relevance ofRace Research, 84 ETHICS 140, 144 (1974). The controversy
should be cured by having reputable scientists look into the matter. Id.
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court noted that while state officials "would not rule out the ge-
netic explanation for . . . IQ scores . . . ." the state was "unwill-
ing to admit any reliance on it for policy-making purposes.
' '4 ° °
California's ambivalent treatment of IQ scores, and the Riles
court's reaction to this treatment, suggest that where the conse-
quences of research rest with the state's use of the results, official
abridgment of the research may be unconstitutional.
IV. COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
Americans traditionally regard knowledge, including scien-
tific knowledge, as indispensable for informed political decision-
making, improvement of the human condition, self-fulfillment,
and as an end in itself of great intrinsic worth. Constitutional
doctrine and case law, reviewed in the previous section, reflect
these values, placing the burden of proof on the party who would
discourage or regulate scientific research which might generate
such knowledge. Thus, the proponent of regulatory measures
aimed at curbing race-IQ research must show that substantial
harms are likely to result from the conduct of the research, the
knowledge it is likely to produce, the uses to which this knowledge
is put, or some combination of these. This section reviews the
harms that have been asserted, or might be asserted, to flow from
race-IQ research, and assesses the probability that a court will find
them plausible and compelling. A final section discusses mecha-
nisms that could accommodate the interest of the scientist in pur-
suing race-IQ research and the interest of society in averting
injury likely to be associated with the research.
A. Erosion of the Ideal of Equality
The ideal of equality-that "all men are created equal," 40 1
and that each person is an equal moral agent-is deeply rooted in
our legal system.402 This ideal has been imperfectly realized: over
a century after the abolition of slavery, minority citizens continue
to suffer from discriminatory attitudes and treatment which infect
our economic system, our cultural, political, and educational insti-
tutions, and the daily interactions of individuals.40 3 Moreover, in
400. 495 F. Supp. at 955.
401. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
402. Eg., U.S. Const. amend. XIII (slavery prohibited); amend. XIV, § I ("No
state shall deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the law"); amend. XV, § I
(right to vote not to be abridged by reason of race or color). See generally Brest, The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword" In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976).
403. See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1978) (racism is a contin-
uing problem in American life); K. CLARK, DARK GHETTo (1965). See also G. ALL-
PORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 77-78 (1954). Studies at the time led researchers
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the past ten years minorities have become the victims of a discern-
ible increase in racial hostility.4°4 One risk associated with race-
IQ research that must therefore be faced is the possibility that it
will contribute to a further erosion of the ideal of equality. If
either the results of the research or its mere conduct could lead to
this result, then the research would be "inopportune" in the
strongest sense-research that should not be conducted because it
threatens a central principle by which our society seeks to order
itself.
Contemporary response to Arthur Jensen's 1969 article405
gives some strength to concern for the erosion of the ideal of
equality.40 6 In an article entitled "Born Dumb?" Newsweek sum-
marized Jensen's views:
Dr. Jensen's view, put simply, is that most blacks are born
with less "intelligence" than most whites .... Jensen's theo-
retical views lead him in his article to develop some quite prac-
to estimate that four-fifths of the American population harbored enough antagonism
toward minority groups to influence their daily conduct. Id. at 197-98 (84% agree-
ment among college students for stereotype of blacks as superstitious). See generally
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (Kerner
Commission) 203-82 (N.Y Times ed. 1968).
404. Racial hostility is increasing in many areas of national life, including college
campuses, see, e.g., The Black Mood on Campus, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1982, at 107.
Students broke into a black dormitory at Cornell and wrote, "The KKK's here to
stay" on the wall; at Michigan State, a black professor's car was defaced with spray
paint and official reports show a rise in racial incidents in the dormitories; a recent
issue of the Dartmouth Review depicted blacks as semiliterate; vandals ransacked
Brown University's Third World Center. The director of the Institute for the Study of
Educational Policy at Howard University said, "racial stress has picked up considera-
bly." He attributes the tension in part to cut-throat competition for jobs, and in part
to the "negative climate" created by the Supreme Court's 1978 Bakke decision on
affirmative action admission plans: "Bakke made it possible to express pent-up hos-
tility without being charged with racism, and young people have picked it up." Fewer
black students are applying to college, and of those who do more have decided to opt
for black colleges. Id. at 108. See also Trescott, Is Social Racism Now Becoming
"Acceptable," L.A. Times, June 12, 1981, at 2, col. 1 ("Social racism-the veiled in-
suit, contempt masquerading as a joke [and] the direct slur," underground in 1960's
and early 1970's, is now being "recycled . . . as a protest against minority gains");
Racism Flares on Campus, TIME, Dec. 8, 1980, at 28 (a black dean at Harvard Univer-
sity attributed recent upsurge in racist slurs and acts on college campuses to a change
in national mood, which has made such acts "once again ... respectable").
405. IQ and Scholastic Achievement, supra note 54.
406. See A. CHASE, THE LEGACY OF MALTHUS, THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE NEW
SCIENTIFIC RACISM 469 (1980). Jensen's conversion to the hereditarian school was
"treated as the greatest scientific development since the first nuclear device was ex-
ploded at Los Alamos in the closing days of World War II"; it rated lead stories in
Newsweek (circulation 2,150,000), Life (7,400,000), Time (3,800,000), and U.S. News
& World Report (1,625,000). Id. See also J. BLUM, PSEUDO-SCIENCE AND MENTAL
ABILITY 115, 130-31 (1978) (inauguration of Nixon guaranteed that the article would
receive widespread publicity; black power movement emphasized educational failure
of black children; both factors produced "a social climate conducive to revival of the
nature-nurture race issue." Id.).
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tical policy recommendations. Since intelligence is fixed at
birth anyway, he claims, it is senseless to waste vast sums of
money and resources on such remedial programs as Head Start
which assume that a child's intellect is malleable and can be
improved ("Compensatory education has been tried and it ap-
parently failed," he writes). Instead, programs should concen-
trate on skills which require a low level of abstract
intelligence.
40 7
The opposition to and criticism of Jensen's views by many geneti-
cists and educational psychologists 4°8 received less attention from
the popular news media.40 9 Thus, the message that many Ameri-
cans received was simple: well-intentioned social programs can-
not overcome the unfortunate fact that blacks were "born
dumb."
410
Advocacy and publication of disparaging views about a so-
cial group may, if the victimized group lacks the means to oppose
407. Born Dumb?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 1969, at 84.
408. See Bridger & Golden, A Refutation of Jensen's Position on Intelligence, Race,
Social Class and Heredity, MENTAL HYGIENE, Oct. 1969, at 648 ("Jensen does not
offer any startling new scientific evidence to support his point of view, but instead
dredges up old data and offers the same sterile arguments of the past . . . . Politi-
cians may use Jensen's arguments to reduce the amount of money made available for
compensatory education programs. ... ). See also H. EYSENCK & L. KAMIN, THE
INTELLIGENCE CONTROVERSY 94 (1981) (quoting American Psychological Associa-
tion's Cleary Committee Report) (repudiates idea that IQ is innate); poll of American
Psychological Association (1970) (reprinted in A. CHASE, supra note 406, at 43-44
(over two-thirds of members either disagreed or tended to disagree with the Jensen
thesis)); Hirsch, Behavior-Genetic Analysis and Its Biosocial Consequences, 2 SEMI-
NARS IN PSYCHIATRY 89, 97-98 (1970); Layzer, Science or Superstition? A Physical
Scientist Looks at the IQ Controversy, in THE IQ CONTROVERSY, supra note 30, at 195
(Jensen's hypothesis "of genetic differences in intelligence between ethnic groups is
shown to be untestable by existing or foreseeable methods. Hence it should not be
regarded as a scientific hypothesis but as a metaphysical speculation"); J. MERCER,
LABELLING THE MENTALLY RETARDED 95-123 (1973) (Sociocultural factors cannot
be ignored in interpreting the meaning of a standardized intelligence test when evalu-
ating a child from a non-Anglo background because the IQ tests are measuring, to a
significant extent, sociocultural characteristics. Mercer retested 268 children who had
been placed in classes for the mentally retarded and found that 70% would not have
been there had their socioeconomic backgrounds been taken into account.). Cf. J.
BLUM, supra note 406, at 18, 105 (blacks outscored whites on specially designed IQ
test); Lewontin, Race and Intelligence, in THE IQ CONTROVERSY, supra note 30, at 89
("between two populations, the concept of heretability of their differences is
meaningless").
409. Can Negroes Learn the Way Whites Do?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Mar. 10, 1969, at 55. See Block and Dworkin, I. Q., Heritability and Inequality, in
THE IQ CONTROVERSY, supra note 30, at 513 ("Serious and harmful consequences
arise from the predictable distortion and misunderstanding by the mass media of the
technical results of such investigation."). See also Lewontin, Race and Intelligence, in
THE IQ CONTROVERSY, supra note 30 (summarizes Jensen's position as same as that
reported by media); P. GREEN, THE PURSUIT OF INEQUALITY 47 (1981) (criticisms of
Jensen and Shockley did not receive same media coverage as presentation of their
original views).
410. See supra note 407. See also supra note 408.
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them successfully, permanently damage the chances of the group's
members to achieve economic and social equality with the major-
ity population. Such negative images may enable the majority
group to construct a stigma-theory, an ideology to explain the stig-
matized group's inferiority and the danger it represents. 411 A
stigma permits the majority group to treat the victims as less than
fully human; if they are treated unequally, they are only getting
what they deserve.4 12
In considering challenges to educational "tracking," courts
have analyzed the use of intelligence-labelling devises in terms
similar to these.4 13 In Hobson v. Hansen,4 14 decided in 1967,
411. E. GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY
5 (1963). Stigma is the attitude with which "normals" regard those with differentiat-
ing characteristics. See P. GREEN, supra note 409, at 51 ("Banfield's notion that there
is a 'culture of poverty' indeed lacks the power of Jensen's genetic theory. . . because
it offers no real theory of causation. If there is no structure of white oppression, then
black inferiority is the only available alternative. That may explain the greater popu-
larity of Jensen's work. ... ). See also Chomsky, Comments on Hernnstein's Re-
sponse, in THE IQ CONTROVERSY, supra note 30, at 322 (There is a need for "some
new device ...to ensure that privilege is not threatened. What could serve better
than the theory that the poor and weak must accept and welcome their status which
results from the wise decision to reward the talented in a 'hereditary meritocracy.' ").
412. See supra note 411. See also C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM
CROW 67-69 (3d rev. ed. 1966). A common result of stigma is the reduction of job
opportunities, inferior medical care, poorer schools, etc., on the basis of the stigma-
tizing characteristic. See generally K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO: DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL
POWER (1965); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISOR-
DERS, supra note 403, at 251-65 ("Unemployment, Family Structure and Social Dis-
organization"); A. CHASE, supra note 406, at 1-47 (race-based research has been used
to justify lower standards of medical care and forced sterilization for minorities and
the poor); Casas, Wampold & Atkinson, The Categorization of Ethnic Stereotypes by
University Counselors, 3 HISPANIC J. BEHAVIORAL SCl. 75, 81 (1981) ("Results ...
suggest that counselors have a constellation of stereotypes for each ethnic group; the
confirmation of one stereotype in this constellation probably will tend to confirm the
entire constellation.").
413. IQ testing served as the theoretical basis for the development of educational
tracking systems. See supra notes 26-30, 39-47, 48-53 and accompanying text. In
educational tracking, students are separated into groups according to their perform-
ance on IQ or similar tests-a use that many current race-IQ researchers approve.
Jensen, for example, contends that some children have only "Level I" brains and are
best capable of learning through rote, associational methods. See IQ and Scholastic
Achievement, supra note 54. Jensen contends that intellectual ability is distributed in
the population as a function of class and race. The Level I group, which contains
mostly blacks, should therefore be taught only basic occupational skills. Id. See gen-
erally P. GREEN, supra note 409, at 55.
The suggestion espoused by Jensen also that blacks have only Level I brains and
are capable of only "associative" or rote learning originated among supporters of
segregation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. See J. VAN EVRIE, THE BRAIN,
WHITE SUPREMACY AND NEGRO SUBORDINATION 129 (1868), cited in A. CHASE,
supra note 406, at 177 ("[Tlhe negro brain in its totality is ten to fifteen percent less
than that of the Caucasian" and "incapable of grasping ideas, or what we call abstract
truth, as absolutely as the white child.") (emphasis in original). See also Bean, The
Negro Brain, 72 CENTURY ILLUSTRATED MONTHLY MAGAZINE 778, 784 (1906)
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Judge Skelly Wright found the Washington, D.C. school district's
tracking system discriminatory because it segregated races by
tending to place a disproportionate number of black children in
the lower tracks with few remedial opportunities.4 1  After noting
the relatively rigid class and racial separation that resulted,
41 6
Judge Wright concluded:
Even in concept the track system is undemocratic and discrimi-
natory. Its creator admits it is designed to prepare some chil-
dren for white-collar, and other children for blue-collar, jobs.
Considering the tests used to determine which children are to
receive the blue collar special, and which the white, the danger
of children completing their education wearing the wrong col-
lar is far too great for this democracy to tolerate.
4 1 7
The court carefully considered the basis for ability grouping
in theory and practice, and found that the tests, which ostensibly
measured ability, actually measured and reinforced socio-eco-
nomic advantage. 41 8 Furthermore, once a child was placed in a
track, a self-fulfilling prophecy occurred: "[T]eachers acting
under false assumptions because of low test scores will treat the
disadvantaged student in such a way as to make him conform to
their low expectations. . ". .. ,49 The student in turn acts out the
system's judgment; "there is strong evidence that performance in
fact declines ."420
("Having demonstrated that the negro and the Caucasian are widely different in char-
acteristics, due to [an hereditary] deficiency of grey matter in the negro . . . we are
forced to conclude that it is useless to try to elevate the negro by education or other-
wise, except in the direction of his natural endowments."). See also P. GREEN, supra
note 409, at 55 (life expectancies of whites and blacks are in same ratio as their IQs;
disadvantageous social conditions cause both disparities); Fishman & Wainer, A His-
tory of the Concept o/Race, SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE (Mar./Apr. 1982), at 9.
414. 269 F.Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
415. "[Tlhere is substantial evidence that tracking tends to thin out the number of
Negroes in the higher curriculum levels, thus redistributing the racial balance in inte-
grated schools." 269 F. Supp. 401, 457 (D.D.C. 1967).
416. Id. at 458 (separation permanent and complete).
417. Id. at 515. But see H. EYSENCK & L. KAMIN, supra note 408, at 94. The
English educational system, based on studies by Cyril Burt, tests school children at
age II to "stream" them into one of three separate school systems. According to Burt,
"'Intelligence' will enter into everything a child says, thinks and does or attempts
... . If intelligence is innate, the child's degree of intelligence is permanently lim-
ited. No amount of teaching will turn the child who is genuinely defective in general
intelligence into a normal pupil." Id. (Burt's research has subsequently been accused
of falsification. See supra note 66).
418. "ITihe disadvantaged child-and particularly the disadvantaged Negro
child-tends to be under much greater psychological stress in the testing situation and
thus more likely to show the effects in test performance." Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at
482.
419. Id. at 514.
420. Id. at 491. See id. at 514 ("Because these tests are standardized primarily on
and are relevant to a white middle class group of students, they produce inaccurate
and misleading test scores when given to lower class and Negro students."). See also
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In 1979 the Federal District of Northern California applied
strict scrutiny42' to student ability grouping and became the first
court to order a permanent injunction against the use of IQ tests
in placing children in educable mentally retarded classes. Judge
Peckham found that the IQ tests used to place students in special
education classes were biased against blacks422 and that these
placements stigmatized the students423 and relegated them to an
inferior educational setting.424 The court inferred a segregative
intent from the test's discriminatory impact and found that the
school board had violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
School tracking causes specific harms (stigmatization and in-
ferior education) and does so to identifiable victims and over a
short period of time. The injury flowing from race-IQ research,
however, is diffuse and general, and the mechanism by which it
occurs-the formation of a stigma picture42 5-is slow and cumu-
lative. It seems probable that race-IQ research will contribute to
some extent to a weakening of the ideal of equality; the point of
the research, after all, is to find and quantify differences in intel-
lectual capacity among the various population groups. It is uncer-
tain, however, whether a court would view the mitigation of such
dangers as a compelling state interest. Unlike Judges Wright's
and Peckham's findings with respect to school tracking, some
judges may see the harms to the ideal of equality of race-IQ re-
search to be speculative.426  /
B. Psychological Injury
Another ground justifying regulation of race-IQ research
might be prevention of psychological injury to minority persons.
This injury could stem either from the research results, or from
the mere fact of the investigation itself. A public accusation that
one is less intelligent or worthy than another or even that one's
Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 992 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (IQ tests used to rationalize
inaction by blaming educational failure on the perceived intellectual inferiority of
blacks); J. BLUM, supra note 406, at 98-112; P. GREEN, supra note 409, at 53-54 (per-
formance of black schoolchildren declines with attendance in school, relative to
whites; schools treat black children's education less seriously, tend to "give up" on
them).
421. Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. at 984. Racial classifications are "suspect,"
demanding "rigid scrutiny" of their j ustifications. See generally Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
422. 495 F. Supp. at 956-60, 965.
423. Id. at 979, 986.
424. Id. at 941-42, 985-87. Accord Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980).
425. See supra text accompanying notes 410-12.
426. See generally supra Part IIlc(3)(d) (Proof of harm).
19831
UCLA LAW REVIEW
genetic heritage carries a predisposition to low mentality can seri-
ously damage self-respect.427 When the accusation attributes a
permanent and unchangeable inferiority associated with race, the
potential for psychological injury is great.428
Private law protects against damage to feelings in the torts of
outrage and intentional or unintentional infliction of emotional
distress. Our public law also recognizes psychological harms as
evils. Brown v. Board of Education429 turned in large part on the
demonstration that separate but equal schooling would damage
the self-regard and future prospects of black schoolchildren.4 30
Hobson v. Hansen 431 disapproving the use of IQ tests for educa-
tional tracking, mentioned as one ground for disapproval that la-
beling a child as intellectually inferior caused a sense of
worthlessness, fear and despair. The court stated that "evidence
of turmoil [could] be found," and cited "the inability of many Ne-
gro pre-schoolers and first graders to draw themselves as colored,
or other than in animal-like or caricature-like fashion. ' 432 The
court in Larry P. v. Riles made similar findings.433
In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court invalidated antimis-
cegenation legislation designed "to maintain White
Supremacy, '434 in part because its purpose was stigmatic.435 The
harm which justified the Court's ruling in Loving lay not only in
the enforced separation of the races but also in allowing "one in-
group [to enjoy] full normal communal life and [barring] one out-
427. See G. ALLPORT, supra note 403, at 152 (discussing psychological effect of
social oppression). See also M. DEUTSCH, I. KATZ & A. JENSEN, SOCIAL CLASS,
RACE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 175 (1968); Delgado, supra note 319, at
136-37.
428. See K. CLARK, supra note 412, at 63-64. See also Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 49 (1969) ("The peculiar evil of a relative deprivation...
is psychic or moral; it consists of an affront; it is immediately injurious insofar as
resented or taken personally, and consequentially injurious insofar as
demoralizing.").
429. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
430. Id. at 494.
431. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
432. Id. at 482. See also M. DEUTSCH, THE DISADVANTAGED CHILD 106 (1968)
(Black children tend "to be more passive, more fearful, and more dysphoric than the
white.").
433. 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979). In an earlier proceeding, the court noted
that black students scored significantly higher when retested individually by black
psychiatrists, with credit given for non-standard answers that revealed an understand-
ing of the question. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See
also J. MERCER, supra note 408, at 495 (the median score for Chicano children with
an IQ of 70 climbed to 83 when given the test in their own language). The Court in
Riles relied heavily on Mercer's research. 495 F. Supp. at 952, 972-73.
434. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1966). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 1021.
435. See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 425
(1960) (suggesting this interpretation).
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group. .. . from this life and forc[ing it] into an inferior life of its
own. ' 436 The suggestion made by some race intelligence propo-
nents that blacks are inferior to whites at birth falls within the
Court's definition of stigma in both Brown and Loving.
Avoidance of stigma and psychological injury resulting from
discriminatory treatment on the basis of race is a clearly recog-
nized and compelling state interest.437 Moreover, research aimed
at discovering race-based differences in IQ may well contribute to
the weight of psychological injury and the stigma that many mi-
nority persons bear. Such individual injury is more concrete and
focused than the relatively abstract injury to the ideal of equality
discussed earlier. The intelligence and personal worth of every
member of the target group is called into question, and each per-
son is forced to deal with this negative attribution as best he or she
can. Unless the psychological harm likely to result from race-IQ
research can somehow be minimized, prevention of such harm
would probably constitute a compelling state interest.
C. Economic Loss
The sense of inferiority and hopelessness that can result from
being labeled inferior may cause demoralization and "sup-
press[ion of] aspirations that look unattainable when seen with the
restricted vision imposed by a withered self-concept. ' 43 8 A recent
experiment which put blacks and whites of similar aptitudes and
capacities into a competitive situation found that the blacks exhib-
ited defeatism, half-hearted competitiveness, and "high expecta-
tions of failure. ' 439  Also, there is evidence that racial
stigmatization affects parenting practices" 0 among minority group
members and hence reinforces a tradition of failure. 44 1 One study
found that many minority mothers were hypersensitive to ques-
tions of race, accepted whiteness as superior, and harbored nega-
tive feelings about life's chances.442  If self-image affects
achievement, racial labeling, including that which results from
race-IQ studies, may cause economic loss in two ways: the imme-
diate pecuniary loss to the individual victim in the form of dimin-
436. Id.
437. See supra notes 429-30 and accompanying text.
438. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1977).
439. See J. MARTIN & C. FRANKLIN, MINORITY GROUP RELATIONS 43 (1979).
See generally Delgado, supra note 319, at 136-43 (racism instills apathy and defeat-
ism in some of its victims).
440. Delgado, supra note 319, at 138-39 nn.27-28 & 32.
441. See id.
442. See Kiev, Psychiatric Disorders in Minority Groups, in PSYCHOLOGY AND
RACE 416, 420-24 (P. Watson ed. 1973).
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ished life prospects, and the more long-term loss to society
resulting from the decreased productivity of a segment of its
citizenry.
While economic loss of both types, individual and societal,
seems probable, the extent of the loss is difficult to evaluate. Some
persons may feel victimized yet be spurred to try even harder to
succeed. Others may suffer psychological but no pecuniary injury
because they are fortunate enough to find employment in an envi-
ronment devoid of prejudice. Still, the probable economic effect
supplies an additional element of legitimacy to regulatory propos-
als aimed at averting or minimizing the harms of race-IQ re-
search, if only by adding a quantitative measure of state interest in
psychological and emotional welfare.
D. Inhibition of Reproductive Freedom
Further harm that may occur from the results, or possibly
even the conduct, of race-IQ research is inhibition of reproductive
opportunities of the population singled out. The history of race-
based intelligence research reveals that on occasion it has pro-
vided scientific justification for harsh legislation and social poli-
cies aimed at reducing the procreative opportunities of groups
considered genetically inferior.
Early interest in IQ testing developed from the eugenics of
Francis Galton, who believed that science should give to the more
suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing over
the less suitable. 4 3 Once the IQ test was developed, followers of
Galton such as Henry Goddard employed test results to urge re-
duction of immigration from southern and eastern Europe on the
ground that the children of persons from these regions demon-
strated an "inability ... to handle abstractions." 4  Goddard
maintained that 83 percent of Jews were feeble-minded, a "hered-
itary" defect they shared with 87 percent of Russians, 80 percent
of Hungarians and 79 percent of Italians. 4 5 Goddard and his co-
worker Carl Brigham informed Congress and powerful political
supporters of eugenics such as Theodore Roosevelt and Herbert
Hoover446 that American intelligence was declining. Army intelli-
443. See F. GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
24-25 (1883).
444. See Goddard, The Binet Tests in Relation to Immigration, 18 J. PSYCHO-AS-
THENICS 109-10 (Dec. 1913).
445. See H. EYSENCK & L. KAMIN, supra note 20, at 93; Goddard, Mental Tests
and the Immigrant, 2 JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND FAMILY RELATIONS 243-77
(Sept. 1917); Goddard, supra note 444, at 109 ("inability of these immigrants to han-
dle abstractions").
446. See A. CHASE, supra note 406, at 126-27, 277, 326 (Roosevelt believed in
white superiority and supported eugenics. Hoover was active on behalf of eugenics
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gence tests447 proved, according to Brigham, that the influx of "in-
tellectually inferior" Alpine and Mediterranean races together
with "the presence here of the Negro"' "4 8 would cause a deteriora-
tion of American intelligence unless immigration laws were
passed. Moreover, tax savings would accrue if the government
could reduce the large numbers of "inferior racial stock" that had
become wards of the state.449 Thus, in 1924 Congress passed the
Johnson Restriction Act which imposed "national origin quotas"
and reduced the influx of Southern and Eastern Europeans to a
trickle.450 President Calvin Coolidge, signing the law, declared
that "America must be kept American."' 45' Advocates of eugenics
also spearheaded the drive for compulsory sterilization.452 More
than thirty American states followed the lead of Indiana in 1907
in passing eugenics sterilization laws.453 These laws provided for
movement and contributed money while serving as Secretary of State.). See also
Karier, supra note 30, at 342-45.
447. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
448. See C. BRIGHAM, A STUDY OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE 208-10 (1923).
The campaign against American blacks and Mexicans continued and even intensified
during the period of immigration quotas. See L. TERMAN, MEASUREMENT OF INTEL-
LIGENCE 91-92 (1916) (urging that lQs in the 70-80 range were "very, very common
among Spanish-Indian and Mexican families. . . and also among negroes"). Terman
observed:
Their dullness seems to be racial, or at least inherent in the family
stocks from which they come. . . . [T]he whole question of racial dif-
ferences in mental traits will have to be taken up anew. . . .The writer
predicts that when this is done there will be discovered enormously sig-
nificant racial differences in general intelligence, differences which can-
not be wiped out by any scheme of mental culture.
Children of this group should be segregated in special classes ...
They cannot master abstractions, but they can often be made efficient
workers. . . .There is no possibility at present of convincing society
that they should not be allowed to reproduce, although from a eugenic
point of view they constitute a grave problem because of their unusu-
ally prolific breeding.
See also A. CHASE, supra note 406, at 471 ("It is only the catch phrases and the rheto-
ric, and not the concepts or the conclusions, that have changed between Terman...
in 1916 and 1922 and Jensen in 1969."); H. EYSENCK & L. KAMIN, supra note 20, at
92.
449. See H. LAUGHLIN, EUROPE AS AN EMIGRANT-EXPORTING CONTINENT AND
THE UNITED STATES AS AN IMMIGRANT-RECEIVING NATION, HOUSE COMM. ON IM-
MIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, 68th Congress, 1st Sess. 1311 (1924). See gener-
all, Karier, supra note 30, at 348 (eugenics movement opposed immigration of
allegedly inferior stock).
450. See A. CHASE, supra note 406, at 300. (Between 1900 and 1924 the number
of immigrants from central, eastern, and southern European countries was 434,810 a
year. Between 1925 and 1939, under the quotas of the Immigration Act, that number
was reduced to 24,430 per year, a difference of more than six million.)
451. Karier, supra note 30, at 349.
452. A. CHASE, supra note 406, at 349-50.
453. See generally Karier, supra note 30, at 342, .345, 349. (Large corporate
foundations financed by Carnegie and Rockefeller provided money in the campaign
for eugenics and restrictive quotas. Influential donors and supporters included Alex-
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compulsory sterilization of "idiots," "imbeciles," "criminals,"
"epileptics" and "dissolute and degenerate persons, ' 45 4 on the
ground that their undesirable traits were transmitted through the
genes.455 Under California's sterilization law, which permitted
the sterilization of persons deemed "morally and sexually" de-
praved, 6200 sterilizations were performed between 1907 and
1928. Other states passed laws calling for sterilization for chicken
theft, car stealing and prostitution.456 Pro-sterilization sentiment
frequently focused on "anti-social whites"45 7 and low-income
blacks.4 58
Harry Laughlin, drafter of the Model Eugenical Sterilization
law,459 played a critical role in convincing the Supreme Court to
uphold the sterilization of Carrie Buck, an eighteen-year old in-
mate of the Virginia state prison. Laughlin described Buck as a
"feeble-minded daughter of a whore," a member of "the shiftless,
ignorant, worthless class of anti-social whites" and "a potential
parent of socially inadequate offspring. ' 4 6 0 In Buck v. Bell,4 6 1 Jus-
tice Holmes agreed with Laughlin. Noting that "experience has
shown that heredity plays an important part in the transmission of
insanity [and] imbecility," 462 Holmes endorsed eugenic steriliza-
tion in the Court's 8-to-1 decision:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains com-
ander Graham Bell, Mrs. E.H. Harriman, the presidents of Stanford and Harvard
Universities, and Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Warren Harding and Calvin Coo-
lidge.) See also A. CHASE, supra note 406, at 140, 164 (role of Immigration Restric-
tion League, American Coalition of Patriotic Societies).
454. H. EYSENCK & L. KAMIN, supra note 20, at 93. See also A. CHASE, supra
note 406, at 125-26 (many were sterilized against their will for being adjudged feeble-
minded or mentally retarded-defined in most states as having an IQ below 70).
455. H. EYSENCK & L. KAMIN, supra note 20, at 93. See also Karier, supra note
30, at 345. (Eugenics committees on the "Heredity of the Feeble-Minded," "Steriliza-
tion" and "Inheritance of Mental Traits," etc., took the lead in identifying those who
carried "defective germ plasm" and disseminating propaganda in favor of steriliza-
tion laws. For example, Laughlin's "Committee to Study and Report on the Best
Practical Means of Cutting Off the Defective Germ-Plasm in the American Popula-
tion" reported that "society must look upon the germ plasm as belonging to society
and not solely to the individual who carries it." Laughlin estimated that 10 per cent
of the population carried "bad seed" and called for sterilization as a solution. So-
cially deviant behavior, from criminality to prostitution, was associated with intelli-
gence and the nature of one's germ plasm.) See also A. CHASE, supra note 406, at 127.
456. Karier, supra note 30, at 345-46.
457. See infra text accompanying notes 459-6J.
458. See infra text accompanying notes 465-66.
459. A. CHASE, supra note 406, at 313-14.
460. Id.
461. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
462. Id. at 206.
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pulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallo-
pian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.463
Carrie Buck was sterilized.
Although more than 63,000 human beings have been steril-
ized under state laws patterned after Laughlin's model law, 464
many more have been sterilized on the authority of questionable
state and federal administrative action. In a 1974 decision, Relf v.
Weinberger,465 Judge Gerhard Gesell found that "an estimated
100,000 to 150,000 low-income [mainly black] persons have been
sterilized annually under federally funded programs. ' 466 Gesell
concluded that "uncontroverted evidence" demonstrated "that an
indefinite number of poor people have been improperly coerced
into accepting a sterilization operation under the threat that vari-
ous federally supported welfare benefits would be withdrawn un-
less they submitted to irreversible sterilization." 467
Many present-day proponents of race-IQ research share the
same assumptions and urge the same solutions as their predeces-
sors. Jensen believes we should study the "danger that current
welfare policies, unaided by eugenic foresight, could lead to the
genetic enslavement of a substantial segment of our popula-
tion. ' 468 According to Shockley, the reason behind this "retro-
gressive evolution" is that lower IQ mothers have significantly
more children than others, and the proportion of "white genes" is
being reduced in each generation.469 His solution to the problem
of "genetic enslavement" is a public "sterilization Bonus Plan."
This plan would offer a "bonus rate of $1000 for each point below
100 IQ, $30,000 put in trust for a 70 IQ moron of a 20-child poten-
tial and, thus, it might return $250,000 to taxpayers in reduced
463. Id. at 207.
464. Chase, supra note 406, at 16; see also Karier, supra note 30, at 345-46 (be-
tween 1907 and 1928 California sterilized 6200 people who were considered racially
impure or "morally and sexually depraved"; twenty other states had similar laws).
465. 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974).
466. Id. at 1199 (emphasis added).
467. Id. See also Karier, supra note 30, at 365 n.2 1. State authority is still being
used to sterilize people. On Mar. 4, 1971, a bill was introduced into the Illinois Legis-
lature which required mothers who had two or more children while on welfare to be
sterilized before they could draw further support. Now the argument is based upon
the economic cost to society.
468. IQ and Scholastic Achievement, supra note 54, at 95.
469. Interview with W. Shockley, Stanford Daily, Dec. 2, 1970, cited in A. CHASE,
supra note 406, at 483. See also P. GREEN, supra note 409, at 63 (Jensen distorted the
data to reach his conclusion). See also L. KAMIN, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF IQ
(1974) (describes at length the distortion of data by hereditarians); IQ and Scholastic
Achievement, supra note 54, at 316 (supports the superior gene thesis and suggests that
an "admixture of Caucasian genes, even so few as one-eighth, introduce mental struc-




costs of mental retardation care. '470 More recently, Shockley has
been active on behalf of the "Nobel Prize sperm bank," a private
effort to increase the breeding potential of persons of demon-
strated genius.
47'
In 1942, the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma472 di-
rectly addressed the manner in which invidiously selective govern-
ment control over reproductive matters might be exercised. In
Skinner, the Court held invalid a state law requiring the steriliza-
tion of anyone convicted three times for felonies, but exempting
convictions for white-collar crimes such as violation of tax laws or
embezzlement. Recognizing procreation as "fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race," Justice Douglas's opinion
for the Court invoked strict scrutiny to strike down the law on
equal protection grounds.473 The Court also attacked the distinc-
tions made by the law among the different offenses: "Sterilization
of those who have thrice committed grand larceny, with immunity
for those who are embezzlers, is a clear, pointed, unmistakable
discrimination. .. . We have not the slightest basis for inferring
that.. . [discrimination] has any significance in eugenics, nor that
the inheritability of criminal traits follows the neat legal distinc-
tions which the law has marked between those two offenses.
'474
The Court then pinpointed the threat to a pluralistic and demo-
cratic society posed by eugenics and its advocates: "The power to
sterilize, if exercised. . . [i]n evil or reckless hands. . . can cause
races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither
and disappear. ' 475
470. W. Shockley, Letter to National Academy of Sciences, April 16, 1970, cited in
A. CHASE, supra note 406, at 482. See also id. at 510-13 (National Academy of Sci-
ences refused to heed Shockley's request to sponsor an investigation of Negro intelli-
gence; NAS described Shockley's proposals as "based upon such simplistic notions of
race, intelligence and 'human quality' as to be unworthy of serious consideration by a
body of scientists"). See also id. at 481 (letter from I. Michael Lerner of U.C. Berke-
ley: "It is basically vicious to evaluate individuals on the basis of the group to which
they belong.").
471. Comment, Eugenic Artqcial Insemination.- A Curefor Mediocrity? 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1850 (1981) (considering whether a system of artificial insemination that
would use sperm of "genetically superior" donors is consistent with the American
ethic of equality of opportunity and equality of condition).
Schockley's private plan must be distinguished, of course, from his proposals for
governmental action. The private plan can be lauded as a commendable way in
which women who are interested in mating with a high-IQ male may do so. It there-
fore promotes reproductive choice.
472. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
473. Id. at 541-43.
474. Id. at 541-42.
475. Id. at 541. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 1010 (allowing the govern-
ment to exercise centralized discretionary choice with regard to a fundamental right
"will invite prejudiced action, oppressing powerless or despised minorities"). Nota-
bly, Skinner did not overrule Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1974). The Skinner Court
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Race-IQ research has, without question, been associated with
ignoble, even genocidal, ends.476 Equally clearly, the state has a
compelling interest in wishing to avoid any association with such
ends, and to do so may refuse to fund the research or permit it to
be carried out on state campuses or in state facilities. The race-IQ
researcher can counter, of course, that there may, in fact, exist
great differences in intellectual potential among the races and
that, once known, these differences would justify measures to con-
trol the reproduction of races or groups found to be inferior.
These differences, if they exist, can only be shown by scientific
research aimed at discovering them. Skinner, in short, may be
wrong.
In deciding how much weight to afford this interest, it is use-
ful to observe that the danger from limiting reproductive freedom
is likely to arise, if at all, only if the outcome of the relevant re-
search is applied in a particular way. Unlike the harms consid-
ered to this point, genocidal policies seem unlikely to arise merely
because race-IQ research is initiated. In addition, it cannot be
said that these policies would arise immediately and ineluctably
from the new knowledge; society might decide to ignore the re-
sults, or to apply only a mild incentive not to reproduce, which the
target population could ignore. Because of these uncertainties, the
genocidal potential of race-IQ research appears not to give rise to
a compelling state interest.
E. Risk of Violence
A final justification for regulation of race-IQ research is that
the research, or the uses to which it may be put, will lead to vio-
lence. Although apparently no writer has tried to justify state con-
trol on this ground, the argument can easily be made.
477
The recent riots in Florida478 serve as a reminder that group
violence is not confined to our past, but is "a recurring. . . feature
of American political and social history. '479 For many members
found no constitutional defect in sterilization applicable only to "mental defectives"
in state institutions: "[I]t was pointed out that 'so far as the operations enable those
who otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the world, and thus open the
asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached.' Here there is no
such saving feature." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542 (1942) (quoting Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)).
476. Harry Laughlin's Model Eugenical Sterilization Law, see supra notes 459-60
and accompanying text, became law in Nazi Germany in 1933. See also A. CHASE,
supra note 406, at 135.
477. See, e.g., the last paragraph of Justice Marshall's dissent in Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 141 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (race discrimination's potential to
cause a violent response).
478. Miami's New Days of Rage, TIME, Jan. 10, 1983, at 20.
479. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, To
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of this nation's racial minorities, the living conditions largely re-
sponsible for the ghetto uprisings of the 1960's, such as unemploy-
ment, consumer exploitation, inferior education, segregated
housing, and police violence, remain unchanged today.480 Their
understandable resentment may be exacerbated if it becomes
known that social scientists of the majority race are engaged in
research aimed at demonstrating the genetic inferiority of minor-
ity populations. Individual acts of violence may occur even if the
research ultimately demonstrates no difference in IQ among the
races, or proves inconclusive.
The danger of violence is increased if the research does pur-
port to find an IQ difference, large or small, between the majority
and minority races. Governments may use this result to relieve
their budgets of the burden of providing for the poor, or increase
efforts to control the reproductive rates of the minority popula-
tions. School authorities may gear education of certain racial mi-
norities toward rote memorization and away from the acquisition
of conceptual skills. Employers and universities may eliminate or
scale down affirmative action programs. Society as a whole may
lose respect for minority populations and devote less effort to pro-
tecting their rights. The frustrations which breed violence will in-
crease as blacks and other persons of minority race realize that
their prospects are not just holding steady, but are actually
diminishing.4
8'
The prevention of anarchy and violence is, of course, a core
purpose of government, and measures designed to reduce the like-
lihood of civil unrest fall squarely within an area of legitimate
state action.482 The difficulty with using a prevention-of-violence
rationale to support limitations on race-IQ research is that it is
difficult to determine in advance how much, if any, violence is
likely to result if race-IQ research goes forward. The argument
for regulation fits generally into the model of violence suggested
by the " 'Fire' in a crowded theater" model. As the lives of a
group of persons become increasingly threatened, they become
more and more desperate to escape. If only a few doors are open,
ESTABLISH JUSTICE, To INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY 51 (1970). The chart on
page XX shows that outbreaks of group violence have peaked every twenty or thirty
years.
480. R. FOGELSON, VIOLENCE AS PROTEST: A STUDY OF RIOTS AND GHETTOS 22
(1971).
481. Cf. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDER,
supra note 403, at 284 (frustration at denial of equal opportunity one cause of inner-
city violence).




eventually their panic turns them against the society that "walls"
them in.
The analogy is not perfect, however. As the Kerner Commis-
sion found, outbreaks of violence depend on a number of causes
and cannot be predicted with any certainty. 483 Many persons in-
ternalize hatred or assaults on their integrity, while others erupt at
the slightest insult.48 4 Thus, one cannot say for certain that vio-
lence will result from either the research itself or the uses the state
may make of it. Nonetheless, it is likely that inquiry into the pos-
sible genetic inferiority of populations will be met with anger,
frustration, and demoralization.48 5 In considering the social inter-
ests in regulating race-IQ research, courts should take the possibil-
ity of these destructive effects into account, even if they do not rise
to the level of a compelling state interest.
F. Social Disutility of Race-IQ Research
A number of the interests discussed so far provide strong ar-
guments against social sponsorship of race-IQ research and, per-
haps, even against permitting such research to take place under
state auspices. On balance, however, it is uncertain that any single
one of these arguments is compelling, or that they are compelling
in the aggregate. When courts have been unable to decide
whether an individual's first amendment interest outweighs a
competing state interest, they have sometimes resolved the issue
by examining the social utility of the speech or speech-act in
question.
48 6
The strongest utility-based argument that an advocate of
race-IQ research can make is that knowledge of racial differences
is essential in order to develop educational strategies to educate
483. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS,
supra note 403, at 5.
484. P. GREEN, supra note 409, at 53-54.
485. See generally Delgado, supra note 319.
486. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text. Although this Article does
not endorse "ad hoc balancing" in first amendment cases, the authors recognize that
the Court may engage in such nondoctrinal adjudication. See Nimmer, The Right to
Speak From Times to Time.- First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied
to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 942-45 (1968). Ad hoc balancing is susceptible to
the charge that it is unprincipled and unpredictable:
In essence, the balancing doctrine is no doctrine at all but merely a
skeleton structure on which to throw any facts, reasons, or speculations
that may be considered relevant. Not only are there no comparable
units to weigh against each other, but the test is so vague as to yield
virtually any result in any case.




members of racial minorities.487 Although the knowledge of in-
nate intellectual differences might hurt in the short run, the re-
searcher may argue, it is necessary in the long run to make
realistic appraisals of what can and cannot be done.488 This argu-
ment makes it necessary to assess the likelihood that a race-IQ
researcher could prove (or disprove) that such racial differences in
intelligence exist. A number of formidable hurdles lie in the way
of any such demonstration.
Assuming that we do inherit a certain capacity for intelli-
gence, that capacity is not easily measured. Intelligence is an ev-
eryday concept which has no agreed-upon scientific definition.489
Existing psychometric definitions of intelligence lack both the
"logical rigor" and "scientific relevance" that are necessary for a
research result to have the proper predictive scope and the proper
capability of being reproduced in another setting.490 Jensen at-
tempts to avoid this definitional problem by taking an operation-
alist stance that IQ is not intelligence, but is simply what the IQ
tests measure.
49 1
To avoid such circularity, intelligence is most plausibly de-
fined as the ability to adapt and survive in various environ-
ments.492 Adaptability is not easily measured, however, and even
less easily analyzed into genetic and acquired components. Rich-
ard Lewontin and David Layzer point out that for malleable traits
such as intelligence, the environment does not just quantitatively
limit or encourage the phenotype of the genetic trait, as it does for
height.493 The environment determines qualitatively, in interac-
tion with one's genes, how that trait will develop. For instance, in
environment X, A might outscore B on a mental test, while in
environment Y, B might outscore A on the same test.494 Thus
487. See IQ & Scholastic Achievement, supra note 54, at 1-4, 95 (compensatory
education has failed; society must devise new educational strategies).
488. Id.
489. Layzer, Behavioral Science and Society.- The Nature-Nurture Controversy as a
Paradigm, in GENETIC DESTINY 59, 73-75 (E. Tobach & H. Proshansky eds. 1976);
Scarr-Salapatek, Race, Social Class and IQ, in EDUCATING THE DISADVANTAGED 198
(E. Flaman ed. 1973); Garcia, The Logic and Limits o/Mental Testing, 36 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 1172 (1981).
490. Id. See also P. GREEN, supra note 409, at 57 (Jensen's methodology flawed,
use of data "meretricious").
491. A. JENSEN, GENETICS AND EDUCATION 75-76 (1972). Block and Dworkin
argue that operationalism is a "thoroughly discredited doctrine ... even among most
of its former proponents," IQ, Heritability and Inequality, reprinted in THE IQ CON-
TROVERSY, supra note 30, at 416. See C. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCI-
ENCE 88-100 (1966).
492. Layzer, supra note 489, at 66-69.
493. Lewontin, The Analysis of Variance and the Analysis of Causes, reprinted in




even if the environment were completely controlled for a group,
the test results of that group could not be used to make any assess-
ment of its genetic superiority over another group. These difficul-
ties are more than methodological; they constitute serious
conceptual difficulties with any attempt to test the race-IQ hypoth-
esis. Because they call into question the likelihood of any useful
result from race-IQ research, and because that research threatens
a number of distinct harms, a court might well tip the balance in
favor of regulation or prohibition.
V. LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES To STATE
INTERVENTION INTO RESEARCH
As the analysis of research into the area of racially based in-
telligence so far has demonstrated, strong state interests are ar-
rayed against equally strong first amendment interests in allowing
the research to continue. To assess the constitutionality of any
means the state selects to accommodate those interests, it must be
determined whether the state's, action intrudes upon the first
amendment interest more than necessary to avert the evil at which
the remedy is aimed. The "least restrictive alternative" require-
ment insists that even if a governmental interest is substantial and
legitimate it shall not be pursued by "means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more nar-
rowly achieved. '49
5
The least restrictive alternative requirement has been viewed
as embracing two concerns.496 First, the state may not choose a
means for protecting its interests which restricts the liberties of
persons whose exercise of those fundamental rights does not
threaten the state interest.497 Second, as to persons whose exercise
of first amendment rights does threaten the state interest, the state
may not choose a particular means of restricting their freedom of
action when a less intrusive means of averting the harm is avail-
able.498 For example, a state interest in protecting minorities from
495. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also NAACP v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
496. See Spece, A Purposive Analysis of Constitutional Standards of Judicial Review
and a Practical Assessment of the Constitutionality of Regulating Recombinant DNA
Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1340 (1978). See generally Note, The Less Restric-
tive Alternative in Constitutional Adjtudication: An Analysis, a Justilcation, and Some
Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974).
497. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957) (state may not restrict the
access of adults to pornographic literature as a means of protecting children from the
harmful effects of obscenity). See also Ellbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
498. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (a city's legitimate in-
terest in keeping its streets clean did not justify ordinance banning distribution of
handbills on public streets when city could satisfy its interest through ordinance pun-
ishing littering). See also Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943).
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the harm of stigmatization would not support a broad remedy
prohibiting scientists from conducting. research that was unlikely
to produce the harmful results. It also would not support a restric-
tion on the methodology or choice of research that might produce
stigmatizing data where a nonintrusive remedy could be applied
to prevent that harm.
Because the state must choose a remedy which narrowly ad-
dresses the harm threatening its announced state interests, it is es-
sential that courts and legislatures first identify the concerns that
would motivate state intervention into research on racial differ-
ences in intelligence. In one setting, the state might be concerned
with the quality of the research techniques;499 in another, with the
manner in which the research data are obtained.5°° In still an-
other setting, the state might be concerned about the effects of val-
idly conducted research on persons of minority race.50 1 Each of
the concerns calls into play different measures of first amendment
solicitude and requires a response that accommodates the particu-
lar mix of personal and social interests at stake.
Since each situation requires a tailored response, it is impos-
sible to specify a single suitable regulatory mechanism. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to make certain generalizations. Measures
aimed at the time, place, or manner of race-IQ research, designed
to avert an evil that arises from the conduct of the research rather
than its content or the type of knowledge acquired, will normally
be constitutional.5 0 2 The only requirements are that the measures
be reasonable and not excessive. 503 Measures aimed at the con-
tent of the research, by contrast, will need to be justified by a very
strong state interest and be narrowly adapted to promote the spe-
cific interest. 5 4 When the state's regulatory concern is content-
499. See supra notes 101-202 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
prevalence of fraud in contemporary science, see Broad & Wade, Science's Faulty
Fraud Detectors, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Nov. 1982, at 51, which notes that scientists
rarely bother to replicate the results of scientific experiments. This tendency is espe-
cially strong where the fraudulent data are "seductive" in that they fit neatly into the
overall theory or where the data are produced by a leading scientist, as in the Cyril
Burt Case. Id. at 54. It should be noted, however, that the complacency of scientists
is probably minimal in scientific controversies with political implications where close
attention is paid to the methodologies of the competing theories. See generally supra
text accompanying notes 114-19.
500. The research might consist of administering IQ tests to school children, for
example, thus triggering informed consent requirements. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1981). See
supra text accompanying notes 152-58, 304-10.
501. See supra Parts IV B, C, D (psychological and pecuniary harm; loss of repro-
ductive freedom).
502. See supra note 174 (regulatory measures aimed at noncommunicative im-
pact). See also supra notes 357-67 and accompanying text (discussing time, place,
and manner restrictions).
503. See sources cited supra notes 174, 357-67.
504. See supra notes 174-77 (restrictions aimed at communicative content).
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based the preferred constitutional remedy is "more speech. '50 5
When the evil it seeks to avert is independent of content, the state
may provide for "less speech," or speech conducted in a less
troublesome manner.
The following discussion of remedies considers each of the
two types of restriction. Part A discusses remedies aimed at regu-
lating the manner in which race-IQ research is conducted. These
remedies seek to minimize a harm (such as stigma) that the state
believes will arise from the very conduct of the research. Part B
discusses the adequacy of "more speech" remedies that might be
employed to confine a harm (such as erosion of the ideal of equal-
ity) which could follow from knowledge about racial differences
that the research might generate if carried out.
A. Regulation Aimed at Noncommunicative Impact
A number of regulatory proposals have been, or could be,
directed at the noncommunicative impact of race-IQ research.
These include self-imposed moratoria; measures aimed at the tim-
ing of the research; measures aimed at consent or broadening par-
ticipation; and measures aimed at ascertaining the risk of harm.
1. Voluntary moratoria .506 If a group of educational psycholo-
gists or population geneticists were to conclude that race-IQ re-
search ought not be conducted, and were successful in convincing
their colleagues to follow suit, no constitutional problem would
arise. Theoretically, a nonscientist aggrieved at the lack of activ-
ity in the field of race-IQ research could become a race-IQ re-
searcher and decline to join the moratorium. While the lack of
new knowledge generated might seem lamentable to a lay person,
it is implausible to argue that a private citizen has a right to have
others conduct research if they are unwilling to do so.
2. Measures aimed at the timing of the research. A university or
other arm of state government could conclude that the knowledge
that race-IQ research is being conducted might inflame a tense
racial situation and cause an outbreak of violence.50 7 If this belief
is well founded, and not merely a pretext, it would justify a tem-
porary prohibition of any such research, for the duration of the
emergency.
505. See infra notes 521-27 and accompanying text; L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at
602-I1.
506. See supra Part II A(3) (voluntary moratorium on DNA research).
507. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (racial segregation of in-
mates to maintain prison security and discipline constitutional): See also supra notes
93-100 and accompanying text; supra Part IV E (danger of violence); supra Part IlI
C(3)(b) (quality of environment and time, place and manner restrictions).
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A number of those who criticize race-IQ research as "inop-
portune," however, seem to have in mind a much longer delay-
perhaps on the order of 100 years. 50 8 For them, the subject of
race-based differences in intelligence should not be pursued be-
cause society has not reached the point, morally and socially,
where it can absorb the results of the research without pain and
shock.509 Research into such matters may thus justifiably be post-
poned until we have acquired the ability to assimilate the results
without injury.
Our investigation disclosed no case in which a court has ap-
proved such an onerous "time" restriction. It would seem that the
proponent of such a limitation would bear a heavy burden of
proof that it is the only means of avoiding a very severe social
harm. Without such a demonstration, the time restriction would
be unconstitutional as a total prohibition.51 0
Another type of timing regulation was proposed by Professor
Bernard Diamond, who urged that controversial research with
ethnic minority populations be halted until social scientists have
demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the groups under study, that
they are worthy of the group's trust.51" According to Professor
Diamond, the record of majority race social scientists carrying out
research in minority communities is a sorry one; thus it is not un-
reasonable to require a demonstration of good faith on the part of
social scientists before permitting race-IQ research to proceed.
512
As a basis for a voluntary moratorium, or other measure of self-
restraint by social scientists, Diamond's proposal is certainly un-
objectionable. But as a basis for compulsory state interference
with scientific research, it is troublesome. How long would such
an enforced moratorium last? Who would decide when sufficient
trust has been re-established? How would social scientists, short
of carrying out additional research with minority populations,
show that they could be trusted in the conduct of such research?
3. Measures aimed at broadening participation. A number of
"manner" restrictions could be devised, aimed at broadening the
base of participation in race-IQ research. As each restriction
would be directed toward an evil alleged to result not from the
508. See supra note 16 (defining and giving examples of inopportune research);
supra part IV A (research that erodes ideal of equality); supra Part III C(3)(b) (ban on
"inopportune" research as a "time" restriction).
509. See Sinsheimer, supra note 16, at 23-27. (Sinsheimer's view of inopportune
science).
510. See supra notes 357-67 and accompanying text.
511. Diamond, supra note 74, at 32. See also Holman & Dutton, A Casefor Public
Participation in Science Policy Formation and Practice, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1505
(1978).
512. Diamond, supra note 74, at 32-33.
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content of the research but from its noncommunicative impact,
such measures would be constitutional if reasonable and no more
intrusive than necessary. 5
13
a. Individual consent requirements. If the research entails ad-
ministering IQ tests, or reviewing the confidential records of
school children, then a requirement that the researcher obtain the
consent of the test-taker or school child is reasonable and constitu-
tionally valid.514 Indeed, failure to obtain consent might expose
the researcher to civil liability for invasion of privacy. 515 Consent
requirements have traditionally been imposed in research using
human subjects and are a presumptively valid means of protecting
the autonomy and privacy of the subjects. 516
b. Society-wide consent. Consent requirements may be con-
ceived more broadly, however, to include an obligation on the
part of the researcher to consult all, or at least a relevant portion,
of society before commencing work. Several scientific commenta-
tors and at least one organization of scientists and lay persons
have proposed that the scientific agenda, particularly in areas such
as race-IQ research, is so important that society should be given a
voice in deciding which portions of the agenda should be en-
couraged. 517 One writer has observed that certain technological
advances have a "reconstitutive" impact, that is, they alter the
ways in which we see ourselves as human beings. 518 This change
in our self-definition follows immediately upon completion of the
research and affects all who learn about it.5 19 Because race-IQ
research has a potentially large reconstitutive dimension, it could
be urged that researchers in this area have an obligation first to
513. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
514. See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text (consent requirements in
HEW-sponsored research). See also supra notes 304-10 (consent requirements are
content-neutral because they apply to all human subject experimentation).
515. See Schloendorffv. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914) (landmark informed consent case holding that "[E]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body
.... "); J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 540-69 (1972) (reasons
for informed consent doctrine in medical and psychological treatment and human
experimentation; reasons include protection of the subject's decisional autonomy).
516. See supra Part II C(2).
517. See Culliton, Science's Restive Public, 107 DAEDALUS 147 (Spring 1978); 9
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16-19 (Supp. Apr. 1979); Lappe & Martin, The Place of the
Public in the Conduct of Science, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1535 (1978); Nelkin, Threats and
Promises. Negotiating the Control of Research, 107 DAEDALUS 191 (Spring 1978).
This is the general position of Science for the People, an organization of scientists and
lay persons who wish to increase the "public accountability" of science. See generally
Racism in Science, 14 SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE (Mar./April 1982) (symposium
issue).
518. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of In-
strumentalRationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 641-50 (1973).
519. Id. at 640, 649.
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ascertain whether or not society wishes to redefine itself in the
manner portended. These considerations seem to lead to some
form of "town hall" approach; decisions to permit or encourage
research would be made through the political process, rather than
through the individualized decision-making approach mandated
by the first amendment.
Although it is conceivable that a court would uphold such a
broad-scale approval requirement as simply an extension of in-
formed consent, this seems unlikely. For the average member of
society, detached from the actual conduct of race-IQ research, any
"reconstitutive" impact arrives by virtue of the knowledge the re-
search produces, not from the mere conduct of the investigation.
A court would most likely see such a requirement as aimed at
communicative content and find it unconstitutional unless sup-
ported by a state interest of the highest order.
c. Preliminary ascertainment of risk. A final "less speech" ap-
proach would require the researcher first to investigate, in a pilot
study, the extent of harm the research poses to individuals and
groups. Once this were ascertained, the researcher could seek ap-
proval for a more broad-based study. Some Institutional Review
Boards are apparently applying such a two-step approval proce-
dure in connection with research where the degree of risk is ini-
tially unknown. 520 A pilot-study requirement is relatively
unintrusive, of finite duration, and has a certain common-sense
appeal, although it can be argued that it wastes valuable re-
sources. If applied by an institution in the case of race-IQ re-
search, we believe it would be constitutional.
B. Measures Aimed at the Content of Race-IQ Research
Under the first amendment, the preferred remedy for com-
munications with a harmful content is the competition of oppos-
ing views. "More speech" can expose the fallacies of the harmful
speech, educate the listener, and otherwise avert the evils that may
follow from the harmful speech. 52' This remedy is constitution-
ally preferable to state regulation of speech for a number of rea-
sons. Providing more information to the public furthers the first
520. Interview with Brigitta Walton, UCLA Human Subjects Protection Commit-
tee (Feb. 11, 1983) (on file at UCLA Law Review).
521. Linmark Assocs. v. WiUingboro, 431 U.S. 885, 897 (1977); Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927), overruled, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 449 (1969),
("If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert
the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence") (Brandeis, J., concurring). Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418
U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (the ability of public figures and public officials to respond in the
public forum to defamatory statements is a factor in according them a lesser degree of
legal protection than private individuals).
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amendment function of encouraging self-government.5 22 By al-
lowing the free exchange of ideas the government refrains from
making ultimate judgments, thereby ensuring that the public's
ability to make decisions is not undermined by governmental pa-
ternalism.5 23 Finally, the researcher's constitutional interest in
continuing the investigation is left undisturbed. Thus, where the
state's concern arises because of the content of a scientist's re-
search, encouraging speech, rather than regulating it, generally
will be the preferred remedy.
Whether "more speech" will be the appropriate remedy in
any particular case is determined by the circumstances under
which the speech occurs.524 Considerations such as the persua-
siveness or purpose of the speech usually are not considered rele-
vant to determining whether additional speech is the appropriate
remedy. For example, scientists' influence over the lay public be-
cause of their training and position should not justify a more in-
trusive remedy than one which would be permitted in the case of
nonscientists. The Court has announced on several occasions that
"the concept that government may restrict the speech of some ele-
ments of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... -525 In First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 26 for example, the Court
struck down a Massachusetts law preventing corporations from
making expenditures for the purpose of influencing referendum
elections. The Court held that without a showing by the state that
corporations posed an imminent threat of dominating elections,
the first amendment interest in allowing the free flow of speech
could not support the restriction, even though the corporation
might enjoy more wealth and power than the average
noncorporate citizen.5 27
Similarly, the state is not justified in regulating a particular
course of scientific research because it is conducted for the pur-
pose of affecting society when more research to counter the scien-
tists' conclusions is an available alternative. In Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 5 28 for example, the Supreme Court vacated
an injunction restraining an organization from distributing leaflets
522. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964). See also
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 255.
523. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978).
524. See L. TRIBE, supra note 174, at 603-06; cases cited infra notes 525-29.
525. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
526. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
527. Id. at 788-92.
528. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
19831
UCLA LAW REVIEW
criticizing the respondent for his business practices. The Court
observed that "[pletitioners plainly intended to influence respon-
dent's conduct by their activities. 5 29 This intent did not, how-
ever, remove petitioner's activities from first amendment
protection. Scientists may similarly intend to have an effect on
public policy with their research, but this intention should not jus-
tify state application of a more restrictive remedy than allowing
competition with other researchers' ideas.
While the persuasiveness and the purpose of a scientist's re-
search will not affect the appropriateness of "more speech" as a
remedy, a restrictive remedy may be sought where discussion
would be ineffective in preventing the threat to the state's interest.
Speech is effective where there is "time to expose through discus-
sion the falsehood and fallacies, [and] to avert the evil by the
processes of education." 530 Consequently, where time allows, the
remedy to be applied is "more speech, not enforced silence."' 53'
Only where there is the threat of an imminent danger and insuffi-
cient time for discussion, may the state intrude to prevent the
threatened harm.5 32 For example, speech has been held to be an
ineffective remedy in cases where pressure may be exerted on a
party without opportunity to have a competing influence counter
the initial pressure, 533 or where the means of communication is
such that the access of opposing speech to the medium is inher-
ently restricted.5 34 In such circumstances, the opportunity for
remedying the harms by further speech is absent and the state
may validly use a more intrusive form of control.
Scientific speech does raise concerns about the ability of more
speech to remedy the harms produced by new ideas. In the cases
where more speech has been viewed by the Court as an effective
remedy it has been assumed that competing ideas exist, or are ca-
pable of being generated, which can oppose the speech with harm-
ful content.5 35 Science, however, may be one area of dispute
529. Id. at 419.
530. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
531. Id.
532. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (state may intervene in speech where "advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action"). See generally supra Part III C(3)(a) (standard of review for group libel
and group vilification statutes).
533. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978).
534. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
535. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) ("[Tlhat the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out.") (Holmes, J., dissenting). See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1974) ("However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not
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where that assumption is incorrect. To the lay person, the formi-
dable consensus of scientific opinion in most matters may make
the idea of dissent seem futile. In large part, of course, this is due
to the circumstance that scientific knowledge is not primarily a
product of opinion or ideology, but a public explanation, gener-
ally accessible, and presumably subject to renewed tests of verifi-
cation. 536 Once a scientific truth is established, that truth will be
accepted by virtually all who accept the authority of science. 537
The constitutional preference for more speech may, therefore, be
mistaken in the case of science since science may progress to a
point where no speech can effectively compete with a harmful sci-
entific theory once it is accepted as true. Under such conditions a
restriction on research may be the only alternative to the ineffec-
tive competition of ideas.5 38 Whether the Constitution's reliance
on speech as a remedy is mistaken will be considered in the fol-
lowing examination of the process by which scientific disputes are
resolved.
on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."). See
also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S: 88, 104-05 (1940).
The extent to which the first amendment is viewed as promoting self-government
will also indicate the importance of the existence of alternative ideas for first amend-
ment analysis. The Court has indicated an acceptance of Professor Meiklejohn's view
that the first amendment exists to encourage self-government by precluding govern-
ment from undermining the public's ability to make ultimate judgments. First Nat'l
Bank, 435 U.S. at 791 n.31 (referring to Meiklejohn, supra note 522, for support).
Scientific research may likewise undercut the public's capacity for self-government by
restricting the choices available for public consideration and by allowing scientists to
make the ultimate judgments. Thus, it has been argued that first amendment consid-
erations might militate in favor of public intervention into research decisions. See
MacRae, Science and the Formation of Policy in a Democracy, II MINERVA 228 (Apr.
1973).
536. D. BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 381-83 (1976).
537. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 159 (1970). See
also M. POLANYI, SCIENCE, FAITH AND SOCIETY 73 (1946).
538. Ultimately, it is the scientific component of research producing stigmatizing
data that must provide a justification for state regulation of the research. The harm
which results from the stigmatization of minority groups is, of course, the concern
which motivated states to enact "group libel" laws, such as the one which the
Supreme Court upheld in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). See supra text
accompanying notes 320-67. However, although it has never been explicitly over-
ruled, Beauharnais has been criticized and.questioned by subsequent decisions. See
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 82 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969). Consequently, the continuing vitality of the Beau-
harnais holding is doubtful. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663
F.2d 686, 694 n.7 (6th Cir. 1981). But see Note, Group Vi~fcation Reconsidered, 89
YALE L.J. 308 (1979). Thus, in the area of group libel the appropriate remedy will be
further speech to counter the libel. See generally New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 288-92 (1964). If an exception is to be made for the case of research which
leads to the harms of group stigmatization, that exception must be justified on the
basis of some consideration unique to science.
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1. How complex scient!fic disputes are resolved. Science owes
much of its prestige and authority to the presumed empirical bases
that allow it to make scientific truths generally known, verifiable,
and therefore trustworthy. 39 In this respect, scientific statements
seem to differ from those of politics and religion, whose assertions
are statements of value and, consequently, not subject to any ob-
jective verification. 540 Despite science's empirical foundation,
complex scientific issues are rarely resolved by appeals to testable
data. The history of science contains many instances in which
theories were accepted despite the existence of contradictory em-
pirical observations,541 and in which propositions were rejected
even though they had an arguable basis in experimental proof.542
For instance, in the recent controversies over nuclear power and
the fluoridation of water supplies, one commentator has noted
that various experts chose one side of the controversy over the
other when the data were ambiguous, for such reasons as the de-
sire of an expert to aid a friend or oppose an enemy, or simply
because the expert was accustomed to one position and did not
desire to have it questioned. 543
The introduction of scientists' values may serve a legitimate
539. D. BELL, supra note 536, at 382-83.
540. This assumed dichotomy between scientific facts and societal values underlies
several proposals to resolve scientific controversies. See Kantrowitz, The Science
Court Experiment, 13 TRIAL 48 (1977). See also Weinberg, The "Science Court" Con-
troversy. Are Our Courts andAgencies Adequate to Resolve New and Complex Issues?,
33 RECORD 8, 11 (1978). However, such proposals have been criticized on the ground
that the belief that controversies can be separated clearly into political and scientific
components is based on an overly simplistic model of the relationship between sci-
ence and society. See generally Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA
209-22 (1972); Matheny & Williams, Scientfic Disputes and Adversary Procedures in
Policymaking, 3 LAW & POL'Y Q. 360 (1981); infra notes 541-56 and accompanying
text (scientific disputes often irreducibly valuative).
541. For example, the periodic system of elements is formally contradicted by the
fact that argon, potassium, tellurium and iodine fit into the periodic table only in a
sequence of decreasing, instead of increasing, atomic weights. Similarly, the quantum
theory of light was first proposed by Einstein, and upheld subsequently for twenty
years, in spite of its being in sharp conflict with the evidence of optical diffraction.
Neither system has been, abandoned despite the observational anomalies. M. PO-
LANYI, supra note 537, at 29.
542. A classic instance of this is provided by the "Velikovsky controversy." In his
book Worlds in Collision, Immanuel Velikovsky purported to explain the descriptions
of miraculous celestial occurrences found in the Old Testament of the Bible by actual
shifts in the orbits of the planets. As part of this theory, Velikovsky predicted that the
surface of Venus would be hot and its clouds heavy with hydrocarbons. The sugges-
tion that planets could actually leave their orbital positions and collide with one an-
other was summarily rejected by the scieatific community, and the confirmation of
Velikovsky's predictions by Mariner II did not induce scientists to reassess Velikov-
sky's theory; the empirical corroboration of Velikovsky's predictions was generally
viewed as coincidental. Polanyi, The Growth of Science in Society, 5 MINERVA 533,
535-36 (Summer 1967).
543. See Mazur, Disputes Between Experts, 11 MINERVA 243, 243-62 (1973).
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and important purpose. Crises in scientific thought generally oc-
cur, according to Thomas Kuhn, when the prevailing conceptual
structure shared by scientists fails to explain anomalous data.
544
Normally, the shared conceptual structure, or "paradigm," defines
the standards by which scientists determine what problems and
solutions are legitimately within the scope of their research en-
deavors.545 However, when the paradigm fails significantly to ex-
plain anomalous data, its scientific legitimacy may be questioned
and a new paradigm may emerge which, by reconciling the ob-
served data, becomes accepted by the scientific community as the
new paradigm.546 It was in this way, for example, that the Coper-
nican astronomical system, which placed the sun at the center of
the solar system, emerged after a long period of failure by Ptol-
emy's earth-centered astronomical model accurately to conform to
observed data of planetary position.
547
The acceptance of a new paradigm by the scientific commu-
nity is usually not immediate.548 Resistance may come from older
scientists who are comfortable with the traditional paradigm, or
from those who are not convinced by the evidence advanced in
support of the new paradigm. 549 Moreover, when a new paradigm
544. T. KUHN, supra note 537, at 66-75. Kuhn's model represents the accepted
viewpoint of the way in which science progresses. For a discussion of competing
models, see Ferguson, Scientfic and Technological Expression. A Problem in First
Amendment Theory, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 539 n.99 (1981).
545. T. KUHN, supra note 537, at 35-51. Paradigms provide scientists with a
means of learning the theory, methods and standards which are employed by scien-
tists practicing in the field. Thus, a shift in a paradigm results in corresponding
change in the "criteria determining the legitimacy both of problems and of proposed
solution." Id. at 109.
546. Id. at 152-54.
547. Id. at 68.
548. Kuhn writes:
Copernicanism made few converts for almost a century after Co-
pernicus' death. Newton's work was not generally accepted, particu-
larly on the Continent, for more than half a century after the Principia
appeared. Priestley never accepted the oxygen theory, nor Lord Kelvin
the electromagnetic theory, and so on.
Id. at 150-51.
549. Id. at 152. This polarization can reach the point where reasoned discussion
breaks down, to be replaced by advocacy. At that point, notes Michael Polanyi:
The less two propositions have fundamentally in common the more the
argument between them will lose its discursive character and become
an attempt at mutually converting each other from one set of grounds
to another, in which the contestants will have to rely on the general
impression of rationality and spiritual worth which they can make on
one another. They will try to expose the general poverty of their oppo-
nent's position and to stimulate interest for their own richer perspective;
trusting that once an opponent has caught a glimpse of these, he cannot
fail but to sense a new mental satisfaction, which will attract him fur-
ther and finally draw him over to its grounds.
M. POLANYI, supra note 537, at 66-67. A controversy which begins as a technical
dispute (like the race-IQ debate) can thus take on the aspects of a religious or political
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is proposed, it is usually a crude explanation of the observable
data and so is easily rejected by those who favor the older para-
digm.550 Additionally, even in the area of crisis, the relative prob-
lem-solving ability of the new paradigm may be little better than
that of the traditional paradigm. 55' Thus, scientific controversy
may reach a point where scientists choose among equally plausi-
ble competing explanations. In resolving the choice between
equally plausible paradigms, the personal values of the individual
scientist play an important role. Individual scientists may choose
one paradigm over another because of aesthetic or moral appeal,
and despite the existence of opposing technical arguments.
552
When it is seen that the development of a new scientific view
or theory contains much scope for valuation, argument, and con-
version, the case for a "more speech" approach strengthens.5
5 3
Scientific disputes over complex issues such as race-IQ connec-
tions resemble ordinary disputes over politics, economics, and so-
cial theory, where a marketplace-of-ideas model is applied.
554
There seems little danger that a small group of scientists will suc-
conflict. Id. See also T. KUHN, supra note 537, at 158-59; Polanyi, supra note 542, at
540.
550. T. KUHN, supra note 537, at 155-56.
551. Additionally, Kuhn notes, outside the area of crisis the new paradigm may
not be able to replace the older theory. See id. at 156-58.
552. Id. at 158. Kuhn observes:
Individual scientists embrace a new paradigm for all sorts of reasons
and usually for several at once. Some of these reasons-for example,
the sun worship that helped make Kepler a Copernican-lie outside the
apparent sphere of science entirely. Others must depend upon idiosyn-
cracies of autobiography and personality. Even the nationality or the
prior reputation of the innovator and his teachers can sometimes play a
significant role.
Id. at 152-53 (footnotes omitted).
553. This isnot to say that a theory that certain minority groups are intellectually
inferior to others will not eventually be accepted by the scientific community and
ultimately the public. The first amendment does not presume that wisdom will al-
ways prevail, only that people will have a choice in determining what point of view
will inform government. See Meiklejohn, supra note 522, at 263. See also Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If in the long run the
beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the domi-
nant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be
given their chance and have their way."). But see A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT 72 (1975). As the examination of the process by which scientific controver-
sies are resolved has demonstrated, such a choice is available as long as scientists
legitimately consider values which they share with the broader society before ac-
cepting the validity of a new paradigm. Thus, during the long period of a scientific
controversy theories may effectively compete for allegiance in the same manner, and
subject to the same values, as political speech.
554. The resemblance of scientific coatroversies to political disputes has inspired
Kuhn to compare the resolution of scientific controversies to "revolutions." As Kuhn
observes, once a scientific community is split into competing camps over the disagree-
ment of competing paradigms, the choice "can never be unequivocally settled by logic
and experiment alone." T. KUHN, supra note 537, at 93-94.
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ceed in capturing the notion of innate racial differences in intelli-
gence and in forcing their views on the rest of the scientific
community. The current controversy that rages in scientific circles
over race-IQ research is evidence that this is, in fact, not occur-
ring. Since the danger of establishing a harmful, stigmatizing
view, resistant to subsequent change, seems remote, the state's in-
terest may best be served by encouraging, rather than restricting,
speech.
2. "More science" remedies for content-based harms. Since the
scientific process is amenable to a "more science" approach to
content-based harms, this is the constitutionally preferred remedy.
But a possible difficulty for this approach is that encouragement of
more science may do little to avert misunderstanding on the part
of the lay public. While scientists resolve scientific disputes gener-
ally after a long period of crisis, the lay public is usually not ap-
prised of the details of the debate, and so may be susceptible to
the view that a theory has been accepted as truth by the scientific
community when in actuality the scientific community is still un-
decided 5 5 Lay persons may, for example, read exaggerated re-
ports of disputed scientific findings in the popular press and accept
those results as conclusive. 556 In order to prevent the stigmatiza-
tion of minority groups during a period when the appropriate sci-
entific authorities are undecided, a state may properly act to
encourage communication between scientists and the public.
557
555. For example, the public was willing to accept Velikovsky's controversial the-
ory despite the vehement opposition of the scientific community. Polanyi, supra note
542, at 534-35; see also Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209,
221-22 (1972). Additionally, the popular derivation of "Social Darwinism" from
Charles Darwin's theory of evolution was based in large part on a mistaken interpre-
tation of that scientific theory. See Flew, From Is to Ought, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY
DEBATE 142, 145-46 (A. Caplan ed. 1978).
556. See Weinberg, A Useful Institution of the Republic of Science, 10 MINERVA
439-40 (1972). See also Mazur, supra note 543, at 259.
557. A final scenario containing elements of both content-based and impact-based
analysis, seems possible, but will be explored only superficially here since no reported
decision seems to have considered it. Consider the following:
Suppose it appeared that race-IQ research presented certain content-based harms
(stigma, erosion of the ideal of equality) and that "more research" might moderate
those harms. According to conventional analysis, the preferred constitutional remedy
would be more speech, and no restriction on the research would be permissible. But
suppose that further research itself created a danger of additional harms of some sort,
arising either from the conduct of the additional research or the knowledge it is likely
to discover.
Should a court in this hypothetical situation conclude that the "more speech"
remedy is inapt? Or should it find that the further harm should be countered by
further speech? Race-IQ research seems to present this type of tangle and makes
obvious the risk of an infinite regress in such a situation. Jeffry Blum has pointed out
that:
Debating the importance of genetic and environmental causes of racial
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The government could encourage scientists to establish pub-
lic-information committees whose purpose would be to inform the
citizenry of the status of the debate about controversial matters.55 8
These committees would operate like the "referees" who exercise
a similar function in the publication of scientific papers in profes-
sional journals. 559 There is, of course, the possibility that any such
committee might inject its own biases and thus undermine its dia-
lectic-facilitating function.560 Some of these dangers could be
avoided by providing for representation of opposing points of
view on such groups, which would thus function in some ways like
the proposed "science court."' 561 The committees could be estab-
IQ score differences has the side effect of propagating the belief that
blacks are indeed less intelligent that whites. Regardless of the debate's
outcome or lack of outcome, the importance of blacks' lower IQ scores
is highlighted and exaggerated in the public's mind.
J. BLUM, supra note 406, at 131; Chomsky, The Fallacy of Richard Herrnstein's IQ, in
THE IQ CONTROVERSY, supra note 30, at 294-95 (posing case of psychologist in
Hitler's Germany who proposes to study possibility that Jews have genetically deter-
mined tendency to usury. "[E]ven opening this question... would provide ammuni-
tion for Goebbels and Rosenberg and their henchmen . . . . Of course scientific
curiosity should be encouraged . . . but it is not an absolute value.").
The decade since the publication of Jensen's article provides some evidence that
free and open discussion of race-IQ theories does not "clear the air" and promote a
fuller, freer debate on public issues. The debate remains polarized; in the meantime,
programs such as affirmative action in education and employment, school lunches for
the indigent, and medical insurance have been cut back or eliminated---changes that
impact heavily and disproportionately on minority populations. See The Urban In-
stitute, THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT (1982) (summarizing social changes that occurred
during first two years of Reagan's administration). The promotion of race-IQ theories
may well have contributed to a climate in which neglect of the legitimate needs of
minority persons is possible. If so, it will be scant comfort to the victims of such a
climate that the correct version of the facts may emerge in the distant future. See
Block & Dworkin, IQ, Heritability, and Inequality, in THE IQ CONTROVERSY, supra
note 30, at 514; Scarr-Salapatek, The Unknown of the IQ Equation, in THE IQ CON-
TROVERSY, supra note 30, at 128 (promulgation of race-IQ theories as harmful as
shouting "Fire" in a crowded theater).
If blacks and other minority groups some day obtain sufficient influence among
mental testers to defend their own interests, or if they develop adequate numbers of
minority social scientists capable of challenging the methodology and assumptions of
current race-IQ researchers, then the scenario referred to above presumably would
not arise. Cf. Lewontin, Race and Intelligence, in THE IQ CONTROVERSY, supra note
30, at 78-92.
558. Mazur, supra note 543, at 261; T. KUHN, supra note 537.
559. D. BELL, supra note 536; Mazur, supra note 543; M. POLANYI, supra note 537,
at 47; Weinberg, supra note 556.
560. D. BELL, supra note 536, at 401-02; Doty, Can Investigations Improve Scien-
tiflcAdvice? The Case oftheABM, 10 MINERVA 280, 293-94 (1972). The possibility
that such a bias might go undetected is strengthened by the policy of high-level scien-
tific advisory committees to screen out potentially dissenting members so that the
appearance of objectivity of the group will not be undercut.
561. See Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment, 13 TRIAL 48, 49 (1977). See
also Matheny & Williams, Scienqfic Disputes andAdversary Procedures in Policy Mak-
ing, 3 LAW & POL'Y Q. 341, 360-61 (1981).
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lished by Congress, or by individual research institutions. Be-
cause such an approach can effectively counter the danger of the
public's premature acceptance of a scientific theory, "more
speech" would seem an adequate remedy for harms associated
with the content of race-IQ research.
CONCLUSION
The debate about race-IQ research places in tension two
deeply held values, equality and freedom of inquiry. The former
is essential to our self-image as a people concerned with the dig-
nity and worth of all persons; the latter, to our most vital mecha-
nisms of self-government. Opponents of race-IQ research argue
that it is so harmful that society should not permit it-perhaps
should forbid it entirely. Its supporters urge that the research go
unregulated, at least until a high probability of grave harm is con-
vincingly shown. The outcome of the debate will convey an im-
portant statement about the way we, as a society, choose to lead
our lives together.
This Article surveyed the arguments for protecting race-IQ
research, as well as those that support regulation. Powerful cases
can be made for each. We concluded that regulation of genuinely
scientific race-IQ research would be constitutional if narrowly
aimed at those specific social harms that may arise immediately
and demonstrably from the very act of research: stigma, psycho-
logical injury, and the risk of violence. How compelling these in-
terests may be is far from certain, however; in a close case a court
might resolve the doubt by assessing the social utility or disutility
of the science in question.
Much more problematic are prohibitions aimed at abating
the evils--erosion of the ideal of equality; pressures to limit the
reproductive rate of minority groups-that result from the content
of the research or the knowledge it may bring to light. Our survey
of arguments for intervention and review of the applicable case
law cast doubt on the ability of society to regulate race-IQ re-
search for these reasons. With respect to these content-based con-
cerns, "more science" may be the only remedy, just as "more
speech" is the constitutionally preferred remedy in situations
where a responsive communication may cancel the evil of an of-
fending message.
In any event, casting the debate in these terms seems a fruit-
ful way to begin.
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